Since you left: United Nations peace support, private military and security companies, and Canada

Published date01 March 2018
Date01 March 2018
DOI10.1177/0020702017740158
Subject MatterScholarly Essays
SG-IJXJ170060 68..84
Scholarly Essay
International Journal
2018, Vol. 73(1) 68–84
Since you left: United
! The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702017740158
private military and
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security companies,
and Canada
Christopher Spearin
Department of Defence Studies, Canadian Forces College,
Toronto, Ontario, Canada
Abstract
In the late 1990s when Canada was largely removing itself from United Nations peace
support endeavours, private military and security companies were heralded as likely
replacements. Canada has indicated its desire to reengage in a United Nations peace
support milieu in which there is now a private military and security presence. It is not
the type of presence initially envisioned, but it is one with multiple impacts regarding
training and operations. This article emphasizes the interventions in the first decade of
the twenty-first century and the corresponding, defensively minded regulations that
came about in the private military and security industry. The article reveals that com-
mercial logics are now insinuated in United Nations peace support operations and the
private military and security presence therein is indicative of a larger shift in United
Nations activities towards insularity and protection.
Keywords
Canada, United Nations, peace support, peacekeeping, private military and security
companies (PMSCs)
The 1990s marked the decline of Canada as a substantial troop contributor in
United Nations (UN) peace support operations for a variety of reasons.
To begin, these operations were becoming more complex and dangerous. This
was exemplif‌ied by the UN Security Council’s ground-breaking December 1992
Corresponding author:
Christopher Spearin, Canadian Forces College, Department of Defence Studies, 215 Yonge Blvd., Toronto,
Ontario, M5M 3H9, Canada.
Email: spearin@cfc.dnd.ca

Spearin
69
invocation of chapter VII of the UN Charter for the humanitarian operation
in Somalia. Subsequently, Canada’s UN engagements in Somalia, Rwanda, and
the former Yugoslavia were tumultuous, draining, and ultimately unsettling for a
military accustomed to earlier UN operations that relied upon the traditional prin-
ciples of consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-
defence. Moreover, these operations coincided with what General Rick Hillier,
while serving as chief of the defence staf‌f, retrospectively described as the
‘‘decade of darkness.’’1 During the 1990s, as the government tackled the def‌icit,
the Department of National Defence’s budget dropped by 23 percent, with a result-
ant purchasing power loss of 30 percent. Concurrent with the f‌inancial cuts was a
troop reduction from 88,000 personnel to 60,000 personnel, as laid out in the 1994
Defence White Paper.
To compensate for these reductions and to take into account the changing
context of peace support operations, the government of‌fered a new conceptual
approach in its 1995 proposal ‘‘Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the
United Nations.’’ The document espoused a ‘‘vanguard concept,’’ a well-trained,
5,000-member force that could quickly enter zones of instability to prevent the
spread of violence. Because the force would arrive early, combat was not to be
expected.2 On the one hand, the proposal eventually meshed with Scandinavian
initiatives and led to the creation of the Standby High Readiness Brigade for UN
Peace Operations (SHIRBRIG); it was ready for operations from 2000 to 2009,
and then stood down. On the other hand, Canada’s zeal for participation in UN
peace support endeavours had def‌initely ebbed over the decade. Though the
Canadian military f‌ielded 1,002 personnel in UN peace support operations in
1990, that number was 425 by the close of 2000, and only 198 in 2002.3
Participating troop levels continued to decline over the next decade.
There were, however, new actors in the 1990s that were seemingly well-posi-
tioned to take the place of Canada and other countries who were doing less and less
peace support work: private military and security companies (PMSCs). These
companies, epitomized by the South African f‌irm Executive Outcomes (EO) and
its contracts in Angola (1993–1995) and Sierra Leone (1995–1997), were well-
trained, well-equipped, and not hesitant about working in a dangerous milieu
and applying force therein. They were also not averse to casualties. Taking into
account the 2000 Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, PMSCs
seemingly possessed what states often lacked: ‘‘The United Nations has bitterly and
repeatedly discovered over the last decade, [that] no amount of good intentions can
1.
Gloria Galloway, ‘‘Hillier laments military’s ‘decade of darkness’ under Grits,’’ The Globe and Mail,
16
February
2007,
http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/national/hillier-laments-militarys-
decade-of-darkness-under-grits/article20393157/ (accessed 1 October 2017).
2.
Government of Canada, ‘‘Towards a Rapid Reaction Capability for the United Nations,’’
September
1995,
24,
https://www.worldfederalistscanada.org/programdocs/UNEPSfiles/
RR_eng.pdf (accessed 22 March 2017).
3.
Statistics garnered from United Nations, ‘‘Troop and Police Contributors Archive (1990–2016),’’
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/contributors_archive.shtml
(accessed
9
October 2017).

