Saudi Arabia After the Gulf War: the Internal-External Security Dilemma
| Published date | 01 December 1995 |
| Date | 01 December 1995 |
| Author | Clive Jones |
| DOI | 10.1177/004711789501200602 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
31
SAUDI
ARABIA
AFTER
THE
GULF
WAR:
THE
INTERNAL-EXTERNAL
SECURITY
DILEMMA
Dr
Clive Jones
Introduction
The
Gulf
War
of
1990
to
1991
marked
a
watershed
in
the
political
development
of
Saudi
Arabia.
While
the
coalition
forces
led
by
the
United
States
removed
the
direct
threat
presented
to
Riyadh
by
Saddam
Hussein,
the
crisis
exacer-
bated
religious,
economic,
ethnic
and
social
tensions
that
now
challenge
the
consensual
base
of
popular
support
previously
enjoyed
by
the
House
of Saud.
In
turn,
these
domestic
challenges
have
moulded
a
new
Saudi
approach
to
regional
politics.
Iraq’s
invasion
of
Kuwait
exposed
the
limitations
of
Saudi
Arabia’s
previous
dependence
on
its
accumulated
wealth
to
buy
security
for
the
regime.
Generous
loans
and
contributions
made
to
Arab
states,
the
Palesti-
nians
and
various Islamic
organizations
may
have
bought
the
regime
time,
but,
as
the
crisis
demonstrated,
this
did
not
necessarily
translate
into
regional
stability.
Indeed,
the
Gulf
War
demonstrated
that
the
external
security
of
Saudi
Arabia
remained
dependent
upon
a
confluence
of
interest
with
the
West
and
in
particular,
Washington.
Yet
this
relationship
remains
problematic
for
King
Fahd,
not
least
because
of
the
emotive
impact
such
ties
have
had
upon
the
growing
Islamic
opposition
inside
the
Kingdom.
While
in
part
fuelled
by
the
economic
anomie
now
facing
Saudi
society,
dependence
upon
direct
American
military
aid
provided
a
powerful
means
of
challenging
the
legitimacy
of
the
self-proclaimed
’Servant
of
the
two
Holy
Places’,
King
Fahd
himself.
Although
the
positioning
of
non-Muslim
troops
on
Saudi
soil
during
the
crisis
was
condoned
by
afatwa
issued
by
the
chief
Saudi
religious
authority,
Sheikh
Abdul
Aziz
Bin
Baz,
wider
Islamic
sentiment
condemned
as
apostasy
such
an
overwhelming
presence
and
an
overt
attempt
by
the
West
to
occupy
the
’Muslim
Heartland’.’
1
Reliance
upon
the
West
remains
nonetheless
the
most
salient
means
of
ensuring
the
territorial
integrity
of
Saud
Arabia.
But
the
pursuit
of
external
security
has
had
a
clear
impact
upon
the
internal
stability
of
the
Kingdom.
Investment
in
high-technology
weapons
systems,
coupled
with
the
massive
payouts
in
reparations
to
coalition
partners
have
drained
Saudi
currency
reserves
from
a
peak
of $121
billion
in
1984
to
an
estimated
$7
billion
a
decade
later.2
While
unwilling
to
impose
substantial
levels
of
direct
taxation
on
Saudi
society -
a
characteristic
of
rentier
states -
cut
backs
in
funding
to
state
1
James
Piscatori,
’Religion
and
Real
Politik:
Islamic
Responses
to
the
Gulf
War’,
in
James
Piscatori
(ed.),
Islamic
Fundamentalisms
and
the
Gulf Crisis
(Chicago:
American
Academy
of
Arts
and
Sciences,
1991),
pp.
9-10.
2
Jeff
Gerth,
’Saudi
Stability
Hit
by
Heavy
Spending
Over
the
Last
Decade’,
New
York
Times,
22 August
1993.
32
institutions,
the
largest
employers
in
the
Saudi
economy,
have
necessarily
seen
levels
of
unemployment
rise.
