Chapter 17: Regulation 4057/86: dumping of shipping services and the unfair pricing of shipping services

LibraryEU shipping law
Pages1007-1029
AuthorVincent Power
A: Introduction

17.001 “Dumping” occurs when a product or service from one country is introduced on to another country’s market at less than the normal value of that product or service. This practice has serious consequences for the economy in which the goods or services are dumped because it undermines unfairly industry in that second economy. 1 Dumping can be a temporary phenomenon but the consequences can be long lasting. The European Union (“EU”) has fallen victim to dumping in sectors such as photocopiers, textiles, footwear and, most importantly for present purposes, shipping services. 2 There is no doubt that the dumping by some non-EU shipowners particularly, the former USSR, of their freight rates on the EU markets had a detrimental effect on EU shipowners. 3 The former USSR was able to “dump” shipping services because it had a desire for hard currency, 4 a large shipping fleet and a cost base lower than western shipowners because it did not fact the same expenses (e.g. insurance and lower wage costs). The EU responded to such dumping by adopting Council Regulation 4057/86, 5 which was the first EU anti-dumping measure to deal with services. 6 The purpose of Regulation 4057/86 is to provide a remedy against:

“unfair pricing practices by certain third country 7 shipowners engaged in international cargo liner shipping, which causes serious disruption of the freight pattern on a particular route to, from or within the [EU] and cause or threaten to cause major injury to [EU] shipowners operating on that route and to [EU] interests.” 8

It is therefore a limited measure in that it relates only to international cargo liner shipping and to behaviour by non-EU State shipowners (i.e. “third country” shipowners). However, it was also a unilateral protectionist measure which the EU would say was justified given the issues involved but nonetheless it was protectionist of EU interests. It favoured shipowners but not consumers. 9 It has been commented:

“Regulation 4057 came about because of a desire to promote collective competitiveness: it put new tools into the hands of the [EU], to be used at the discretion of the Council, and was a response to external pressures from Soviet-bloc fleets that (at least since the 1970s) had been poaching cargoes on lucrative runs at below market prices in order to gain hard currency. It was not the subject of dispute between member states, who were in favour of it, nor between members and the Commission. Rather, it was seen as a necessary response to challenge from third countries, and represented an implicit trade-off for shipowners, who were required to open their national markets under regulation [4055/86]. 10

Yet consumers were adamantly opposed to it, and the debate over the details was between shipowners and consumers; the outcome clearly favoured the former. The reasons for this are largely the same as for [Regulation 4056/86]. First, carriers, as ‘concentrated winners,’ were able to lobby more effectively than consumers, who were ‘dispersed losers’. Consumers did not have [Directorate General for Competition (“DG COMP”)] to bat for them on this measure. Carriers, transport ministers, and [Directorate General for Transport] formed a European version of the iron triangle in which it was assumed that the interests of consumers would not be harmed as much as carriers would benefit. In any case, there was legitimate concern about the impact of third country practices.” 11

B: Council Regulation 4057/86 Introduction

17.002 Many non-EU shipping companies (especially Eastern European (while they were socialist and communist in the years leading up to the adoption of Regulation 4057/86) and South-East Asian ones)) were engaging in unfair practices to the detriment of their EU counterparts. Non-EU shipping companies were engaged in various unfair practices consisting of, among other things, cheap or even below-cost freight rates brought about by subsidies from their governments. EU shipping companies suffered as a consequence of this dumping. There was, according to some market participants, a need for some EU-driven legislation to deal with the issue because there was need for a collective and co-ordinated response to the problem.

