Renouf v Attorney General for Jersey

JurisdictionUK Non-devolved
Judgment Date1936
Date1936
Year1936
CourtPrivy Council
[PRIVY COUNCIL.] RENOUF APPELLANT; AND ATTORNEY-GENERAL FOR JERSEY RESPONDENT. ON APPEAL FROM THE ROYAL COURT OF THE ISLAND OF JERSEY. 1936 April 6. LORD HAILSHAM L.C., LORD THANKERTON, LORD MAUGHAM, SIR GEORGE LOWNDES, and SIR SIDNEY ROWLATT.

Jersey - Appeal to Privy Council in criminal cases - No appeal as of right - Crown's prerogative right to grant special leave to appeal and to entertain appeals - Conviction of manslaughter - Alleged misdirection - Principles applicable to review of criminal proceedings by Privy Council.

There is no appeal as of right to His Majesty in Council from the decision of the Royal Court of Jersey in a criminal case.

There is no trace in any legislation, or in an authoritative work, of any such right of appeal. The Ordinances of Pyne and Napper, 1591, which, in the light of present evidence, must be regarded as having been properly confirmed by Order in Council and registered, and as having become part of the law of Jersey, support the view that there is no appeal as of right in criminal matters.

There is, however, no Order in Council, charter, or other instrument of authority from which it can be inferred that the Crown's prerogative right to grant special leave to appeal, and to allow an appeal, in a criminal case from Jersey has been taken away. That prerogative right still exists.

Dicta of Baron Parke in In re Ames (1841) 3 Moo. P. C. 409, p. 412, and of Lord Blackburn in Esnouf v. Attorney-General for Jersey (1883) 8 App. Cas. 304, p. 307, approved and applied.

The prerogative right of entertaining appeals can only be taken away by express words or the necessary intendment of a statute or other equivalent act of State.

Nadan v. The King [1926] A. C. 482, p. 491, and British Coal Corporation v. The King [1935] A. C. 500, p. 511, referred to.

The Board treats applications for special leave to appeal in criminal cases and the hearing of criminal appeals so admitted as being on the same footing, and, in the case of misdirection, or in any other case of an alleged failure in the proper trial of a criminal case, will advise His Majesty to intervene only if there is shown to have been such a violation of the principles of justice that grave and substantial injustice has been done.

Principle in In re Dillet (1887) 12 App. Cas. 459, and observations of Lord Sumner in Ibrahim v. The King [1914] A. C. 599, p. 615, applied.

Judgment of the Royal Court of Jersey affirmed.

APPEAL (No. 9 of 1935), by special leave, by Dennis Romain Renouf from his conviction in the Royal Court of Jersey (November 8, 1934) and sentence of twelve months' imprisonment with hard labour, on a charge of the manslaughter of Frederick William Whiting on August 19, 1934. The indictment charged the appellant with having on the Place du Pont à Bascule, St. Helier, driven his motor-car at a dangerous speed and to the danger of the public, and with having by his criminal imprudence, want of skill or negligence collided with Whiting and inflicted injuries upon him which caused his death. The appellant pleaded that he was not guilty, but he was found guilty by the unanimous verdict of the jury and was sentenced as stated above.

The ground of appeal was that the Bailiff misdirected the jury as to the degree of negligence necessary to constitute the offence of manslaughter. It was contended that the Bailiff left the jury under the impression not only that the question of the contributory negligence of the deceased was altogether immaterial, but that the appellant must be convicted unless the evidence established that he had taken all the steps that a skilful and sensible driver could have taken, and that he could only be acquitted if the jury were satisfied that the death of the deceased was due to a pure accident or misadventure, such an accident as no reasonably skilful driver could have avoided.

Before the appeal was heard on its merits the question was argued whether, as contended by the respondent, the decision of the Royal Court of Jersey in a criminal case was final and not open to appeal, even with special leave of His Majesty in Council.

1936. Feb. 27, 28; March 2, 3. Sir Thomas Inskip A.-G., Kenelm Preedy and J. P. Ashworth for the respondent. The appeal is not competent. The decision of the Royal Court of Jersey in a criminal case is final and not open to question or appeal. The Crown has relinquished its prerogative right to entertain petitions and appeals in criminal matters from Jersey. It relinquished that right long ago; the history of the matter goes back as far as the time of King John. The Channel Islands were the territory of the Dukes of Normandy, and became part of the territory of the Crown when the Dukes of Normandy became sovereigns of this Realm. In the reign of King John the people of the Channel Islands elected to detach themselves from the territories which King John lost in France, and preferred to be subject to the English Crown. In return for that adherence or allegiance King John granted certain charters and privileges to the Islanders which have been confirmed by successive Sovereigns. In later times the rights which were granted included the privilege of having the right to determine criminal cases without the power of anybody to apply to His Majesty in Council for special leave to appeal by way of the exercise by the Crown of its prerogative right.

