Reed v The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Mr Robert Jay |
| Judgment Date | 01 March 2013 |
| Neutral Citation | [2013] EWHC 787 (Admin) |
| Date | 01 March 2013 |
| Court | Queen's Bench Division (Administrative Court) |
| Docket Number | CO/6493/2012 |
[2013] EWHC 787 (Admin)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
THE ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2A 2LL
Mr Robert Jay QC
(sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge)
CO/6493/2012
Mr M Rudd (instructed by FBC Manby Bowdler LLP Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Claimant
Mr P Greatorex (instructed by the Treasury Solicitors) appeared on behalf of the Defendant
THE DEPUTY JUDGE: On 24 May, 2012, the first respondent's planning inspector dismissed four appeals brought by the appellant, Mr George Reed, against the second respondent local planning authority's four enforcement notices, dated respectively: 4 April 2011 (notices A to C) and 12 October 2011 (notice D).
The appellant seeks permission to appeal to this court under section 289 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended, against the first respondent inspector's decisions on notices A, B and D. Pursuant to the order of His Honour Judge Anthony Thornton QC given on 14 November 2012, a rolled up hearing was ordered for today.
The planning history
The site in question is situated Riverside, Mill Lane, Sandhurst, Berkshire GU47 HAW, and the part being enforced against is shown edged red on the plan at page 43 of the bundle. It was explained to me by Mr Rudd that the red marking is not coextensive with the whole of the appellant's land, but nothing turns on this.
In 1964, planning permission was granted for the construction of a Dutch barn. In 1967, planning permission was granted for the provision of an agricultural storage barn. In 2000, a certificate of lawful use was granted for two stable blocks. Finally, in September 2007, under LPA reference 06/00524/FUL planning permission was granted on appeal for a change of use of part of the subject land for the siting of one caravan for one gypsy family, subject to conditions.
This planning permission is not in the bundle, but I understand that it includes conditions as to restricting occupancy to the appellant and his immediate family and as to the location of one static caravan. Page 62 of the bundle shows the correct location as caravan 1.
The appellant, Mr George Reed, has lived at the site with his wife Scarlet, since the planning permission was granted in 2007. As at January 2012, the Reeds had a son, Joseph, who was then aged 3, and a baby girl was due in March 2012, and I understand that she was born during the course of the inquiry.
Mr Reed earns a living trading horses: see paragraph 6 of his witness statement at page 162. This entails travelling to horse fairs around the country in his touring caravan. There are a number of horses at the site at any time. Since 2010 or thereabouts, Mr Reed's cousin, Nathan Hume, has also been living at the site in a separate static caravan. He had mental health problems, but according to Mr Reed's evidence, his presence at the site is valuable because Nathan is able to look after the horses whilst the appellant is on the road.
Also in 2010, the appellant sought to relocate and replace the static mobile home on the land with a larger mobile home to accommodate his growing family. The larger size of the new home is irrelevant for planning purposes, but its location is.
It is accepted that the new mobile home is not in the position stipulated in the conditions to the 2007 planning permission. But at one stage in the proceedings, there was an issue as to the extent of the deviation. According at least to my interpretation of paragraph 13 of the appellant's skeleton argument, the new home, "remained almost entirely within the boundaries of that permission."
However, this contention is both inconsistent with the appellant's fourth ground of challenge and the first respondent's skeleton argument, and I have looked into the matter further. The upshot is that the onlyb correct location for the mobile home within the conditions to the 2007 planning permission is as designated by "caravan 1" on the enforcement notice plan, at page 62.
A planning application for the new location was made in February 2011 and refused on 13 April 2011. On 4 April 2011, three enforcement notices were served by the local planning authority alleging as follows: first notice A, which is pages 42 to 49 alleging at paragraph 3, page 42 of the bundle:
"Without planning permission, change of use of the land from agriculture to the use for the stationing of 2 static mobile homes, touring caravans for residential use, 1 storage container and 1 mobile utility plot."
