Robinson v Robinson (Disclosure)

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeLORD JUSTICE ORMROD,LORD JUSTICE TEMPLEMAN,MR. JUSTICE WOOD
Judgment Date12 March 1982
Judgment citation (vLex)[1982] EWCA Civ J0312-3
CourtCourt of Appeal (Civil Division)
Docket Number82/0116
Date12 March 1982

[1982] EWCA Civ J0312-3

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE

COURT OF APPEAL

ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

FAMILY DIVISION

(Mr. Justice Cumming-Bruce)

Royal Courts of Justice

Before:

Lord Justice Ormrod

Lord Justice Templeman

and

Mr. Justice Wood

82/0116

8291 1968

Between:
Moira Rosalind Robinson
Appellant (Petitioner)
and
Donald Edgar Robinson
Respondent (Respondent)

MR. M. THORPE, Q.C. and MRS. C. TRITTON (instructed by Messrs Kenwright & Cox, solicitors, London) appeared on behalf of the Appellant (Petitioner).

MR. R. JOHNSON, Q.C. and MR. P.J.D. COLERIDGE (instructed by Messrs Gordon Dadds & Co. Ltd., solicitors, London) appeared on behalf of the Respondent (Respondent).

LORD JUSTICE ORMROD
1

I will ask Lord Justice Templeman to give the first judgment.

LORD JUSTICE TEMPLEMAN
2

This is an application made by a former wife, Mrs. Moira Robinson, to set aside orders for ancillary relief made against her former husband, Mr. Donald Robinson, and for the substitution of reasonable orders for maintenance and a lump sum. In this court we are only concerned with the question of whether the original orders should be set aside. The grounds of the application for setting aside are, it is said, that Mr. Robinson has consistently misrepresented the true value of his fortune.

3

Mr. and Mrs. Robinson were married in 1953. There were four children born between 1955 and 1964 and Mrs. Robinson is now 53 years of age. The husband and wife separated in 1964. Mrs. Robinson petitioned for divorce in 1968 on the ground of desertion. She sought maintenance, a lump sum and property adjustment order, and maintenance for the children. In 1969 Mr. Robinson denied desertion and cross-petitioned.

4

Mr.Robinson was then, and is now, a business man who conducts his affairs through the medium of a parent company, Cadogan and Bramley Hotels Limited, in which, in the early 1970's, he held all the shares except one and that share was registered in the name of his accountant. There were three wholly owned subsidiaries; Edgilton Property Co. Ltd. owned the freehold of the Worcestershire Hotel in Droitwich and also other neighbouring properties in Droitwich. The second company, Edgilton Hotels Limited, was responsible for managing, running and carrying on the business of the Worcestershire Hotel, and there was a third company, Manor Hotels (Winchester) Limited which I think was a trading company and in the event subsequently became a company interested in farming.

5

In 1970 Mr. Robinson bought part of the Gilchristland Estate in Scotland. The Mansion House, certain farm buildings and 528 acres mainly of woodland were conveyed to the Edgilton Property Company for £55,000. The remainder of the estate consisting of 1,496 acres and some farm buildings, composed of 1,200 acres of hill land and 746 acres of arable and pasture was conveyed to a Mr. Morrison for £95,000. Mr. Morrison was only interested in saving estate duty on his death; Mr. Robinson was interested in the estate. Mr. Morrison, in these circumstances, let his land to the Robinson Trading Company, Manor Hotels (Winchester) Limited, on an agricultural tenancy for 10 years at an annual rent of £2,600 but by a contemporaneous agreement the rent was reduced to £1800 and the landlord was relieved of his responsibilities for repairs and improvements. There was also an understanding, which was not legally binding, that, upon the death of Mr. Morrison his land would be conveyed to Mr. Robinson, or as Mr. Robinson might direct, for £96,000, that is to say the 1970 value of £95,000 plus £1,000 presumably for costs. Thus, between honourable men, the result of the 1970 arrangement was that Mr. Robinson obtained the whole estate, subject to a deferred payment of £96,000 and, in the mean time, subject to paying £1,800 a year.

6

In January 1973 Mr. Morrison died and in April 1973 agreement in principle was reached for effect to be given to the understanding between Mr. Morrison and Mr. Robinson. It was made clear by conversations and letters which took place between Mr. Robinson and the representatives of the executors of the late Mr. Morrison, that the original understanding would be carried into effect and that Mr. Robinson would buy the freehold reversion of the Morrison land for the stipulated price of £96,000.

