Screening for Bid Rigging—does It Work?

DOI10.1093/joclec/nhy006
Date25 July 2018
Pages235-261
Year2018
Published ByOxford University Press
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 14(2), 235–261
doi:10.1093/joclec/nhy006
Advance Access publication 25 July 2018
SCREENING FOR BID RIGGING—DOES IT
WORK?
David Imhof
*
, Yavuz Karagök
†
& Samuel Rutz
‡
ABSTRACT
This paper proposes a method to detect bid rigging by applying mutually
reinforcing screens to a road construction procurement dataset from Switzerland
in which no prior information about collusion was available. The screening method
is particularly suited to address the problem of partial collusion, that is, collusion
that does not involve all firms and/or all contracts in a specific dataset, implying
that many of the classical markers discussed in the corresponding literature will fail
to identify bid rigging. In addition to presenting new screens for collusion, it is
shown how benchmarks and the combination of different screens may be used to
identify subsets of suspicious contracts and firms. The discussed screening method
succeeds in isolating a group of “suspicious”firms exhibiting the characteristics of
a local bid-rigging cartel with cover bids and a—more or less pronounced—bid
rotation scheme. Based on these findings, the Swiss Competition Commission
(COMCO) opened an investigation and sanctioned the identified “suspicious”
firms for bid rigging in 2016.
JEL: C00; C40; D22; D40; K40; L40; L41
I. INTRODUCTION
Bid rigging involves groups of firms conspiring to raise prices or lower the quality
of goods or services offered in public tenders. Although illegal, this anticompeti-
tive practice costs governments and taxpayers vast sums of money each year.
1
It
*
Economist, Secretariat of the Swiss Competition Commission. Email: david.imhof@weko.
admin.ch.Affiliated with the University of Fribourg (Switzerland), CRESE EA 3190, Univ.
Bourgogne Franche-Comté, F-25000 Besançon and Unidistance (Formation universitaire à
distance, Switzerland). Disclaimer: All views contained in this paper are solely those of the
authors and cannot be attributed to the Swiss Competition Commission or its Secretariat.
Acknowledgements: The authors would like to thank Christian At, Marc Blatter, Karine
Brisset, Rafael Corazza, Thierry Madiès, Daniel Marszalec, Hiroshi Ohashi, Dan Sasaki, Frank
Stüssi, and Niklaus Wallimann for support and helpful comments.
†
Senior Economist, Secretariat of the Swiss Competition Commission. Email: yavuz.karagoek@
weko.admin.ch.
‡
Project Manager, Swiss Economics and Adjunct Fellow, Avenir Suisse. Email: samuel.rutz@
avenir-suisse.ch.
1
On average, procurement amounts to 29percent of the government expenditure in OECD
countries and to 13 percent of GDP. For Switzerland, procurement accounts for 23 percent of
the government expenditure and represents 8 percent of the Swiss GDP (see OCED, 2013).
© The Author(s)2018. Publishedby Oxford UniversityPress. All rightsreserved.
For permissions, pleasee-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
is therefore not surprising that the fight against bid rigging is currently a top pri-
ority in many countries and also a much-debated issue internationally.
2
In
Switzerland, it was acknowledged a few years ago that the fight against bid rig-
ging in the procurement sector should be a priority, not least because the Swiss
Competition Commission (COMCO) uncovered several bid-rigging cartels in
the recent past.
3
To detect bid rigging (and other competition law infringements), national
competition authorities rely heavily on leniency programs
4
. Switzerland is no
exception: whistle-blowers or leniency applicants are the common denomin-
ator of recently prosecuted cases, and they contributed significantly to the
uncovering of bid-rigging cartels. To mitigate the dependency on these exter-
nal sources and actively reinforce the fight against bid rigging, COMCO
decided to initiate a long-term project in 2008. One of the goals of this pro-
ject was to develop a statistical screening tool with the following properties:
(1) Modest data requirements: Screening exercises will often have to rely on
limited available public data, for example, data collected by a procure-
ment agency or a statistical office. Gathering detailed information from
private firms will hardly ever be an option because this would immedi-
ately raise the suspicion of potential cartel members and lead to the
destruction of any proof of collusion.
(2) Simplicity: For a competition authority to conduct screening exercises on
a regular basis, the applied method should be as simple as possible. In
other words, it is rather unlikely that methods based on complex, econo-
metric models are suited for broad-based screening activities. Such mod-
els are often data-intensive and time-consuming to implement.
(3) Flexibility: Of course, it cannot be expected that there is a “one-size-fits-
all”approach to detect bid-rigging cartels. The screening method should
therefore be simple to adapt to different situations, for example, to spe-
cific circumstances of the screened industry or to the available data.
2
In 2009, the OECD adopted the Guidelines for Fighting Bid-rigging in Public Procurement. These
guidelines were followed by the adoption of a Recommendation on Fighting Bid-rigging in Public
Procurement in 2012, which calls for governments to assess their public procurement laws and
practices at all levels of government to promote more effective procurement and reduce the
risk of bid rigging in public tenders. The two documents mentioned and many other docu-
ments related to bid rigging are available on the OECD homepage (http://www.oecd.org/daf/
competition/fightingbidrigginginpublicprocurement.htm).
3
See Strassenbeläge Tessin (LPC 2008/1, pp. 85–112), Elektroinstallationsbetriebe Bern (LPC 2009/
2, pp. 196–222), Wettbewerbsabreden im Strassen- und Tiefbau im Kanton Aargau (LPC 2012/2,
pp. 270–425), Wettbewerbsabreden im Strassen- und Tiefbau im Kanton Zürich (LPC 2013/4, pp.
524–652) and Tunnelreinigung (LPC 2015/2, pp. 193–245). Furthermore, COMCO regularly
institutes proceedings concerning bid-rigging cases (at the beginning of 2017, several proceed-
ings were still being investigated by COMCO).
4
OECD, Roundtable on ex officio Cartel Investigations and the use of screens to detect cartels,
BACKGROUND NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT (2014).
236 Journal of Competition Law & Economics

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