Reorganization of anti-corruption agencies in China
| Date | 03 May 2016 |
| Published date | 03 May 2016 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/JMLC-03-2016-0013 |
| Pages | 106-108 |
| Author | He Jiahong |
| Subject Matter | Accounting & Finance,Financial risk/company failure,Financial compliance/regulation,Financial crime |
Editorial
Reorganization of anti-corruption agencies in China
On January 12-14, 2016, the Central Discipline Inspection Commission of CPC held
its sixth comprehensive meeting in Beijing. According to statistics released by the
Commission, the total number of party ofcials disciplined from January 1 to
November 30 in 2015 were 43,000, including 3,818 of the division chief rank and 441
of the department chief rank, increased by 45 and 123 per cent, respectively, with the
numbers of 2014. For “hitting tigers”, since the 18th National Congress of CPC in
2012, more than 100 high ranking ofcials have been inspected and charged,
including Su Rong, former Vice-President of Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference; Xu Caihou, former Vice-Chairman of the Central Military Commission
of CPC; Zhou Yongkang, a former standing member of the Politburo of CPC;
and Ling Jihua, former Vice-President of Chinese People’s Political Consultative
Conference.
Generally speaking, corruption cases involving high ranking ofcials are rst
investigated by the discipline inspection commission of CPC, hereafter referred to as
the discipline commission. Once the facts are clear, the case is sent to the
people’s procuratorate for formal investigation and indictment in accordance with
the Criminal Procedure Law. Ofcials who are inspected and charged by the
discipline commission are generally indicted by the procuratorate. Therefore, the
discipline commission is in fact the main force, though not the “regular army”, in
the investigation of criminal corruptions in China.
According to the Criminal Procedure Law, all occupational crimes, or corruption
crimes in broader sense, committed by state workers, or public ofcers, shall be
investigated by two investigation departments of procuratorates at all levels. They
are the department of anti-dereliction of duty and infringement on human rights,
and the department of anti-embezzlement and bribery. There is also a department of
preventing those occupational crimes in each procuratorate. As the procuratorates
are basically under the leadership of the CPC committee and the government at the
same level, this system has the demerits of decentralization with both horizontal and
vertical dispersion of force.
Besides the discipline commissions and the procuratorates, the police
departments at all levels are also in charge of investigation of corruption crimes
committed by non-state workers, or commercial bribery in private sectors.
On the whole, the present anti-corruption system in China is a decentralized
model, with the feature of “controlling the waters with many dragons”. Even though
the three agencies have a division of labor, there is bound to be some overlap in the
investigation of corruption cases. It is not rare to see the repeated work between
the discipline committee and the procuratorate or between the procaratorate and the
police.
However, ghting corruptions requires establishing a homogenous and
consolidated system, and building up a nation of rule of law requires the
investigation of corruption crimes within the legal framework. Therefore,
JMLC
19,2
106
Journalof Money Laundering
Control
Vol.19 No. 2, 2016
pp.106-108
©Emerald Group Publishing Limited
1368-5201
DOI 10.1108/JMLC-03-2016-0013
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