Ronald Reagan and the Politics of Declining Union Organization
| Author | Bruce Western,Henry S. Farber |
| Date | 01 September 2002 |
| Published date | 01 September 2002 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/1467-8543.00240 |
Ronald Reagan and the Politics of
Declining Union Organization
Henry S. Farber and Bruce Western
Abstract
New union members in the United States are typically gained through work-
place elections. We find that the annual number of union elections fell by 50 per
cent in the early 1980s. A formal model indicates that declining union election
activity may be due to an unfavourable political climate which raises the costs
of unionization, even though the union win-rate remains unaffected. We relate
the timing of declining election activity to the air-traffic controllers’ strike of
1981, and the appointment of the Reagan Labor Board in 1983. Empirical
analysis shows that the fall in election activity preceded these developments.
1. Introduction
Declining membership in US labour unions throughout the 1980s is often
traced to political causes. Following the national election of 1980, the
Republican Party controlled the Senate and union leaders found regular
support among just 130 out of 435 representatives in the Democratic-
controlled House (Gross 1995: 247). Most important, the incoming Reagan
administration boasted a free-market philosophy that was inimical to the
interests of organized labour. The anti-union stance of the Reagan admin-
istration was expressed in public policy and political appointments.
During the first Reagan administration, two political events stand out as
symbolizing vigorous Republican opposition to organized labour. First, in
the summer of 1981, striking air-traffic controllers were dismissed by President
Reagan and non-union employees were hired as replacements. This event is
often held out as demonstrating a new strategy of employer opposition to
industrial action. Second, in the 12 months following the election, two seats
on the five-seat National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) were filled by
Reagan appointments. These and subsequent appointments to the Labor
Board were to establish a solid pro-management majority that expanded
employers’ rights to oppose union organizing.
Henry Farber and Bruce Western are at Princeton University.
British Journal of Industrial Relations
40:3 September 2002 0007–1080 pp. 385–401
#Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics 2002. Published by Blackwell Publishers Ltd,
108 Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA.
The link between the political composition of the NLRB and union
decline seems particularly suggestive because of the Board’s key roles in
union elections and labour law administration. The main framework for US
labour law is provided by the National Labour Relations Act (NLRA). The
original Act of 1935 was passed to quell industrial unrest and encourage
collective bargaining. Through a system of government-run elections, the
NLRA created an enforceable procedure for union representation based on
majority vote within bargaining units. Employer conduct was tightly
regulated during elections, and the use of threats and dismissals to influence
the vote was prohibited. Violations could be remedied by bringing unfair
labour practice charges before the NLRB.
Earlier research on the political determinants of unionization examined
trends in the unionization rate, or the success rate of unions in NLRB
elections (Weiler 1983; Lalonde and Meltzer 1991). Although the Reagan
administration is sometimes charged with lowering the overall rate of
American union organization, union decline has a significant structural
basis in the slow (even negative) rate of employment growth in the unionized
sector of the economy relative to the non-union sector (Farber and Western
2001). The political determinants of unionization are thus more likely to
be observed in the process of recruiting new members through the NLRB
election process. A number of studies observe that the success rate of unions
in NLRB elections has declined through the postwar period. The slow rate
at which unions now organize new members is thus attributed to electoral
failure.
Although our analysis studies the organization of new union members
through NLRB elections, we shift attention from the election win-rate to the
overall volume of election activity. The annual number of elections con-
tested by unions fell dramatically in the early 1980s. Although often over-
looked, the effect of declining election activity far overshadows the impact
of declining electoral success on new union organizing. Using a series of
monthly data on election activity, we document this decline and examine its
timing in relation to the air-traffic controllers’ strike and the installation of
the Reagan Labor Board. We find that the sharp decline in election activity
follows the inauguration of President Reagan but precedes the air-traffic
controllers’ strike and new appointments to the Labor Board.
2. Trends in union election activity
The National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) provides the central mechanism
through which jobs become unionized. The NLRA, passed in 1935,
guarantees the rights of workers to organize and bargain collectively with
their employers. The Act also specifies a procedure for unions to become
recognized as the exclusive bargaining agent of workers. The procedure is
initiated when a large proportion (at least 30 per cent) of workers show
interest in union representation by signing authorization cards. The union
386 British Journal of Industrial Relations
#Blackwell Publishers Ltd/London School of Economics 2002.
To continue reading
Request your trial