Revolutionary Ideology and Chinese Foreign Policy: the Case of South and Southeast Asia

Published date01 December 1972
AuthorWayne Bert
Date01 December 1972
DOI10.1177/004711787200400605
Subject MatterArticles
688
REVOLUTIONARY
IDEOLOGY
AND
CHINESE
FOREIGN
POLICY:
THE
CASE
OF
SOUTH
AND
SOUTHEAST
ASIA
WAYNE
BERT
The
work
of
scholars
sometimes
precedes
and
stimulates
innovation
by
the
practitioner,
sometimes
the
policy-maker
en-
lightens
the
scholar.
Recent
developments
in
the
international
system,
particularly
the
implementation
of the
belief
by
American
elites
that
balance
of
power
approaches
to
international
politics
are
valid
and
desirable,
thus
allowing
a
reduction
in
international
tension
between
the
superpowers
and
the
breakdown
of the
bipolar
world
as
the
People’s
Republic
of
China
was
recognized
as
an
important
actor
in
international
politics,
have
rendered
obsolete
at
least
two
fundamental
assumptions
on
which
US
policy
in
the
post-war
period
was
based.
These
assumptions
rested
on
the
supposition
that
in
countries
ruled
by
Communist
Parties
(with
the
possible
exception
of
Yugoslavia)
foreign
policies
would
manifest
the
indelible
and
unique
stamp
of
the
Marxist-Leninist
ideology
to
which
the
regime
claimed
adherence.
This
Marxist-Leninist
ideology
(sometimes
including
indigenous
influences
such
as
Maoism
or
Castroism)
was
allegedly
the
explanation
of
two
in-
portant
consequences
in
foreign
policy
behaviour.
In
the
first
place,
the
revolutionary
core
of the
ideology,
expressed
as
an
interest
in
and
support
for
world
revolution
and
proletarian
internationalism
meant
that
disruption
of
the
&dquo;bourgeois&dquo;
status
quo
and
the
establishment
of
Communist
regimes
would
be
2
primary
concern
of
Communist
policy.’
Secondly,
the
ideology
and
institutions
common
to
these
otherwise
diverse
regimes
were
thought
to
exert
a
cohesive
influence
which
ensured
the
unity
of
Communist
re-
gimes
and
the
coordination
of
their
foreign
policy
efforts
against
the
Western
capitalist
bloc
and
Western
interests
in
the
developing
world.
Not
only
the
assumptions
of
policy-makers,
but
also
those
of
specialists
in
international
politics
and
Communist
studies
have
been
called
into
question
by
recent
developments.
In
this
instance
1 For
an
excellent
discussion
of
this
goal
as
the
sine
qua
non
of
Chinese
ideology
see
Peter
Van
Ness,
Revolution
and
Foreign
Policy
(Berkeley :
University
of
California
Press,
1970),
pp.
66-73
and
Lin
Piao,
Long
Live
the
Victory
of
the
People’s
War
(Peking:
Foreign
Languages
Press,
1965),
pp.
37-54.
Practice
threatens
to
undermine
theory,
leading
to
ambiguity
toward,
for
example,
the
justification
given
for
supporting
a
non-
Communist
led
revolution
such
as
Algeria.
In
addition,
Mao
and
the
Chinese
have
repeatedly
pointed
out
the
difficulties
inherent
in
trying
to
export
revolution.
On
this
see
also
the
introduction
to
Stuart
R.
Sclirarn,
The
Political
Thought
of
Mao
Tse-tung,
revised
edition
(New
York:
Praeger,
1969).
Nonetheless,
if
Marxism-Leninism-Maoism
is
to
have
any
operational
significance
in
foreign
policy
beyond
a
kind
of
handbook
of
pragmatic
strategy,
it
must
be
in
terms
of
a
preference
for
Communist
led
revolutionary
movements
and
governments.
689
the
policymakcrs
reconsidered
and
revised
assumptions
about
Communist
foreign
policy
to
which
a
significant
number
of
scholars
still
clung.
In
this
study
I
intend
to
review
and
discuss
theoretical
approaches
to
the
role
of
ideology
in
the_foreign
policy
of
Communist-Party
states.
