Rights, Common Good, and the Separation of Powers
| Published date | 01 May 2023 |
| Author | Michael Foran |
| Date | 01 May 2023 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2230.12769 |
bs_bs_banner
Modern Law Review
DOI:10.1111/1468-2230.12769
THE
MODERN LAW REVIEW
Volume 86 May 2023 No. 3
Rights, Common Good, and the Separation of Powers
Michael Foran∗
Common good constitutionalism seeks to ground and legitimate choices of constitutional design
and interpretation in a manner committed to pursuing the ourishing of all members of the
community. This raises important questions relating to the separation of powers and fundamental
rights protection. This paper seeks to advance and defend an account of rights-based judicial
review from within a common good constitutional framework. It will argue that rights and
the common good are co-constitutive: a genuinely common good will ensure the protection
of fundamental rights and genuinely fundamental rights will help constitute and further the
common good. With this in mind,a conception of the separation of powers will be advanced
wherein dierent organs of state act collaboratively to ensure both that fundamental rights are
protected and that the state can pursue goals which help to further the common good.
INTRODUCTION
[A]n interest in the common good is the ground of political society, in the sense
that without it no body of people would recognise any authority as having a claim
on their common obedience.1
The classical natural law tradition has seen yet another revival in recent years.
Constitutional scholars have expressed renewed interest in reassessing core ques-
tions relating to the justication of constitutional authority and the relation-
ship between that authority and the community over which it seeks to assert
itself. The role of general jurisprudence within constitutional theory is increas-
ingly central to new debates, their character and scope reviving older debates
concerning the purpose of law in so doing. In the United States of America,
this has manifested in a reappraisal of originalism, liberalism, and positivism
as foundational principles of constitutional interpretation.2A new approach to
∗Lecturer in Law, University of Glasgow.My thanks to Adr ian Ver meule,Conor Casey,Richard Ekins,
Erika Bachiochi and Stefan Teil for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this paper.
1 T.H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation (London: Longman, Green and Co,
1950) 109.
2 See Conor Casey,‘Common-Good Constitutionalism and the New Battle over Constitutional
Interpretation in the United States’ [2021] PL 765.
© 2022 The Author s. The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
(2023) 86(3) MLR 599–628
Thisis an open access ar ticle under the terms of the CreativeCommons Attr ibution License,which permits use,distr ibution and reproduction
in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
Rights, Common Good, and the Separation of Powers
constitutionalism,g roundedwithin a natural law framework and focused on en-
suring the ourishing of all members of the community, has begun to emerge.
Much of the recent surge in interest in the common good stems from le-
gitimate frustration that many have with current forms of constitutionalism.
Most existing theories of constitutionalism do not see questions relating to the
ourishing of individuals or of what constitutes a good life as central or even
important to constitutional theory.Where notions of the good arise, they often
do so incidentally and contingently within rights analysis or they are relegated
to questions of institutional design where the issue concerns who gets the ul-
timate say on the good. On this account, the good, where it is relevant for
constitutional theory, is either whatever a given individual says it is for them,
or it is whatever a democratic institution determines it to be. What the good
actually consists in is thus abandoned as unworthy or even problematic for a
constitutional theorist to consider, the liberal ideal of neutrality holding sway.3
Thus, while some forms of liberalism may have envisaged an important role
of the good life within one’s private morality, liberal constitutionalism is often
characterised by the neutrality principle, what Dworkin described as the re-
quirement ‘that governments must be neutral on what might be called questions
of the good life … that political decisions must be, so far as is possible, inde-
pendent of any particular conception of the good life or of what gives value to
life … liberalism takes [this] as its constitutive political morality’.4Dworkin ar-
gued that this neutrality is what distinguishes liberalism from rival left-wing and
right-wing doctrines which all embrace non-neutral conceptions of the good
life and attempt to mobilise state power to establish a virtuous,ourishing soci-
ety.5This is evidently in contrast with certain liberal thinkers, particularly John
Stuart Mill, who argued that the goal of maximising human good, under stood
in a utilitarian sense, can only be achieved through tight limits upon the state’s
power to interfere with individual liberty.6Mill’s utilitarianism is an example
of a non-neutral liberal constitutionalism because it is openly grounded in a
particular – utilitarian – conception of the good life; it does not purport to
be neutral. But most contemporary liberal constitutionalists are not utilitarian.
Modern liberal constitutionalism is far more likely in practice to reect the
neutrality principle embraced by Dworkin, defending a priority of the r ight
over the good.
This neutrality has failed. It has failed both because liberal constitutionalism
has not, in fact, remained neutral on the good life and because its attempts to
remain neutral have frustrated the development of a constitutionalism which
consciously and unequivocally pursues the ourishing of all members of a po-
litical community. The inability to address, in constitutional terms, concerns
3 See Ronald Dworkin, ‘Liberalism’ in S. Hampshire (ed), Public and Private Morality (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1978); cf Patrick Neal, ‘Liberalism & Neutrality’ (1985) 17 Polity
664; Richard J. Arneson, ‘Liberal Neutrality on the Good: An Autopsy’ in Steven Wall and
George Klosko (eds),Perfectionism and Neutrality: Essays in Liberal Theory (Lanham,MD: Rowman
& Littleeld, 2003).
4 Dworkin, ibid, 127.
5ibid, 128.
6 John Stuart Mill,On Liberty (New York,NY:Cosimo, 2005),orig inally (Liberal Arts Press,1859).
600 © 2022 The Author s. The Modern Law Review published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd on behalf of Modern Law Review Limited.
(2023) 86(3) MLR 599–628
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting