Scala Ballroom (Wolverhampton) Ltd v Ratcliffe

(The Court did not call upon Mr. Harry Lester.)

This is an appeal by Plaintiffs who unsuccessfully applied for an injunction. The matter arises in this way: the Plaintiffs, who are the proprietors of the Scald Ballroom, are seeking to restrain the Defendants, who are officials of the Musicians Union, from persuading or attempting to persuade any members of the Union not to perform at the Scald Ballroom, and from persuading or attempting to persuade any persons to refrain from employing any musicians on the ground that those musicians have played or agreed to play at the Scald Ballroom.

The Ballroom was opened on the 28th April by the Plaintiffs, who subsequently decided to deny admittance to coloured people. That was a course which they ware entitled to adopt in their own business interests; but the reaction of the officials of the Musicians Union was immediate as soon as the licence was granted by the Licensing Justices at Wolverhampton and publicity was given to that licence. The first Defendant is the General Secretary of the Musicians Union; the second Defendant is the Assistant Secretary of the Union; and the third Defendant is the Midland Area Organiser of the Union. Some question arises in this case as to whether in any event the first Defendant is a party to the combination which has been alleged by the Plaintiffs, but it is unnecessary to discuss that matter further.

The second Defendant, who is, as I said, the Assistant Secretary, wrote to the Plaintiffs saying on behalf of the Union: "Our attention has been drawn to press reports concerning your policy of racial discrimination as it will affect the clientele of your ballroom. According to these reports, coloured people are not permitted to enter the ballroom." Then he challenged the use of the word "coloured". "The long-established policy of the Musicians' union is strongly opposed to discrimination of any kind including. of course. racial discrimination, and, assuming the reports to be accurate we hereby give you notice that members of the Musicians'Union will not be permitted to perform at the Scald Ballroom on any occasion so long as a policy of racial discrimination is maintained by its proprietors. Instructions are being issued accordingly, but, should you decide to abandon your policy of racial discrimination, please notify us immediately."

There were various contracts outstanding with the band leaders to perform at the Ballroom. the question arose as to whether those contracts were being interfered with by the Defendants, and on the 2nd July the Plaintiffs issued their writ for damages for conspiracy and claiming an injunction restraining the Defendants from, inter alia, persuading or attempting to persuade any member of the Union not to perform at the Scald Ballroom, and with regard to existing contracts, an injunction was granted by Mr. Justice Havers on the 9th July restraining the Defendants, their servants and agents, from procuring or attempting to procure any member of the Musicians'Union to break any contract to perform at the Scald Ballroom until the trial of the action or until further Order. There was no appeal against that Order, but the rest of the Summons was adjourned and came before Mr. Justice Diplock, who refused to grant the injunction asked for, and in respect of that refusal this appeal has been brought.

This appeal calls for consideration of the law of conspiracy which was considered and very closely analysed by the House of Lords in the case of ( Crofter and Woven Harris Tweed Co. Ltd. v. Veiteh 1942 A.C. 433). The claim in this casa which is relevant is a claim that the Defendants have wrongly combined and conspired together to injure the Plaintiffs in the way of their trade by preventing members of the Union from playing at the Scald, and it has been necessary for the Judges who have bad to deal with this matter and for this Court to consoler the element of the tort of conspiracy as a civil wrong. Any decision at on an application for an injunction is a provisional decision and it would be wrong to attempt to lay down in detail the law which is relevant to this case. I accept Mr. Le Quesne's submission that if there is a reasonable probability that he is entitled to the relief that he has claimed, this Court would be ready to greet an injunction; and he submits, in support of his application, that the learned Judge's approach to this matter has not been correct. I must, therefore, refer to some extent to the Crofter case, where Lord simon pointed out, as indeed did Mr. Justice Diplock, that in order to make cut their case the Appellants "have to establish (a) agreement between the respondents (b) to effect an unlawful purpose (c) resulting in damage to the appellants".

The learned Judge has found here an agreement between the Respondents, and he has also found resultant damage to the Appellants. I think, as I read the , there is prima facie evidence to support his finding. "In doing so", he says, "they"- that is the Defendants - "would necessarily injure the C Plaintiffs in their trade." But the remaining element is the one which always gives rise to difficulty in these cases, that which is under the heading (b), namely, "to effect an unlawful purpose".

In one of the leading cases in the House of Lords, ( Sorrell v. Smith 1925 A.C. 700), Lord Cave, Lord Chancellor, at pages 711 and 712, after examining three cases in their Lordships'House, extracted cert-tin principles and formulated two propositions, namely: "(1) A...