The
remainder
of
the
study
is
devoted
to
a
discussion
of
how
well
Chinese
foreign
policy
toward
Burma,
India,
Indonesia
and
Pakistan
during
periods
of
domestic
mobili-
zation
in
China
fulfills
the
expectations
for
revolutionary
style
and
content
in
Communist
foreign
policy
behaviour.
I.
Theoretical
Perspectives
on
Ideology
and
Communist
Foreign
Policy
Behaviour.
Theoretical
assumptions
about
the
role
of
ideology
in
Com-
munist
foreign
policy
behaviour
have
been
diverse.
On
the
one
hand,
writers
such
as
Hans
Morgenthau,
R.
V.
Daniels
and
Peter
Van
Nessz
respectively
discussing
Communist,
Soviet
and
Chinese
foreign
policy
have
alleged
that
ideology
is
simply
window
dressing
for
foreign
policy
behaviour
which
is
wholly
concerned
with
power,
security
and
traditional
national
interests.
This
view
mini-
mizes
differences
between
the
foreign
policies
of
democratic
and
Communist
or
&dquo;totalitarian&dquo;
states,
since
it
views
ideology
as
simply
the
means
which
all
national
leaders
use
to
legitimate
their
policies,
with
ideologies
playing
a
very
minor
role
or
none
at
all
in
determining
the
actual
direction
of
policy.
The
function
of
ideology
is
a
passive
one,
serving
only
to
justify
and
explain
policy
which
is
a
response
to
more
basic
goals
of
maintaining
and
increasing
power
and
pursuing
national
interests.
At
the
other
extreme
and
very
much
in
the
minority
is
a
view
which
holds
that
ideology
is
the
primary
explanation
of
Communist
foreign
policy.
Representative
of
such
a
view
is
Franz
Michael
who
holds
that
&dquo;by
their
words
and
actions,
the
Chinese
Communists
have
made
it
amply
clear
that
the
main
purpose
of
their
foreign
policy
is
to
advance
the
Communist
world
revolution
and
play a
major
part
in
directing
it&dquo;.
Michael
maintains
that
2
Hans
Morgenthau,
Politics
Among
Nations,
fourth
edition
(New
York:
Alfred
A.
Knopf.
1967),
p.
83;
Robert
V.
Daniels,
"Doctrine
and
Foreign
Policy",
Survey,
No.
57
(1965),
pp.
4,
13;
Peter
Van
Ness,
op.
cit.,
p.
250.
A
similar
conclusion,
stated
in
slightly
different
language
is
J.
D.
Singer,
"Inter-Nation
Influences:
A
Formal
Model,"
American
Political
Science
Review
(APSR)
LVII
(1963),
pp.
422-423.
Unfortunately,
until
recently
most
of
the
writing
on
this
question
has
been
carried
out
on
a
speculative
level
with
little
attention
to
the
systematic
utilization
of
empirical
evi-
dence.
Welcome
exceptions
to
this
are
the
studies
by
Daniels
and
Van
Ness,
op
cit.,;
J.
F.
Triska
and
David
D.
Finley.
Soviet
Foreign
Policy
(New
York:
Macmillan,
1968),
pp.
111-114;
Richard
A.
Brody
and
John
F.
Vesecky,
"Soviet
Openess
to
Changing
Situations:
A
Critical
Evalua-
tion
of
Certain
Hypotheses
About
Soviet
Foreign
Policy
Behavior."
in
Jan
F.
Triska,
ed.,
Communist
Party-States
(New
York :
Bobbs-Merrill,
1969);
Adam
B.
Ulam,
"Soviet
Ideology
and
Soviet
Foreign
Policy,"
World
Politics,
XI
(1959),
pp.
153-172;
and
articles
and
comment
by
R.
N.
Carew
Hunt,
Samuel
L.
Sharp
and
Richard
Lowenthal
in
the
symposium
in
Problems
of
Communism,
VII
2
(1958),
pp.
10-30
and
VII.
3
(1958),
pp.
50-52.

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