Routine Presidential Activism by Going Public under Semi-Presidential and Parliamentary Regimes
| Published date | 01 November 2024 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/14789299231185453 |
| Author | Mažvydas Jastramskis,Lukas Pukelis |
| Date | 01 November 2024 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/14789299231185453
Political Studies Review
2024, Vol. 22(4) 740 –761
© The Author(s) 2023
Article reuse guidelines:
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DOI: 10.1177/14789299231185453
journals.sagepub.com/home/psrev
Routine Presidential Activism
by Going Public under
Semi-Presidential and
Parliamentary Regimes
Mažvydas Jastramskis and Lukas Pukelis
Abstract
Presidential research commonly focuses on the most prominent cases of going public by presidents
in semi-presidential regimes: such as expressing a lack of trust in the cabinet members. However,
it is also important to understand the day-to-day functioning of semi-presidential republics and
routine efforts by the presidents to insert themselves into government decisions. Moreover,
presidents in parliamentary republics may also try to influence the government through the power
of the public word. In this article, we conceptualize going public as an instance when a president
weighs in on the performance of the cabinet and/or individual minister in the media. We analyze
the focus and intensity of these instances in semi-presidential (Lithuania) and parliamentary (Latvia)
regimes. Our main finding is that on average, presidents are more routinely active in public under
semi-presidentialism. We also find that the intensity and focus of presidential attention on the
cabinet are highly correlated to the media attention. Furthermore, presidents go public more
often during the first year of their terms and pay more attention to foreign and defense policy than
to other areas. Our results tend to support the presidency-centered arguments that emphasize
the institutional prerogatives and political culture in the explanation of presidential activism.
Keywords
semi-presidentialism, presidential activism
Accepted: 9 June 2023
Introduction
With the advance of popular presidential elections, semi-presidentialism is now the most
popular regime in Europe (Neto and Strøm, 2006). Although direct elections grant presi-
dents popular legitimacy, semi-presidential systems vary quite considerably according to
the constitutional powers and role of presidents (Elgie, 2009; Siaroff, 2003). While the
Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, Vilnius, Lithuania
Corresponding author:
Mažvydas Jastramskis, Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University, Vokiečių g.
10, Vilnius 01130, Lithuania.
Email: mazvydas.jastramskis@tspmi.vu.lt
1185453PSW0010.1177/14789299231185453Political Studies ReviewJastramskis and Pukelis
research-article2023
Article
Jastramskis and Pukelis 741
president-parliamentary type (Shugart and Carey, 1992) favors the president over the
prime minister, it is considered less stable and could be even dangerous for democracy
(Elgie, 2019). Under the premier-presidential system, the president cannot dismiss the
government unilaterally and, accordingly, this type (mostly found in Europe) usually
favors the prime minister over the president. However, these presidents may still have
some substantial powers such as a central role in foreign and defense policy, legislative
veto, or influence over some high-level appointments. Moreover, despite the limits in
their powers to affect government composition and public policies, directly elected presi-
dents usually enjoy higher popularity than prime ministers (Raunio and Sedelius, 2022).
Because of these configurations, directly elected presidents face both institutional (lim-
ited power over the prime minister) and sociological incentives (popularity) to resort to
informal presidential activism and use informal powers such as going-public tactics.
Concrete aims of these tactics could be various: pressuring the government over the pol-
icy issues or posts in the cabinet, power play in order to establish the authority of the
presidency in intra-executive relations, or enhancing the probability of presidents’
re-election.
The power of the public word is one of the major tools in the arsenal of presidents in
semi-presidential republics and it may significantly affect the public policies and compo-
sition of government (Feijó, 2021). Although the ability of presidents to use public appeal
in order to pressure Congress is well researched in the context of the US presidential
system (Canes-Wrone, 2005; Kernell, 2006; Lowi, 1985; Rudalevige, 2005), it received
less attention in the case of the European presidents. Available evidence shows that going-
public tactics indeed favors the presidents under semi-presidential systems, as they often
emerge victorious from intra-institutional conflicts (Protsyk, 2006; Pukelis and
Jastramskis, 2021; Raunio and Sedelius, 2020). However, this research focused on the
most prominent cases of going public, such as expressing lack of trust by presidents in
some ministers or even prime ministers. Such an approach highlights the key points in the
competition for power. However, it also ignores the day-to-day functioning of semi-pres-
idential republics and the routine efforts by the presidents to insert themselves into the
decisions by the government.
Recent debates on informal presidential activism and going-public tactics are mostly
focused on the directly elected presidents (Feijó, 2021; Raunio and Sedelius, 2019, 2020).
However, there is an argument in the literature that “presidents are presidents, regardless
of how they come to power” (Tavits, 2008: 235): variation in presidential activism is
determined by the structure of political opportunities. Inconsistent constitutional design
such as indirect presidential elections combined with some substantial powers (Grimaldi,
2023) or inconsistency between high popularity and weak powers may drive presidents in
parliamentary republics toward informal presidential activism. Moreover, trends of per-
sonalization in democracies create opportunities for informal leadership (Grimaldi, 2023;
Passarelli, 2015). These arguments build a rather strong case to also include the parlia-
mentary regimes into the analysis of informal presidential activism.
In this article, we analyze the routine going-public tactics by the presidents in both
semi-presidential (Lithuania) and parliamentary (Latvia) regimes. We selected these
cases because they are representative to their respective regime classes (in terms of presi-
dential powers) and are politically similar. In our analysis, we focus on instances when a
president weighs in on the performance of the cabinet and/or individual minister in the
mainstream media. Cases of going public may vary according to their intensity (how
often the president goes public), focus (policy areas and ministers that are targeted), and
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