Not
only
has
this
stoked
the
fires
of
Islamic
opposition,
but
some
observers
have
also
discerned
a
perceptible
rise
in
the
level
of
provincial
discontent
at
the
political
hegemony
exercised
by
the
House
of
Saud
over
the
Kingdom.’
.
In
short,
Saudi
Arabia
faces
an
internal-external
security
dilemma.
King
Fahd
has
had
to
adapt
to
conflicting
calls
for
greater
liberalization
throughout
the
Kingdom,
while
paying
careful
attention
to
those
who
demand
greater
Islamic
piety
in
the
future
development
of
Saudi
Arabia.
Yet
the
costs
of
the
war
to
the
Saudi
economy
have
inhibited
his
political
room
for
manoeuvre,
serving
to
increase
a
sense
of
dependency
on the
military
capabilities
of
the
West
in
general
and
the
United
States
in
particular.
The
increased
polarization
of
Saudi
political
debate
in
the
wake
of
the
Gulf
conflict
is
now
the
major
challenge
facing
King
Fahd.
Failure
to
accommodate
these
competing
demands
will
have
not
only
severe
consequences
for
Saudi
society,
but
also
profound
implications
for
the
stability
of
region.
Saudi
Arabia:
the
domestic
challenge
That
Islamic
opposition
exists
at
all
in
Saudi
Arabia
is
a
source
of
much
dis-
quiet
to
the
House
of
Saud.
Because
the
Kingdom
is
run
according
to
the
Shari’a,
leading
defenders
of
the
regime
argue
that
opposition
to
the
state
on
Islamic
grounds
is
meaningless.
The
Islamic
legitimacy
of
the
ruling
order
remains
based
upon
its
adherence
to
the
orthodox
Wahhabi
interpretation
of
Sunni
Islam.
Wahhabism
has
traditionally
been
marked
by
its
’austerity,
discipline
and
emphasis
on
Islamic
devotion,
purity,
simplicity
and
egali-
tarianism
as
they
are
perceived
to
have
existed
in
the
days
of
the
Prophet’ .4
The
rapid
rate
of
modernization
experienced
by
the
country
after
the
discovery
of
oil,
however,
meant
that
Wahhabism
was
used
increasingly
to
sanctify
political
decisions
already
taken
by
the
ruling
elite,
rather
than
having
a
direct
Islamic
bearing
on
the
process
of
decision-making
itself.
Accordingly,
the
Supreme
Committee
of
Ulema,
consisting
of
government-appointed
clerics
and
lawyers,
became
the
bastion
of
theological
legitimization
for
policy
decisions
already
taken
by
King
Fahd.
The
fatwa
issued
by
Sheikh Bin
Baz
condoning
the
presence
of
non-Muslim
troops
on
Saudi
soil
provides
one
obvious
example.
In
the
wake
of
the
Gulf
crisis,
the
subservience
of
this
relationship
has
been
brought
into
sharp
relief
following
the
resurgence
of
what
might
be
termed
neo-Wahhabism,
concentrated
particularly
among
the
Islamic
state
univer-
sities
of
the
Najd
region.
The
call
for
the
restitution
of
strict
Wahhabi
practice
in
the
governing
of
the
Kingdom
has
proved
of
particular
concern
to
the
Saudi
elite:
not
only
did
the
House
of
Saud
originate
from
the
Najd,
but
the
theological
basis
of
the
regime,
Wahhabism,
remained
a
largely
Najdi
phenomenon.
The
emergence
of
such
an
opposition
is
therefore
the
cause
of
3
Heiga
Graham,
’Saudis
Break
the
Silence’,
London
Review
of Books,
22
April
1993.
4
Mahmud
A.
Faksh
and
Ramzi
F.
Faris,
’The
Saudi
Conundrum:
Squaring
the
Security-
Stability
Circle’,
Third
World
Quarterly,
Vol.
14,
No.
2 (1993),
p.
287.
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