Sequential auction based parking space sharing and pricing mechanism in the era of sharing economy
| Date | 09 September 2019 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/IMDS-04-2019-0244 |
| Published date | 09 September 2019 |
| Pages | 1734-1747 |
| Author | Bing Qing Tan,Su Xiu Xu,Ray Zhong,Meng Cheng,Kai Kang |
| Subject Matter | Information & knowledge management |
Sequential auction based
parking space sharing and
pricing mechanism in the era of
sharing economy
Bing Qing Tan
Management School, Jinan University, Guangzhou, China
Su Xiu Xu
Institute of Physical Internet, School of Intelligent Systems Science and Engineering,
Jinan University (Zhuhai Campus), Zhuhai, China, and
Ray Zhong, Meng Cheng and Kai Kang
Department of Industrial and Manufacturing Systems Engineering,
University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Abstract
Purpose –The purpose of this paper is to design a parking space management platform to alleviate the
parking problem and a two-stage solution for sharing and allocating parking spaces.
Design/methodology/approach –The marketdesign mechanism and auction mechanismare integrated to
solve theproblem of parking space sharingand allocation. In the firststage, the market design mechanismwith
two rules is appliedfor making the good use ofidle parking spaces. In the secondstage, two sequential auction
mechanismsare designed by extending first/second-price sealedbid auction mechanism to allocateboth private
and public parking spaces, which are receivedin previous stage and owned by the platform. Twostages are
connected througha forecasted price which is calculatedthrough the exponential smoothingmethod.
Findings –First, we prove three important properties of the proposed sequential auction mechanisms,
namely, incentive compatibility, revenue equivalence and individual rationality. Second, a simulation study is
used to verify the effectiveness of the mechanisms through numerical analysis. The impact of the system on
three parts, namely, agents (private parking space suppliers), bidders (parking space customers) and the
platform, is examined. Third, the results show that the sharing mechanism with monetrary incentive will
attract a number of agents to join in the platform. The bidders are also able to obtain considerable utility, as
compared with the (average) market parking fees. The platform can thus effectively allocate parking spaces
with reasonable prices.
Originality/value –This paper combines the classical sequential auction mechanisms with the market
design mechanism for the parking space sharing and allocation problem. The modeling and analysis method
can also be used to address the similar allocation and pricing problems of other resources like bicycle sharing.
Keywords Sharing economy, Market design theory, Parking space allocation, Sequential auction
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
This paper is motivated by searching for available parking spaces in big cities during
regular working time. Obviously, finding a parking space in peak hours is always a big
headache to almost all car drivers. Some studies concluded that cruising for available and
suitable parking spaces generally takes between 3.5 and 14 min in congested downtown
(Shoup, 2006). Even a small search time per car can create a surprising amount of traffic,
and about 50 percent of the traffic is caused by cruising for parking (Shoup, 2006).
Meanwhile, tons of car emissions and remarkable traffic costs are generated for parking,
Industrial Management & Data
Systems
Vol. 119 No. 8, 2019
pp. 1734-1747
© Emerald PublishingLimited
0263-5577
DOI 10.1108/IMDS-04-2019-0244
Received 19 April 2019
Revised 3 July 2019
Accepted 20 July 2019
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
www.emeraldinsight.com/0263-5577.htm
The authors thank the reviewers and editors for their critical but constructive comments, and also
acknowledge the support from National Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 71701079) and Seed
Fund for Basic Research in HKU (201906159001).
1734
IMDS
119,8
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