Shorts International Limited v Google LLC
| Court | Intellectual Property Enterprise Court |
| Judge | MICHAEL TAPPIN KC |
| Neutral Citation | [2024] EWHC 2738 (Ch) |
| Date | 31 October 2024 |
| Year | 2024 |
| Counsel | Simon Malynicz Kc,Daniel Selmi,Laura Adde,Lindsay Lane Kc,Jessie Bowhill |
Neutral Citation Number: [2024] EWHC 2738 (Ch)
Case No: IL-2023-000037
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
BUSINESS AND PROPERTY COURTS OF ENGLAND AND WALES
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LIST (ChD)
Rolls Building
Fetter Lane
London, EC4A 1NL
31 October 2024
Before :
MICHAEL TAPPIN KC
(sitting as a Deputy Judge of the High Court)
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Between :
SHORTS INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
Claimant
- and -
GOOGLE LLC
Defendant
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SIMON MALYNICZ KC, DANIEL SELMI and LAURA ADDE (instructed by Sheridans)
for the Claimant
LINDSAY LANE KC and JESSIE BOWHILL (instructed by Fieldfisher LLP) for the
Defendant
Hearing dates: 2-4, 7-8 & 10-11 October 2024
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Approved Judgment
I direct that no official shorthand note shall be taken of this judgment and that copies of the
version as handed down may be treated as authentic.
This judgment was handed down remotely at 10.30 am on 31 October 2024 by circulation to
the parties’ representatives by email and release to The National Archives.
SIL v Google
Page 2
The Deputy Judge:
1. These proceedings concern the YouTube Shorts service of the Defendant
(“Google”). The Claimant (“SIL”) contends that Google’s use of certain signs in
relation to its YouTube Shorts service amounts to infringement of SIL’s
registered trade marks and passing off. Google contends that there is no
infringement or passing off and that SIL’s registered trade marks are invalid.
2. The bulk of the oral submissions and cross-examination at trial was conducted by
Mr Malynicz KC for SIL and Ms Lane KC for Google. However, Mr Selmi and
Ms Adde each carried out some of the cross-examination for SIL and Ms Bowhill
did some of the cross-examination and made some of the oral closing submissions
for Google. I was glad to see junior counsel being given the opportunity to
conduct some of the oral advocacy at trial. I am grateful to them all for their
written and oral submissions in this interesting and complicated case. I am also
grateful to Sheridans for SIL and Fieldfisher for Google for their preparation of
the case and their work in making the trial run smoothly.
3. I am conscious that there has been a measure of public interest in this case.
Therefore, because my judgment is lengthy, I have decided to set out a summary
of my conclusions in a more digestible form, though my actual reasoning and
conclusions are set out from paragraph 5 below. My conclusions, in summary,
are:
i) At the relevant dates, the meaning of the word “shorts” extended beyond
“short films” and included other short-form audiovisual content.
ii) SIL has a number of registered trade marks incorporating the word “shorts”.
Most of those trade marks are valid, though the word mark “SHORTSTV”
is invalid for most goods and services, and the other marks should be
revoked for non-use for some goods and services. However, all SIL’s trade
marks have low inherent distinctive character, and SIL’s use of its trade
marks in the UK has not been extensive enough to enhance that distinctive
character.
iii) Google has used the word “shorts” in various ways in relation to the
YouTube Shorts service. Some of those uses are purely descriptive of the
type of material on the service. Others, in combination with the YouTube
name or logo, or with a derivative logo, act as indications of origin.
iv) None of Google’s uses of signs including the word “shorts” gives rise to a
likelihood of confusion as to origin. While there are significant similarities
between the signs used by Google which include the word “shorts” and
SIL’s trade marks, the similarities concern the aspects which are descriptive
rather than those which give SIL’s trade marks their (low) distinctive
character.
v) While the similarities between Google’s signs and SIL’s trade marks will
give rise to a link in the minds of the limited group of UK consumers
amongst whom SIL’s trade marks have a reputation, Google’s uses of signs
SIL v Google
Page 3
including the word “shorts” will not cause damage to the distinctive
character or repute of SIL’s trade marks.
vi) If I had concluded that there was a likelihood of confusion or significant
damage to the distinctive character or repute of SIL’s trade marks, then I
would have rejected Google’s defence that it was using its signs in
accordance with honest practices. However, as a result of my conclusions,
SIL’s claim of trade mark infringement fails.
vii) While SIL has protectable goodwill associated with its trade marks amongst
a limited group of UK consumers, Google’s signs do not misrepresent its
service as being provided by SIL or in some way authorised by SIL.
Therefore there is no passing off.
4. My judgment is structured as follows:
THE NATURE OF THE DISPUTE ...................................................................................................... 4
YOUTUBE SHORTS AND SIL’S COMPLAINT ........................................................................................... 4
SIL’S MARKS AND GOOGLE’S ATTACKS ON THEM ................................................................................ 9
IDENTIFICATION OF THE ISSUES TO BE DETERMINED ........................................................................... 12
THE EVIDENCE .................................................................................................................................. 12
SIL’S EVIDENCE ................................................................................................................................. 12
GOOGLE’S EVIDENCE .......................................................................................................................... 14
THE CORE ISSUES OF FACT .......................................................................................................... 16
THE MEANING(S) OF THE WORD “SHORTS” .......................................................................................... 16
SIL’S USE OF ITS MARKS ..................................................................................................................... 19
INVALIDITY ........................................................................................................................................ 23
S.3(1)(C) – THE LAW ........................................................................................................................... 24
S.3(1)(C) – ASSESSMENT ..................................................................................................................... 27
S.3(1)(D) ............................................................................................................................................ 31
S.3(1)(B) ............................................................................................................................................. 32
ACQUIRED DISTINCTIVE CHARACTER .................................................................................................. 33
SIL’S PROPOSED AMENDED SPECIFICATIONS ...................................................................................... 36
S.3(3)(B) ............................................................................................................................................. 39
REVOCATION FOR NON-USE ........................................................................................................ 40
INFRINGEMENT ................................................................................................................................ 45
S.10(2) – THE LAW .............................................................................................................................. 46
THE EVIDENCE ABOUT CONFUSION ..................................................................................................... 56
S.10(2) – ASSESSMENT........................................................................................................................ 63
S.10(3) ............................................................................................................................................... 68
THE S.11(2)(B) DEFENCE..................................................................................................................... 73
PASSING OFF ...................................................................................................................................... 77
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................................... 79
ANNEX 1 – THE SPECIFICATION OF THE 383 MARK ............................................................................. 80
ANNEX 2 – LIST OF ISSUES REFERRED TO IN THE CMC ORDER ........................................................... 82
ANNEX 3 – CONCLUSIONS ON THE 383 MARK ..................................................................................... 84
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