Reflections on Roskill
| Published date | 01 January 2004 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/13590790410808988 |
| Date | 01 January 2004 |
| Pages | 8-9 |
| Author | Monty Raphael |
| Subject Matter | Accounting & finance |
Journal of Financial Crime Ð Vol. 11 No. 1
FRAUD ON TRIAL Ð REVIEWING
THE ROSKILL LEGACY
Re¯ections on Roskill
Monty Raphael
The Frauds Trials Committee, under the chairman-
ship of Lord Roskill, was established almost 20
years ago to deal with a number of perceived short-
comings in the investigation, prosecution and trial
of serious and complex fraud. The social and eco-
nomic world inhabited by the members of the com-
mittee and by those who gave evidence to it was
radically dierent to the one we inhabit today. The
®nancial services industry of the City of London
was international without being global; its members
and the professionals who assisted it were reasonably
homogenous; and its regulation was on the basis of a
gentlemen's club. Share ownership was con®ned to
institutions, pension funds and the prosperous
middle classes. Wider share ownership was only just
being introduced as a political ideal. Cross-border
crime was relatively rare and certainly did not
extend to white-collar oences with any degree of
frequency. Cooperation between dierent investigat-
ing bodies in the UK was inecient, and the inter-
change of information or assistance between our
law enforcement authorities and those of other
countries was negligible and mutually unsatisfactory.
Fraud was investigated by fraud squads attached to
each of the 43 police forces of England and Wales,
with securities and investment fraud being largely
the province of the joint City of London Fraud
Squad and the Metropolitan Police Company Fraud
Department.
Prosecutions for serious fraud were brought by the
Director of Public Prosecutions, by individual police
authorities, or by the Department of Trade and
Industry, and sometimes by Customs & Excise or
the Inland Revenue. There was little or no coherence
of prosecution policy. Probably the principal driver
for the setting up of the Roskill Committee was
the number of acquittals in high-pro®le fraud cases,
particularly those which involved an understanding
of the more arcane investment products available in
the City of London. The committee was made up
of judges, lawyers and police ocers. As Professor
Michael Levi has observed, they started their work
on the basis of investigating the problems of juries
responding to the complexities of fraud trials, but
then broadened their focus almost to a `cradle to
grave' review of the criminal justice process. Their
central conclusion was that seriously complex fraud
was like no other crime in that it could not be
investigated by conventional `Sherlock Holmes'-
type methods. It relied upon obligating those who
had information to provide that information. It also
would rely in the future upon certain standards of
comprehension in those who investigated, ie specialist
police ocers; those who prosecuted, ie specialist
barristers and solicitors; and, last but not least,
greater comprehension on the part of those judges
who would try these cases.
To cure the disparities between agencies investi-
gating and prosecuting, they recommended the
setting up of a uni®ed fraud oce. This was fudged
as a result of turf wars and Treasury parsimony,
and the result was the Serious Fraud Oce. This
was always kept short of resources and instead of
being a uni®ed fraud oce, was just another, albeit
more sophisticated, prosecution agency standing
alongside the Crown Prosecution Service, the DTI,
Customs and the Revenue. The Roskill Committee
did recommend in a majority report the abolition
of jury trials for fraud, but either because it was a
political hot potato, or because the dissenting note
of Walter Merricks was persuasive, this `reform'
was deferred. In the two decades or so since Roskill
was set up, the amounts of money lost to fraud
have become astronomical and incalculable. The
losses in tax fraud of various kinds have had a signi®-
cant eect on the provision of social services. Fraud
in private commerce and industry has had to be
paid for by the consumer. Fraud on the National
Health Service has victimised the patient.
Fraudsters have become more resourceful, they
have become more international, and they have
become more mobile. Just as commerce has become
Page 8
Journal of Financial Crime
Vol.11, No. 1, 2003, pp. 8 ±9
#HenryStewart Publications
ISSN 1359-0790
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