Reinstatement after Confinement: An Obstacle Race for Mothers
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1984.tb01642.x |
| Published date | 01 January 1984 |
| Author | Evelyn Ellis |
| Date | 01 January 1984 |
Jan. 19841
NOTES
OF CASES
107
Medical Association, which formed a guide for converting milli-
grammes of alcohol per millilitre into pints, etc.
,
consumed, because
they, “have been accepted by the medical profession and form part
of
current accepted medical knowledge.”
A
similar approach was
adopted in a civil case decided on common law principles and thus
applicable to criminal cases:
H.
v.
Schering Chemicals Ltd.”
In that
case Bingham
J.
allowed an expert to refer to summaries of research,
articles and letters published in medical journals as part of the
corpus of medical expertise on the subject. Indeed Bingham
J.
goes
further and adopts a position very similar to that of the Court of
Appeal in
Abadom
for he says: “But in my judgment the proper
approach
of
this court is to admit the articles, in the sense
of
reading
them, and to give the factual assertions in those articles such weight
as appears to the court, having heard any cross-examination
or
other
evidence, to be proper.” Cogency equals admissibility?
That, as a matter
of
common sense, the statistical tables should
have been admitted is not in doubt. That the law did allow their
admission is in doubt. That revision of the law relating to hearsay in
criminal cases is required cannot be in doubt.
JENNIFER A.
JAMES*
REINSTATEMENT
A~ER
CONFINEMENT: AN OBSTACLE
RACE
FOR
MOTHERS
THE
recent decision
of
the Court of Appeal in
Lavery
v.
Plessey
Telecommunications Ltd.
highlights the extreme technicality of the
present maternity rights legislation and the injustice which may be
a consequence of it. Ms. Lavery, who had worked for her employers
since 1976, became pregnant in 1979. Her contract
of
employment
contained no express provisions dealing with maternity leave. She
told her employers that she would be away from work from February
11,
1980, that her expected date of confinement was April 2, and
that she intended to return to work after the baby was born. The
employers incorporated this information into a common form docu-
ment (Al), on which it was also noted that she was due to return to
work on October 27 (a date which appears to have been calculated
by reference to Ms. Lavery’s
expected date
of
confinement)
and that
there was a right to extend the 29-week period of absence by a
further four weeks in certain circumstances. In order to exercise her
statutory right to return to work, Ms. Lavery was required under
the then existing legislation to give at least seven days’ notice of the
day on which she intended to return.* On October 22,
Ms.
Lavery
telephoned her employers to say that she was returning to work on
October 27; in other words, she gave only five days’ notice. Her
employers refused to take her back on the ground that she was
l1
119831 1
All
E.R. 849.
*
Lct&er in
Law,
University
of
Reading.
*
The Employment Act 1980, s.ll(3)
has
now
substituted a period
of
21 days’ notice.
[1983] I.R.L.R. 202.
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