7

On 9th May 1973 Mr. Justice Cumming-Bruce (as he then was) granted Mrs. Robinson a decree of divorce but criticised her attitude and her conduct towards her husband. On the same day Mr. Robinson gave evidence concerning Mrs. Robinson's claim for ancillary relief. He said that his company owned part of the Gilchristland Estate, which he vaguely thought was about 800 acres, which had been bought, as his accountant said, for £55,000 and he said that the company rented the remainder, which he estimated at 1,400 acres. Mr. Robinson gave the impression that he was a working tenant farmer who also happened to own 800 acres. But he did not disclose the arrangements he had made to purchase Mr. Morrison's land in 1970, or the fact that in 1973 he was going to obtain fulfilment of a promise which had been dangled before him in 1970 and purchase Mr. Morrison's land at 1970 prices. He and his accountant declined to value the relevant assets because they said that the values were meaningless. The learned judge accepted that proposition. He said at page 58 of our bundle of transcripts:

(Mr. Robinson's) "assets now consist of the hotel businesses and his farm business. And in these businesses he works extremely conscientiously and I accept the fact that although living on the farm in Scotland is obviously congenial to him and that he has arranged his affairs so that he can live a congenial life, yet living there on the farm he is working in building up the farm and the other aspects of the estate that the farm company has bought, and likewise in his visits to his hotel he so organises himself that he can run the hotel by periodical visits. The capital value of his assets is very difficult to quantify accurately partly because an attempt to value the assets on a break-up basis is really pointless as it would clearly be a disaster to the family if there were any break-up of any part of his businesses. I regard it as important for the future of the family that Mr. Robinson should continue to run his hotel and should continue carefully to build up the Dumfrieshire estate. As those businesses ought therefore to be kept in being it is not profitable to consider what their break-up value might be. And I also accept that if one were to make an approach at valuation on a break-up basis one runs immediately into formidable difficulties of taxation when one comes to try to decide what Mr. Robinson personally might realise in the event of an attempt to realise an asset."

8

Realising part of an estate of 800 acres when you are only a tenant of around 1,400 acres is one thing; realising part of an estate of 2,500 acres is another thing. In the event Mr. Robinson experienced no difficulty either in selling parts or in selling the whole of the different assets which he owned, either personally or through his company.

9

The learned judge credited Mr. Robinson with an income of £15,000 a year and he said at page 60:

"The capital assets on any view are worth something between £300,000 and half a million, but the liquid capital is limited to the shareholdings shown in the accounts."

10

The learned judge was referring to a portfolio of investments which were held by one of Mr. Robinson's company's and which was liquid as distinct from land. Then he says:

"When I consider (Mrs. Robinson's) capital and income position and compare it with his capital and income position and the requirement of keeping the businesses running as a going concern, I cannot see that there is any argument here for a transfer of capital from the husband to the wife, nor can I see any reason for making any financial provision by way of a lump sum.

I take the view that it is relevant in this connection to take into account the fact that the original capital on which the businesses have been built up was inherited by Mr. Robinson from his father, and that it is his efforts, unaided by his wife, which have enabled him gradually over the years to build up the businesses so that the talents that he received have multiplied. It seems to me that it would be wholly inappropriate, in the situation disclosed by the evidence in this case, to regard his capital as a family asset on which Mrs. Robinson has a claim, and having regard to the fact that she has her own capital from various sources, which together with her house may be valued at something of the order of £100,000, it seems to me that it would be quite wrong to exercise the new powers under The Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act to transfer any part of his capital to Mrs. Robinson."

11

As I understand it, the judge's views on the capital sum followed two stratas, first of all the nature of the business; there was not any liquid capital and Mr. Robinson could not sell capital assets without causing a disaster to the family. Secondly there was the entirely separate reason that Mrs. Robinson had not contributed to the fortune which had been inherited from Mr. Robinson's father and she had assets of her own of £100,000. The second reason is not affected by the non-disclosure of the dealings by Mr. Robinson with the Morrison land, but that non-disclosure does materially affect the first reason which the learned judge gave. What he would have done if he had known the full facts, is a matter I shall have to consider later in the light of the submissions that have been made. In the event Mr. Robinson was ordered to pay Mrs. Robinson £1,200 a year, later...

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