Samsung Electronics Company, Ltd (a company incorporated under the laws of the Republic of Korea) v ZTE Corporation (a company incorporated under the Laws of the People's Republic of China)

Hearing dates: 19–23 and 26–30 January, 9–11 February 2026

REDACTED JUDGMENT

Remote hand-down: This judgment will be handed down remotely by circulation to the parties or their representatives by email and release to The National Archives. A copy of the judgment in final form as handed down should be available on The National Archives website shortly thereafter but can otherwise be obtained on request by email to the Judicial Office ( press.enquiries@judiciary.uk).

Confidentiality markings in this judgment:

[REDACTED EEO/CISZ] = information that is EEO or is confidential information of the Claimants or Defendants.

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[REDACTED CBP] = information that is confidential as between the parties.

INTRODUCTION

This is my judgment following a trial to consider the terms of a global, FRAND portfolio cross-licence between the Claimants (“ Samsung”) and the Defendants (“ ZTE”). The FRAND obligation in question is that under the ETSI regime.

The parties made a previous licence agreement in 2021 (the “ 2021 PLA”) but have been unable to agree the terms of a renewal, although they agree there should be one. I refer in this judgment to the renewal licence, the terms of which are to be determined by this Court, as the Court-Determined Licence or CDL.

As so often in FRAND disputes, the key issue that divides the parties is price, which it is agreed I should state as a lump sum, though there are also some disputes over non-royalty terms. Although a renewal would be a cross-licence the commercial picture is that Samsung's mobile phone sales are by far the dominant economic driver and the critical factor is how much should be paid for them. For the same reason, it is clear, and common ground, that Samsung will be the net payer.

The parties' inability to agree a renewal has led to widespread litigation. There has been a dispute over which court should rule on the terms of any renewal: Samsung preferred this Court, and ZTE preferred that a decision be made in China (specifically in Chongqing). That led to the decision of the Court of Appeal in [2025] EWCA Civ 1383 setting aside the decision of Mellor J in [2025] EWHC 1432 (Pat) to make an interim licence declaration; the parties had agreed that there should be an interim licence and as to all of its terms except which court should make the decision about the terms of the final renewal licence.

In this setting, the Intermediate People's Court of Chongqing Municipality (the “ Chongqing Court”) had already held a FRAND trial prior to the start of the trial before me. I am told by the parties that the Chongqing trial was only about cellular SEPs, whereas the present trial also includes a claim by Samsung to a licence covering non-cellular SEPs and NEPs, although that is a relatively minor dispute which narrowed further during trial.

As well as the two FRAND trials there are also infringement cases going on internationally: for example, an infringement trial in which ZTE alleges infringement by Samsung was held in the German national courts two days after the last day of the trial before me. The action in the UK also includes claims by Samsung for alleged infringement of its patents by ZTE, which were ordered to be determined in separate “technical” trials in due course (but see further below, as this position changed).

As Arnold LJ has observed on a number of occasions, this profusion of litigation is a symptom of a dysfunctional system, whose critical problem is the lack of a dispute resolution mechanism within the ETSI rules. It is especially unfortunate that all this litigation has been seen by the parties as necessary when they have been in a previous consensual licence relationship, agree that there should be a renewal, and agree on almost everything but price.

A further complication is that although Samsung has undertaken to enter into the CDL as decided by me, ZTE has not (since otherwise it would effectively have to abandon the Chongqing proceedings). ZTE says that the Chongqing decision will give rise to a res judicata here, which Samsung disputes. I have not heard any submissions about whether the Chongqing Court would compel Samsung to enter into a licence.

Overview of the parties' valuation cases

Both parties' valuation cases are based on comparables, while ZTE also relies on a top-down methodology as a cross-check.

Samsung's primary position is that the most appropriate comparables to use in this case are those to ZTE's own portfolio. Samsung relies on the 2021 PLA and alternatively on a licence agreement between ZTE and Apple ( ZTE-Apple 2020). I will refer to the 2021 PLA and ZTE-Apple 2020 collectively as the “ Big Two” where appropriate. Using this abbreviation is convenient where the arguments apply equally to each of them, but I do not lose sight of the fact that in other respects they have some significant differences. It is also an abbreviation that emerged during the trial so is not used in the written evidence or pleadings.

In the ordinary course of events, one would expect that the 2021 PLA and possibly ZTE-Apple 2020 would indeed be used as comparables for the CDL; indeed it might well not be necessary to look any further. But matters are not so simple, because ZTE says that both those agreements were so seriously affected by non-FRAND factors that they cannot be used as comparables at all.

I will need to expand below on the non-FRAND factors alleged, but in a nutshell ZTE says that it entered into negotiations with Samsung and Apple in the shadow of having been the subject of sanctions by the USA which effectively killed its previously thriving handset business and forced it to try to monetise its patent portfolio. It alleges that it told both Samsung and Apple that it wanted a quick deal to bring in cash and that to achieve that it would be willing to give lower rates than would otherwise apply. It says that it did not really want to license its 5G patents because it was not ready to do so (so initially...