The plan at page 43 of the bundle shows the entirety of the appellant's land as edged in red. The appellant's current mobile home is the larger entity coloured mauve on the plan. Mr Hume's is a smaller one, also covered mauve. The plan also shows a utility block and storage container, said to be unpermitted development.
Secondly, notice B, which is pages 50 to 55, alleging at paragraph 3:
"Without planning permission:
(i) laying of hardstanding.
(ii) the installation of three lampposts.
(iii) the installation of a septic tank."
The plan at page 51 has the same red edging but we do not see the mobile homes, the utility block and the storage container, since these are not relevant to the breach of planning control being enforced against.
Thirdly, notice C, which relates to the barn. This is not in the bundle because it is not a subject of the section 289 appeal.
On 12 October 2011, a fourth enforcement notice, notice D, pages 56 to 62 of the bundle, was served, alleging:
"Without planning permission, the erection of a 2 metre high close boarded fence."
This is shown on a different plan, at page 62. Looking carefully at this plan, we can see the following: first the site boundary, as it was described, edged in red. As I have said, that is not quite right, since, as Mr Rudd has told me, the site boundary is slightly bigger than that, but nothing turns on it.
Secondly, the parameters of planning permission 06/00524/FUL granted on 28 September 2007, and the original location of the mobile home, marked on the plan as caravan 1. The parameters of the planning permission granted in 2007 are shown marked by the dotted red line.
Caravan 3, the new mobile home, extends slightly beyond the parameters of this planning permission but, in any event, caravan 3 should be where caravan 1 is. Thirdly, the plan shows the parameters of enforcement notices A and B, which are coextensive with "the site boundary".
Fourthly: "the approximate position of the close boarded fence enclosing the site". There are two points to be made about this. First, the fence does not enclose the entirety of the site boundary; secondly, it encloses the hardstanding on which caravan 3 is now situated. Unsurprisingly, this includes the area which was the subject of the unsuccessful application for planning permission, made in February 2011, and refused in April of that year. In other words, the fence is designed to enclose and protect the appellant's new home.
The plan at page 62 also shows the two locations of the buildings which are the subject of the development consent certificate granted in 2000.
The smaller building is still there and is lawful. It appears on page 62 between the area designated as unit A and unit B and caravan 2. There is also unit A and unit B, which is where the second set of stables originally were, but it now appears as a barn which is unauthorised and was the subject of notice C. The barn divides into two parts: unit A, which is used for car repairs, and unit B for stables, but I emphasise that all of it is unlawful and I have been told that, in any event, it has been removed.
The appeal before the first respondent's inspector: Mr Clive Kirkbride
The inquiry opened on 7 January 2012 and closed on 1 March 2012, sitting for a total of six days. There was a site visit which took place on the first day of the inquiry.
The appellant's main witness was Mr Matthew Green of Green Planning Solutions LLP. His proof of evidence starts at page 83. The appeal proceeded under various subparagraphs to section 174 subsection 2 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 as amended, as more fully set out in the inspector's decision, and summarised in paragraph 18 of the appellant's skeleton argument before me.
The inspector's decision was given on 24 May 2012 and I have read it with care.
The appeal to this court under section 289
The appellant advances four grounds of appeal, at page 6 of 17 of his skeleton argument, at paragraph 19. Something has gone awry with the numbering of the skeleton argument at page 7. But these are the grounds of appeal:
"Ground 1. The inspector failed to properly address the matters before him in relation to notice A ground B (nature of the alleged breach).
Ground 2. The inspector failed to properly address the matters before him in relation to notice A ground C (breach of planning control).
Ground 3. The inspector failed to properly address the matters before him in relation to notice D (fencing).
Ground 4. The inspector failed to properly address the matters before him in relation to the ability of the appellant to relocate the mobile home (notice A and B)."
That is the way the case is summarised in the grounds of appeal in paragraph 19 of the skeleton argument.
I should explain that in relation to ground 1, the reference to ground B, namely, nature of the alleged breach, is intended to be a reference to 174(2)(b) of the 1990 Act....
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Reed v The Secretary of State for Communities and Local Government and Another
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