70
International Journal 73(1)
substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peace-
keeping, in particular, is to succeed.’’4 Though—as we shall see—the UN did not
engage PMSCs as providers of frontline peace support personnel in the 1990s, one
proponent nevertheless made the industry’s benef‌its clear: ‘‘Write a Cheque, End a
War.’’5
While a Canadian mission has not been launched at the time of writing, the
Liberal government, on 26 August 2016, did announce Canada’s desired return to
UN peace support operations.6 Hence, this article is an early intervention that
investigates the conceptual and operational environment in which the Canadian
military would likely be engaged should an endeavour be initiated. Indeed, there
are several questions for Canadian policymakers and analysts to consider: Why did
a frontline PMSC presence not come about in UN peace support operations in the
1990s? What roles do PMSCs have today regarding UN peace support operations?
How does the PMSC presence change the UN posture in the f‌ield? What might the
implications be for the Canadian military should they either work to train peace
support personnel or serve in UN missions directly?
To investigate these questions, the balance of the article has four parts. First, it
presents the reasons why the PMSC presence did not come to fruition as expected
in light of the 1990s era challenges. While it considers state and UN factors, the
article particularly emphasizes the impact of interventions in the f‌irst decade of the
twenty-f‌irst century, and the corresponding, defensively minded regulations that
came about. In these matters, Canada was an active participant in shaping the
PMSC industry. Second, the article considers the role PMSCs play in training
peace support personnel. Given that Canadian policymakers have espoused that
Canada can provide peace support training, appreciating the implications of
PMSC-supplied training funded by the United States will be key. Third, the article
identif‌ies the increasingly protective and insular stance in UN activities in which
PMSCs play a role. This PMSC informed protective posture is in keeping with the
defensive focus instilled by states, but it is also in accordance with perpetuating
commercial dynamics that may not be benef‌icial for the achievement of UN and
Canadian objectives. The f‌inal part concludes with implications for future
Canadian policymaking. Overall, the Canadian government and its military must
take these factors into account, either through their own operations or through
recognition that the utility of force may be limited in the strategic context.
4.
United Nations, ‘‘Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,’’ 21 August 2001,
https://www.globalpolicy.org/images/pdfs/Security_Council/Report-Panel-UN-peace-opera-
tions.pdf
(accessed 9 October 2017), viii.
5.
Doug Brooks, ‘‘Write a cheque, end a war: Using private military companies to end African con-
flicts,’’ Conflict Trends (June 2000), http://www.academia.edu/3295649/Write_a_cheque_end_a_
war
(accessed 9 October 2017). In this vein, EO officials developed a plan to respond to the
Rwandan Genocide, had EO been asked by the UN to do so. Document in possession of author.
6.
Government of Canada, ‘‘Canada to Support Peace Operations,’’ 26 August 2016, https://www.ca-
nada.ca/en/global-affairs/news/2016/08/canada-to-support-peace-operations.html

(accessed
9
October 2017).

Spearin
71
PMSC shift to the defensive
One can point to a number of UN-centric rationales to explain why frontline peace
support duties did not fall to the private sector in the 1990s and beyond. First, with
regards to troop-contributing countries, many developing world states that had
taken over the peace support mantle from developed world states like Canada did
not desire competition. Peace support operations provided valuable hard currency
remuneration. Additionally, UN peace support participation kept sizeable portions
of various armed forces abroad, an important factor for some countries with deli-
cate civil-military relationships. Second, on the developed world side, some states
were wary of the UN developing an...

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