REVIEWS

Date01 January 1982
Published date01 January 1982
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1982.tb02472.x
REVIEWS
LIBERALISM IN
QUEST OF ITSELF
SOCIAL
JUSTICE
IN
THE
LIBERAL
STATE.
BY
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN.
[New Haven and London:
Yale
University Press. 1980.
xii
and 392
pp.
(incl. index) €1 1.00.1
THIS
book positively flows with ideas and arguments, but is founded on two
crucial claims: first, that the key to liberalism lies in the idea of
constrained
conversation
(p. lo), the critical constraint being the principle
of
neutrdity;
and, secondly, that the principle of neutrality is independent
of
the truth of
any particular metaphysical
or
epistemological position.1 Ackerman’s entire
strategy hinges on these claims and we shall confine
our
attention almost
exclusively to them; but to begin with we shall summarise his main aims and
themes in an uncritical fashion, attempting to remain faithful to Ackerman’s
own account
of
these matters. The book is presented in four parts. The
first three parts state and then unpack the ramifications
of
the essence
of
liberalism. Alongside the clarification of liberalism Ackerman constantly
compares and contrasts his line with that taken by utilitarians and contract-
arians. This running commentary is tied together at the beginning of Part
Four
(Chap. 10) but the main task
for
this part is to argue the case
for
being
a
liberal. Put somewhat baldly the book has two main objectives, to restate
liberalism and to justify liberalism:
What is it to be
a
liberal?
and
How
can liberalism be defended?
Ackerman’s restatement
of
liberalism (Chap. 1) consists negatively in the
denial that contract
or
utility constitute the key to liberalism and positively
in the claim that the key is to be found in the idea of constrained conversation.
Thus, if
X
wishes to qualify as
a
liberal he must not violate the three principles
of rationality, consistency and neutrality. Rationality enjoins
X
to offer reasons
for whatever power he holds whenever
a
conversational challenge is thrown
down:
‘‘
Whenever anybody questions the legitimacy of another’s power, the
power holder must respond not by suppressing the questioner but by giving
a reason that explains why he is more entitled to the resource than the
questioner is
(p.
4).
So,
once challenged,
X
must engage in conversation, but
the conversation is constrained in three ways: first, by rationality itself
2;
secondly, by consistency which requires that
[tlhe reason advanced by
a
power wiolder on one occasion must not be inconsistent with the reasons he
advances to justify his other claims to power
@.
7);
and, thirdly, by neutrality
which provides that
[n]o reason
is
a
good reason if it requires the power
holder to assert (a) that his conception of the good is better than that asserted
by any of his fellow citizens,
or
(b) that, regardless of his conception
of
the
good, he is intrinsically superior to one
or
more of his fellow citizens
(p. 11).
The first limb of neutrality
is
called the
‘‘
bar against
selectivify
(p.
43),
and
the second limb is the bar against
‘‘
claims of
unconditional superiorify
(p.
1
At
p.
361,
Ackerman says that “Liberalism does not depend
on
the
truth
oP
any singlo metaphysical
or
epistemological system.”
2
For
a discussion
of
the constraints imposed by rationality see
pp.
34-43.
Briefly,
the constraints are: a distribution rule must be
harmonious
(it would not be har-
monious
if
it assumed
a
greater amount of resources than actually were available)
and
complete
(it must specify each
person’s
position
in
the scheme of distribution);
a reason must not violate the
conceivability
test, that
is,
a statement cannot count
as a reason
if
it
contradicts the very idea that power can be exercised illegitimately;
and, finally, rationality requires not only that the reason for the proposed distribu-
tion
rule
differentiates
it
from one
of
its competiton, the
differenrimion
test,
but
also that
it
marks
out
the
rule
as having merit when compared to all rival proposals,
the requirement
of
comprehensiveness.
104
Jan.
19821
REVIEWS
105
44).
In the ideal liberal polity all powcr relations would be capable of public
defence within the terms of liberally constrained conversation and all citizens
would stand ready to answer their challengers with
a
liberal reason rather
than
a
punch on thc nose.
Equipped with these seminal ideas of liberalism Ackerman invites his readers
to set out on
a
voyage of discovery, the task being to map out the shape of
the ideal liberal polity.
He
invites
us
to imagine
a
group
of
people on a space-
ship circling
a
planet that they are about to cdonise. The planet has but one
resource, manna, which is capable
of
transformation into any physical object.
Unfortunately, there is insufficient manna to meet the demands of the settlers
and
so
there is
a
problem about its distribution (Chap.
2).3
In charge
of
the
spaceship there is
a
liberal commander who decrees that the manna problem
shall be resolved according to the
rules
of liberal conversation. The ensuing
conversation eliminates all distribution
rules
which violate neutrality by appeal-
ing directly
or
indirectly to a formal
or
substantive conception
of
the good.
Utilitarianism, by asserting the superiority of pleasure-maximising over any
other conception of the good, is one
of
the casualties here. The proposal that
the manna should be divided into equal shares alone emerges unscathed and
thus has to be adopted as the liberal solution.
The
argument, which
"
places
a
significant conversational burden upon the opponents of initial equality
"
(p.
58),
has two steps:
(1)
X,
being
a
person with a conception
of
the good,
can claim that he is at least
as
good as any other such person, and therefore
(2)
X
is entitled to at least as much manna as any other such person.
Although neutrality teases out the principle
of
initial equality it operates
only
for
the protection
of
citizens.
But
who is
a
potential citizen? Ackerman
rounds
off
the first part of the book (Chap.
3)
by stipulating that there are
two necessary and sufficient conditions for citizenship:
(1)
dialogic performance,
that is, being
"
prepared to answer the question
of
legitimacy in
a
Neutral way
when it is asked by others"
(p.
73);
and
(2)
the behavioural test, that is,
acting in conformity with those principles established through liberal con-
versation. The !liberal state is not a private club; all people who meet the two
conditions have an unconditional right to citizenship.
Part Two of the book is devoted to unfolding the liberal line on
a
range
of
questions. It is important to remember here, however, that Ackerman is work-
ing at the level
of
ideal theory for we have to imagine that the commander
has
at
her disposal
a
perfect technology
of
justice such that the favoured
liberal power structure can be costlessly implemented. The picture that emerges
in this part
of
the book is one of
a
highly diversified society operating under
the distinctively liberal1 ideal
of
undominated equality. In this ideal world
citizens start with an equal share of manna (Pt. One, Chap.
2),
cross-checked
against both their agemates and their parents (Chaps.
4
and
7);
they have
no
duty to procreate (Chap.
4);
they are educated in such
a
way that they
are
in
a
position to form their own conception of the good (Chap.
5);
within
a
flexible transactional network they have equal transactional facilities and
initially equal trading resources (Chap.
6);
their trusteeship obligations are
identical (Chap.
7)
4;
and conditions of undominated genetic diversity obtain
(Chap.
.5).5
Contrary to popular belief equality does not necessarily lead to a
grey nightmare world and liberals need not fear it. Quite apart from the
standard side-notes on utility and contract these chapters also take stock of
~~
3
This
of
course is the classic
mise en she
for the distribution side
of
the
problem of social justice.
4
Ackerman's principle
of
intergenerational trusteeship holds that each child
is
entitled to an endowment that
is
no
worse than
(1)
that provided to any of his
agemates, and
(2)
that obtained by any older citizen with whom the younger citizen
can converse.
5
At
p.
116.
Ackerman says:
''
[A]
relation of
undominured diversity
obtains
if
some
citizens
say
that
A's
genetic code
equips
him better than
B,
while others place
an opposite evaluation
on
their respective genetic equipment."

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