17.003 On 23 December 1976, the European Parliament’s Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs published its Interim Report on the Community Shipping Industry. 12 The report, written at a time when Eastern European countries were largely State-trading economies and EU carriers were in an economic recession, stated:

  • “26. Most countries with a merchant fleet accord it certain subsidies, either direct or through favourable fiscal provisions. The Third World, especially the Arab countries, is rapidly developing its own State fleets. The policies followed by the State-trading countries are of particular concern here, as certain elements making up a significant part of [EU] shipping costs, such as insurance, are not included as a shipping cost by lines in State-trading countries, with the results that these latter can naturally charge lower rates. Between 1963 and 1974, the [then] USSR and other Eastern European countries increased their share of world tonnage from 5.2% to 7.6%, while the share of the OECD countries fell from 75.7% to 60%. 13 The gross tonnage of the fleets of State-trading countries has increased by about 400% in 15 years. 14

  • 27. Because of their different system of calculating costs, and the fact that their personnel receive a different system of remuneration which results in lower wages costs than those for [EU] fleets, the fleets of State-trading [i.e. communist] countries have been able to offer freight rates between 10 and 50% lower than those offered by [EU] shipping; this is, in effect, a practice of dumping.

  • 28. Concern has been expressed in several quarters over the expansion of Soviet and Eastern European shipping fleets. The ‘World Trade Review and Outlook’ (published by the shipbrokers, Lambert Brothers Shipping) suggests that undercutting of freight rates by the Russians, aided by the East Europeans and some sympathetic developing countries, is making Western liner services insolvent and ripe for State subsidies or public ownership. With nearly 10 million grt already afloat, Russia has the world’s largest general cargo liner fleet, nearly a third of which is competing for scarce cargoes at cut rates against western shipping in western ports. 15

    As an example of problems faced, the percentage of the United Kingdom’s seaborne exports to the Soviet Union by value, carried in Russian ships in 1975, was 78% and in British ships 18%. The corresponding figures for the United Kingdom’s imports from the Soviet Union were 74% and 10% respectively. 16

    The Soviet merchant fleet, according to the General Council of British Shipping, now ranks sixth in the world, and the Soviet Union has the largest conventional cargo liner fleet in the world – 6.9 million gross registered grt in 1974 (the UK has 6.4 million). Moreover, the Eastern bloc could account for up to 20 per cent of all liner tonnage on order. 17

  • 29. The most obvious practices used by Eastern bloc countries, in particular the Soviet Union, to divert cargoes to their own shipping, fell under four main headings:

    a strict enforcement of f.o.b. purchase/c.i.f. sale contract terms in their direct trades with no flexibility, resulting in a near total monopoly of cargo movements;

    • a systematic policy of undercutting in their cross-trading activities by charging freight rates which were uneconomic, certainly in Western terms;

    • inter-governmental (either bilateral or multilateral) agreements reserving part or all of the cargo moving in the trade;

    • the establishment of so-called joint shipping agencies in foreign countries without reciprocity; Western shipping companies were not afforded the same possibility to run their business in Eastern bloc countries with the same freedom. 18

  • a strict enforcement of f.o.b. purchase/c.i.f. sale contract terms in their direct trades with no flexibility, resulting in a near total monopoly of cargo movements;

  • a systematic policy of undercutting in their cross-trading activities by charging freight rates which were uneconomic, certainly in Western terms;

  • inter-governmental (either bilateral or multilateral) agreements reserving part or all of the cargo moving in the trade;

  • the establishment of so-called joint shipping agencies in foreign countries without reciprocity; Western shipping companies were not afforded the same possibility to run their business in Eastern bloc countries with the same freedom. 18

  • 30. Shipping interests have called for Western governments to consider concerted action against uncommercial Eastern bloc practices, and for shippers to bear in mind that the immediate attractions of using Soviet cut rates will only be short-term and there would be a big longer-term price to be paid. Estimates of the significance of the threat from Comecon 19 shipping vary considerably, however; the arguments are complex, and the facts are in some dispute. A study published in February 1976 by Seatrade Publications entitled ‘Soviet Shipping’ suggests, however, that the expansion of the Russian fleet in the next five years may not be as dramatic as supposed by certain European and American shipping sources. This study makes the following important points:

    ‘A Confidential study from the Committee on European and Japanese National Shipowners’ Associations (CENSA) has offered to accept government involvement in their affairs in return for curbs on the “uncommercial practices” of socialist shipping lines’.

    • Soviet shipping minister Timofei Guzhenko stated that the socialist share of world shipping was not expanding since over 80% of world orders for dry cargo ships were being placed by capitalist countries, with socialist countries...

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