REVIEWS

DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1957.tb00428.x
Published date01 January 1957
Date01 January 1957
REVIEWS
THE
FEDERAL LOYALTY-SECURITY PROGRAM.
Report
of
the Special
Committee
of
the Association
of
the Bar
of
the City
of
New
York.
[New
York:
Dodd, Mead
&
Company.
1956.
xxvi
and
801
pp.
$5.00.1
SOONER
or later the basic common sense of the American people reasserts
itself. And for the past two years it has begun to reassert itself strongly
against the excesses which legitimate resentment of the Communist threat
had persuaded it to countenance for too long. At first it was difficult to
be sure that the tide really had turned against the wave of suspicion and
intolerance which had swept over the country. The removal from
a
position
of influence and publicity of the arch-demagogue who had swum in on the
crest of the wave seemed to be little more than the fortuitous result of
a
shift of the balance of power in the Senate and of resentment of his manners
rather than of his opinions and methods. But it was soon apparent that this
was one of many straws in the wind. The voice of true liberalism-shocked
into silence by the
Him
caseis again being heard and listened to, and
quietly but firmly the American public is beginning to make it clear that it
is not prepared to forfeit its birthright of freedom of speech and conscience.
One of the many signs of the receding tide was the appointment in the
spring of
1966
of
a
special committee of lawyers to review the Federal Security
Programmes. The Committee was appointed by the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York-a body with
a
deservedly high reputation for
enlightened public spirit-and was financed by another admirable organisation
-the Fund for the Republic. The Committee was an exceptionally strong one,
with members drawn from many different states and cities of the Union-New
York, Chicago, New Orleans, Washington D.C. and
Los
Angeles-and aided
by
a
staff which included Professor Elliot Cheatham
of
Columbia. They
conferred with
a
wide range of persons in
all
walks
of
life. The influential
report now published deserves the closest attention not only in America but
throughout the Free World-and beyond. Happily
it has already received considerable publicity in the British Press, and here
attention can only be drawn to certain of its salient points.
There are
at
present seven separate Federal security programmes now
covering some
9,000,000
civilian and military personnel, of whom
6,000,000
are civilians.'
It
is with these programmes that the Committee was concerned.
In addition, there are state requirements for loyalty oaths which are indirectly
affected by the Federal programmes since they are linked to the Attorney-
General's List of
"
subversive
"
organisations.
Having reviewed the various Federal programmes in detail the Committee
sum up (at p.
133)
their conclusions on the achievements and intangible
costs in two short paragraphs that are worth quoting in full
:
"
It
is probable that some undesirable and even dangerous persons have
been ousted or barred from employment in Government
or
industry.
It
is
likely that important scientific and technological developments have been
withheld from an aggressive enemy, but the consequent slowing down of
his potential for aggression was of short duration.
It
seems clear that the
reputation of the Government service has been cleared of the imputation
1
The number of persons covered
by
them from their origin is several millions
73
It
has lessons
for
us
all.
larger:
aee
p.
116.
74
THE
MODERN
LAW REVIEW
VOL.
20
of grave subversive infiltration, with improvement of the morale of some
of the employees. Similarly, it is suggested that the security clearance has
somewhat facilitated the prompt operation of the work
of
the Government
“On the other side of the balance there has probably been some im-
pairment of positive security through the dowing down of scientific and
technological advancement. There has been an injury to
our
international
repute and security from the maintenance of
a
system which seems to
our
friends abroad to go beyond the true needs of national security. There
has probably been some injury to the morale of the government service
and certainly needlessly severe burdens to
a
considerable number of
individual employees who have been unnecessarily suspended, tried and
subsequently cleared. And there
is
some evidence of
a
general blunting
of
our
national concern with freedom of speech and fair hearings, although
that is clearly on the rise again.”
They then make proposals for far-reaching changes, saying (at
p.
24):
“We deem
it
appropriate that members of the Bar should do
this.
Indeed,
as
we conceive it,
our
duty as lawyers requires
us
to
do
so.
The Bar in
the United
States
has always been, and must always
be,
alert in the protection
of the liberties on which
our
country was founded
aa
well
as
of other
measures essential
to
national security.
It
is
so,
in fact, with lawyers in
every country where freedom
exists
or
is
emerging.” This
is
well said, and
it
is
to be hoped that lawyers everywhere
are
in fact mindful of these duties.
As this quotation shows, the Committee
are
rightly conscious that their duty
is
not merely to minimise restraints on liberty but also to maximise efficiency
in
measures of national security. Their proposals are
the
more weighty
because of the emphasis which they place on the
latter.
An attempt to screen
nine million people is objectionable not
only
because the vast majority will
be subjected to undeserved scrutiny but because
it
is
so
easy for
the
small
unreliable minority
to
escape detection.
The Committee find weaknesses in four aspects of the programmes.
1.
There
is
a
lack of co-ordination and supervision of the various
programmes.
To correct this they recommend the appointment of
a
Director of Security
in the Executive Office of the President to conduct
a
continuous review of
and supervision over the various programmes and over the classification of
information.a
2.
The scope of the programme is too broad in that positions are covered
which have no substantial relationship to national security.
The Committee’s proposals would restrict the need for clearance to sensitive
positions and no others,
i.e.,
to personnel
(a)
who have access to material
classified
as
top secret
or
secret (not confidential)
or
(b)
who have
a
policy-
making function which bears
a
substantial relation to national security. This
would reduce the number of civilians subject
to
the programmes from
6,000,000
to less than
1,500,000
and would entail
the
total abolition of the especially
objectionable programmes for Port Security and for International Organisa-
tions’ Employees.
a.
The standards and criteria for security clearance do not sufficiently
recognise the variety of elements
to
be considered, including
the
positive
contribution which the employee may make to national security, and they do
not readily permit
a
common-sense judgment on
the
whole record.
The present standards rightly emphasise reliability rather than loyalty
3-
though unfortunately this
is
not fully recognised by public opinion, which tends
a
The Report emphasises the importance
of
proper classification and the tendency
to,
and dangers
of,
over-classification (pp.
69
et
seq.).
The value of its
observations
on
this topic is certainly not limited
to
the
U.S.A.
8
except, most anomalous1 in the case of employees in International Organisa-
tions, where the test is &at
of
loyalty to the United States.

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