The Constitutions of King John, of unknown date, are the basis of the Royal Court's jurisdiction. By the Constitutions twelve jurats were sworn to keep the pleas and rights pertaining to the Crown, and “the same twelve, in whatsoever Island, in the absence of the justices, and together with the justices when they shall come to those parts, are to judge touching all cases in the said Island, howsoever arising, except cases that are too difficult, and if [“et si”: but suggested correction — “ut si” =as if] any shall be lawfully convicted as a traitor of having departed from loyalty to the Lord the King or of having laid violent hands upon the ministers of the lord the King in exercising their duty in a lawful manner.” From that time, by a series of letters and charters, successive Sovereigns assured to the Islands the rights thus conferred by King John. In the reign of Edw. II. there were certain inquiries by way of a writ of quo warrantoF1 to inquire why the Islanders claimed to be so independent, and to have their own form of governing and of administering justice. The Commonalty of the Island replied that “They and their progenitors the Islanders here from a time from which memory runneth not have been used always to have 12 such Jurats of themselves …. And the said 12 ought to judge touching all causes, pleas, contempts, trespasses (and) felonies made on neighbours, strangers, and others whomsoever ….” A charter of Edw. III.F2 confirmed in general the privileges hitherto enjoyed by the Islanders. It is not submitted that the prerogative of mercy has been relinquished by the Crown: by Order in Council of 10 Henry VII., June 17, 1495, rules are laid down that every person shall have a proper opportunity of appealing to the Crown to exercise the prerogative of mercy. [Reference was also made to the following: The Charter of 4 Elizabeth, June 27, 1562F3- which, it was submitted, amounted to a relinquishment of the Royal prerogative; Order in Council of June 22, 1565, at Westminster; Order in Council of May 13, 1572, Reglement Touchant Appels, 1572F4; Order in Council (Guernsey), October 9, 1580, which, dealing with appeals, stated: “Provided that it shall not be lawfull to appeale in anie cause criminall ….”]

An important stage in this history was the Order in Council of February 15, 1590F5, ordering that an inquiry should be made as to certain matters by Dr. Tertullian Pyne and Robert Napper, and the Commission of 33 Elizabeth to Pyne and Napper.F6 The Ordinances of Pyne and Napper, following upon their Commission, and dated April 3, 1591, provided in Ordinance 4 that: “And forasmuch as my Lords of Her Majesty's Privy Council are greatly importuned from time [to time] about many causes in which no definitive sentence has been given which is contrary to the ancient privileges of this Island and contrary to the express Orders thereupon laid down and approved by the said Lords And also about many appeal causes [which have been] well judged and wrongly appealed in And about many sentences given in criminal causes or others in which no appeal lies or ought to be suffered ….” It will be submitted for the appellant that these Ordinances of Pyne and Napper have never been registered in the Island, and therefore have no real authority. An Order in Council making the registration of such documents necessary was not made until 1679, whereas the Pyne and Napper Ordinances were long before that time, in 1591. Those Ordinances have never been registered, and therefore it is necessary to call attention to the way in which they have been regarded by the Crown. By Ordinance 38 it was provided: “Saving always to Her Majesty her heirs and successors and every such rights titles and royalties and preeminences whatsoever which Her Majesty has had or can and might or ought to have in this Isle notwithstanding those Orders, laws and Constitutions hereinbefore recited or anything herein contained which might be contrary thereto in any manner.”

[Reference was made to Orders in Council of June 12, 1635F7; November 8, 1661F8; and April 24, 1668F9, dealing with certain rights of re-hearing.] There is no question about the right of appeal in civil matters. Ex parte AubinF10 is an illustration of the right of appeal to His Majesty for the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. That matter was also dealt with by Orders in Council of June 23, 1698F11, and November 30, 1699.F12 [Reference was made to Le Sbirel v. Procureur-Général et Autres.F13]

The Jersey Code, which was ratified by Order in Council of March 28, 1771, provided (inter alia) that “There shall be...

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