Reclaiming Public Ground: The Right to Peaceful Assembly
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.00261 |
| Author | Gina Clayton |
| Published date | 01 March 2000 |
| Date | 01 March 2000 |
CASES
Reclaiming Public Ground: The Right to Peaceful
Assembly
Gina Clayton*
and remarkable for a number of reasons. The endorsement of the right to peaceful
assembly on the highway, giving a victory to the protesters, Margaret Jones and
Richard Lloyd, is an important vindication of a fundamental civil liberty. The
judgment also gives substance to the notion of a public right exercised in a public
place. In the age of privatisation of public space and in a legal culture dominated
by private rights this assertion of the public domain is particularly welcome.
Finally, the judgment demonstrates how practical effect may be given to a
fundamental right and makes a stand for credibility and relevance in the law.
Background
The case arose from a demonstration which took place on the grass verge between
Stonehenge and the A344, commemorating the Battle of the Beanfield ten years
on, and urging the re-opening of Stonehenge. The protesters’ banners bore the
words ‘Free Stonehenge’ and ‘Never again’. There was no disturbance or violence
at the demonstration. In fact the Crown Court judge, who allowed the first appeal
against conviction, commented favourably on the peaceful conduct of the protest
and the cordial relations between police and protesters. Nevertheless, the
appellants were arrested and charged with taking part in a trespassory assembly
contrary to section 14B of the Public Order Act 1986.
Trespassory assembly under the Public Order Act 1986
Section 14A of the Public Order Act 1986 permits a local authority to issue an
order banning trespassory assemblies, on the application of the Chief Constable,
when certain grounds are made out. Such a ban was in force at Stonehenge at the
time of the demonstration. The offence under section 14B is committed when an
assembly is held during the time and at a place covered by the ban
(a) on land to which the public has no right of access or only a limited right of access, and
(b) .. . in prohibited circumstances, that is to say, without the permission of the occupier of
land or so as to exceed the limits of any permission of his or the limits of the public’s right of
access.1(Emphasis added)
While the ownership of the verge was never conclusively proved, it was accepted
that it formed part of the highway. The appellants could only be guilty of the
offence if their use of the verge exceeded the use for which the highway is
ßThe Modern Law Review Limited 2000 (MLR 63:2, March). Published by Blackwell Publishers,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
252
* Department of Law, University of Huddersfield.
1 Public Order Act 1986, s 14A(5).
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