Ronald Waller v Crown Prosecution Service

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This appellant appeals by way of case stated from the decision of the lay justices at the Stratford Magistrates' Court on 13 December 2017 to convict him on one charge of inconsiderate driving contrary to section 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988.

Section 3 of the Act provides under the heading “Careless, and inconsiderate, driving” as follows:

“If a person drives a mechanically propelled vehicle on a road or other public place […] or without reasonable consideration for other persons using the road or place, he is guilty of an offence.”

Under section 3ZA of the Act, under the heading of “Meaning of careless, or inconsiderate, driving”, subsection (4) provides:

“A person is to be regarded as driving… without reasonable consideration for other persons only if those persons are inconvenienced by his driving.”

At the close of the prosecution evidence, a submission was made by counsel on behalf of the Appellant that there was no case to answer. This was on the basis that there was no evidence of the critical element in the offence, namely evidence that the person concerned had been inconvenienced by the Appellant's driving. That submission was rejected by the magistrates. They then heard evidence from the appellant and, following that evidence, they convicted him.

The charge which the appellant faced was based on an information and summons preferred on 12 July 2017 in these terms:

“On 22 February 2017 at London E14 drove a mechanically propelled vehicle, namely London taxi TX11 LS54 UFP on a road, namely Leamouth roundabout without reasonable consideration for other persons using that road contrary to section 3 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and schedule 2 to the Road Traffic Offenders Act 1988.”

The facts found by the magistrates in their Case were in these terms, to be found in paragraph 2 of the case:

“We heard the said information on 13 December 2017 and found the following facts:

(a) A cyclist, Joseph Collins, was travelling to work on a bicycle wearing a camera attached to his helmet.

(b) The appellant, Mr Ronald Waller, was the driver of a London taxi LS54 UFP.

(c) The incident occurred at around 8.23 am and the weather was overcast, windy and drizzly.

(d) The cyclist entered the roundabout in the middle lane from the Lower Lea crossing, in order to proceed towards East India Quay.

(e) The appellant briefly entered the lane occupied by the cyclist.

(f) The cyclist was not hit by the taxi, and he did not fall off his bicycle.

(g) The appellant had no previous convictions and he had a clean driving licence.”

The evidence for the prosecution comprised the oral evidence of the cyclist, Mr Collins, together with the head-camera footage of the incident which was viewed by the magistrates.

The magistrates in their Case summarised the evidence of Mr Collins in these terms:

“He usually travelled by bicycle to work and he usually wears a reflective top over cash clothing. He was wearing a head camera, and at times his head was leaning slightly to the right making it seem he was more on the right-hand side than he was. He was cycling west on the Lower Lea Crossing towards the Leamouth roundabout. As he entered the roundabout in the middle of three lanes there were no vehicles either side. Immediately after this there were vehicles either side. He continued riding in the centre of the middle lane and noticed from the corner of his eye a taxi approaching the left side closely. It was 2 to 3 feet to his left-hand side. He couldn't say which lane it came from. A significant portion of the taxi was then in the same lane as him. He could not recall where the other portion of the car was. This caused him to have to manoeuvre to the right to avoid the risk of collision, he did not move significantly. The manoeuvre was a quick reaction, and at a slight angle to the trajectory he was already taking, and if he hadn't done that he possibly could have been knocked off. He said this made him feel unnerved for a couple of seconds but did not affect his ability to control the cycle, and he said he did not feel inconvenienced.”

As to the camera footage of the incident, the Case summarises what was to be seen, in the following terms:

“This showed the cyclist approaching and going around the roundabout from the viewpoint of his camera. It showed the taxi appearing on the left of the screen. It was then seen driving in towards the cyclist, then moving away. The taxi then turned left onto East India Dock Road from the centre lane. East India Dock Road has a two-lane entry from the roundabout and the appellant exited the roundabout onto the offside lane. The cyclist is then seen continuing his journey right onto to Silvocea Way. We felt the video footage did show the taxi approaching from behind and encroaching on the lane already occupied by the cyclist.”

The justices found a case to answer having regard to the evidence of the cyclist and their interpretation, as they put it, of the video footage.

The first issue raised before me is whether the justices were wrong in law to find a case to answer. The submission on behalf of the appellant, which has been put carefully and concisely by Miss Etemadi, is that on this evidence no tribunal properly directing itself could find the cyclist had been inconvenienced, as is required for the purposes of the offence under subsection (4) of section 3ZA. Miss Etemadi highlights in this regard the evidence of the cyclist that he did not feel inconvenienced.

Insofar as Miss Etemadi is submitting that the evidence of the cyclist that he did not feel inconvenienced was, as a matter of law, determinative of the critical question whether there was evidence that the person had been inconvenienced by the driving, I am against her. It is a question of fact for the tribunal (in this case the justices) to determine on the evidence before them whether as a matter of fact the person concerned had been inconvenienced by the driving in question. It cannot be for the complainant himself to determine that issue. What is important is the evidence of what actually happened and what, if anything, the driving in question caused the cyclist to do. In this case, there was the evidence of the cyclist which was very straightforward. Having described the taxi by a significant proportion coming into the same lane as himself, he said this caused him to have to manoeuvre to the right to avoid the risk of collision. He said the manoeuvre was a quick reaction. He did not have to move significantly. It was at a slight angle to the trajectory he was taking. If he had not done that, he possibly could have been knocked off, and this made him feel unnerved for a couple of seconds. It is this evidence which the Justices, had to consider, taken with the evidence of the camera footage, when deciding whether at the no case to answer stage there was evidence upon which they could properly find as a matter of fact that the cyclist had been inconvenienced by the driving.

It is impossible, in my judgment, for this court to rule that it was not open to the Justices, properly directing themselves, to find that that evidence was capable of establishing an inconvenience to the cyclist. The cyclist on his own evidence had as a matter of fact been caused to manoeuvre, albeit not significantly and in a quick reaction, to avoid a collision, that is to avoid the possibility of being knocked off. The footage did show, to quote the justices, the taxi approaching from behind and encroaching on the lane already occupied by the cyclist.

The Justices in the stated Case, record the reliance placed by the Appellant in making the submission of no case, on both limbs of the well-known principles set out in Galbraith [1981] 1 WLR 1039. The submission on the first...