Seeking `Legitimate' Great Power Status in Post-Cold War International Society: China's and Japan's Participation in UNPKO
| Author | Shogo Suzuki |
| Published date | 01 March 2008 |
| Date | 01 March 2008 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0047117807087242 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
SEEKING ‘LEGITIMATE’ GREAT POWER STATUS 45
Seeking ‘Legitimate’ Great Power Status in
Post-Cold War International Society:
China’s and Japan’s Participation in UNPKO1
Shogo Suzuki, University of Manchester, UK
Abstract
This article joins the debates on hierarchies in international society. Drawing on the
insights of the English School approach, it shows that the existence of socially legitimated
great powers results in the emergence of ‘frustrated great powers’, which are dissatisfi ed
with their status in international society. By examining the participation of China and
Japan in United Nations peacekeeping operations, it argues that ‘frustrated great powers’
can play ‘recognition games’ and attempt to persuade their peers that they are worthy of
‘legitimate great power’ status. Rather than posing a threat to the international order, as
is often assumed, I show that ‘frustrated great powers’ can inadvertently strengthen the
normative structures of international society by invoking the social discourses that surround
‘legitimate great power’ status. The fi ndings of this article also demonstrate that we need
to pay greater attention to the intentions of ‘frustrated great powers’, and put forward an
alternative framework for examining these states.
Keywords: China, English School, great powers, Japan, legitimacy, recognition, rising
powers, status
Introduction
Most observers of Chinese and Japanese foreign policy accept that both states harbour
considerable frustration with their international standing. Indeed, the literature on the
foreign policy of China and Japan is soaked with the assumption that both states are
seeking to attain great power status – so far with limited success. It is argued that:
[t]here is a strong desire among the Japanese public for an advancement in national
dignity to become, along with security and economic advantage, a major objec-
tive of Japan’s foreign policy – probably stronger than among the publics of any
other major country.2
In China, this tendency is even more pronounced. We are told that there exists a
powerful sentiment that the ‘Chinese nation deserves a much better fate than that
which it has experienced in the modern world’.3 China does possess many attributes
of a great power (such as a large economy and population, and a permanent seat on
the United Nations Security Council). Despite this, Stuart Harris notes, ‘not only
International Relations Copyright © 2008 SAGE Publications
Los Angeles, London, New Delhi and Singapore, Vol 22(1): 45–63
[DOI: 10.1177/0047117807087242]
46 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 22(1)
does China not believe it has the status that its characteristics should entitle it to but
many non-Chinese observers would agree’.4
This may seem somewhat odd, as China and Japan do meet the criteria often asso-
ciated with great powers. Japan still has the second-largest economy in the world,
and is a member of the G8. China, as mentioned above, possesses a large economy,
territory, population and military, and also sits on the United Nations Security Council
as a permanent member. Why are the two states seemingly insecure in their status?
Where does this insecurity come from?
The aim of this article is to further our understanding of this phenomenon, and
examine the process of great power recognition through the cases of China and Japan.
Drawing on insights from the English School approach, it focuses on a particular
type of great power which I call a ‘legitimate great power’. It does not attempt to
forward a defi nition of a great power, which has been done elsewhere.5 The discus-
sion proceeds as follows. I fi rst explore what a ‘legitimate great power’ is and what it
means to be accepted as one. Following from this, the article puts forward the addi-
tional category of a ‘frustrated great power’. It is then argued that ‘frustrated great
powers’ can attempt to persuade their peers that they are worthy of recognition as
‘legitimate great powers’ by engaging in what Erik Ringmar has called ‘recognition
games’. This last point is illustrated through a brief examination of the attempts by
China and Japan to achieve great power recognition.
By concentrating on ‘recognition games’ to become ‘legitimate great powers’, this
article demonstrates that states which aspire to this status do not axiomatically seek
to challenge the status quo. Rather, they can improve their standing in the ‘hierarchy’
of international society by seeking ‘social recognition’ from their peers. The result is
that the ‘frustrated great powers’ actually end up reproducing the social structures of
international society, rather than overturning them. This point has been recognised by
some scholars to a certain extent, but the process remains somewhat undertheorised.
Rosemary Foot, for instance, notes that China has increasingly wanted to attain the
image of a ‘responsible state’ in international society, and to this end has joined an
increasing number of international conventions.6 However, in Foot’s account the
relationship between a ‘responsible image’ and a quest for ‘great power recognition’
remains somewhat opaque. Consequently, we do not know why China, which in many
ways is already a great power, should be so concerned with ‘great power recognition’
or feel the need to project this particular image. This article attempts to fi ll this gap.
It puts forward an alternative account for examining ‘frustrated great powers’ and the
effects their discontent may have on the international status quo. This examination will
hopefully shed light on the question of what type of great power these states might
be, and yield us considerable insights into what ‘legitimate great power’ identity or
status means in contemporary international society.
Legitimate great powers in international society
Scholars working in the English School tradition have long recognised the existence of
a separate entity of states that not only have economic and military strength, but also
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