Sky Bibi v Bar Standards Board

JurisdictionEngland & Wales
JudgeMrs Justice Hill
Judgment Date13 April 2022
Neutral Citation[2022] EWHC 921 (Admin)
Docket NumberCase No: CO/3561/2021
CourtQueen's Bench Division (Administrative Court)

[2022] EWHC 921 (Admin)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION

ADMINISRATIVE COURT

IN AN APPEAL FROM THE BAR DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

PURSUANT TO SECTION 24 OF THE CRIME AND COURTS ACT 2013

Royal Courts of Justice

Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Before:

Mrs Justice Hill

Case No: CO/3561/2021

Between:
Sky Bibi
Appellant
and
Bar Standards Board
Respondent

The Appellant appeared in person

Leo Davidson (instructed by the Bar Standards Board) for the Respondent

Hearing date: 30 March 2022

Approved Judgment

I direct that pursuant to CPR PD 39A para 6.1 no official shorthand note shall be taken of this Judgment and that copies of this version as handed down may be treated as authentic.

Mrs Justice Hill

Introduction

1

This is a statutory appeal by virtue of rules made pursuant to section 24 of the Crime and Courts Act 2013, by which the Appellant appeals the decision of a Disciplinary Tribunal to disbar her from practice as a barrister. The decision was reached after a professional misconduct hearing that took place from 1–3 June and 23–24 September 2021. Oral reasons were given for the Tribunal's decision on 24 September 2021. These were then set out in writing in the Tribunal's Report of Finding and Sanction (RFS) dated 20 October 2021. The Bar Standards Board defended the decisions of the Tribunal and invited me to dismiss the appeal.

The facts

2

The Appellant was called to the Bar on 22 November 2007.

3

On 6 December 2018 she was convicted at Cheshire Magistrates' Court of an offence under Regulation 8(1) of the Council Tax Reduction Schemes (Detection of Fraud Enforcement) Regulations 2013, arising out of her failure to disclose a change in her financial circumstances pertinent to her council tax. This had resulted in her receiving £1,054.24 in council tax benefit to which she was not entitled. She was sentenced to a 12-month conditional discharge, a costs order of £1,000 and a victim surcharge of £20. She appealed this conviction to the Crown Court.

4

On 13 September 2019 her appeal by way of re-hearing was dismissed at Chester Crown Court. The sentence was varied to a 12-month community order with a curfew requirement, a costs order of £2,500 and the victim surcharge of £85.

5

Between June and October 2019, the Appellant worked for Backhouse Jones solicitors. It was alleged by the Bar Standards Board (BSB) that in various respects she had not disclosed these criminal proceedings to them.

6

The five-member Disciplinary Tribunal heard evidence from Linda Hindmoor and Steven Meyerhoff from Backhouse Jones solicitors as well as the Appellant. The Tribunal also considered several bundles of evidence, including the material presented to the Crown Court and a transcript of the judgment dismissing the appeal.

7

The Tribunal found the following four charges of professional misconduct, contrary to the Code of Conduct of the Bar of England and Wales, proved against the Appellant:

Charge 1: behaving in a way which was likely to diminish the trust and confidence which the public places in a barrister or in the profession and/or acted in a way which could reasonably be seen by the public to undermine her honesty and integrity, in that between 13 April 2015 and 6 September 2016, she was required but failed to disclose a change in her financial circumstances, namely, a change of employment status and receipt of income, which she knew would affect her entitlement to a council tax benefit, or affect the amount of any reduction in council tax payments under the council tax reduction scheme of Manchester City Council.

Charge 2: behaving in a way which was likely to diminish the trust and confidence which the public places in a barrister or in the profession and/or acted in a way which could reasonably be seen by the public to undermine her honesty and integrity in that, following her appeal by way of a re-hearing at Chester Crown Court, on the 12 and 13 September 2019, she had dishonestly stated in evidence that:

(i) She had disclosed all of her bank accounts to the Council when completing the initial claim form at the Council;

(ii) She had taken evidence of all of her bank statements to the Council;

(iii) She had declared all of the sums relied upon by the Respondent and/or listed in the schedule used by the Crown Court in the appeal to the Council either over the phone or in person;

(iv) The process of presenting the documents to the Council had changed in 2015, including that in 2015 Council officers did not always scan the documents, and/or when they did scan documents, they sometimes returned the original documents to her and sometimes did not;

(v) She attended the Council Offices in or around September 2014 to provide documents and that these included bank statements of her five different bank accounts;

(vi) She had not worked for PLS (a solicitors' firm); and

(vii) Sums received by her and relied upon by the Council and considered by the Court had not been for legal work.

Charge 3: failing to act with honesty and with integrity in that she:

(i) Failed to disclose the fact of her conviction and sentence pursuant to or during the course of the recruitment process leading to her employment with Backhouse Jones Solicitors;

(ii) In June 2019 provided a Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) certificate which she had obtained on 27 November 2018 prior to her conviction on the 6 December 2018 and which accordingly did not reflect the true state of her criminal record; and

(iii) Between 12 June 2019 and 20 October 2019 during her employment with the Solicitors failed to disclose the fact of her conviction and sentence.

Charge 4: knowingly and recklessly misleading her employer, in the same three ways as specified in Charge 3 (RFS, paragraphs 10–31).

8

Having found Charges 3 and 4 above proved, the Tribunal did not consider it necessary to make a finding on a further charge that had been laid in relation to the Backhouse Jones matters (RFS, paragraph 31).

9

In considering sanction, the Tribunal found that there were two mitigating factors in the Appellant's case, namely her previous good character and unusual personal circumstances, including health and bereavement. However the Tribunal identified several aggravating factors, namely premeditation, an element of financial gain, persistent conduct over a period of time, undermining the profession in the eyes of the public, attempts to hide the misconduct or wrongly lay blame elsewhere, lack of remorse and lack of insight. In respect of charges 1 and 2, the Tribunal ordered that the Appellant be disbarred. In respect of charges 3 and 4, it imposed a suspension of 12 months (RFS, paragraphs 32–38).

10

The disbarment was not to take effect until the conclusion of any appeal. However, the Tribunal ordered that the Appellant suspend her practice immediately. The BSB was also ordered to withdraw the Appellant's current practising certificate and not issue a new one pending the appeal (RFS, paragraph 39). The Appellant appealed the suspension. On 16 December 2021, Bourne J dismissed that appeal.

11

The Appellant's Grounds of Appeal and Skeleton for this appeal advanced six grounds. The BSB's position was, in summary, that none of the grounds disclosed any error of law, merely disagreements with the Tribunal's findings and decisions. I was provided with all the material that was before the Tribunal, a full transcript of the 1–3 June 2021 phase of the hearing and various other documents by the Appellant.

The legal framework

12

This appeal is governed by CPR Part 52. Under CPR 52.21, the Court will allow the appeal where the Tribunal's decision was (a) wrong; or (b) unjust because of a serious procedural or other irregularity in the proceedings in the lower court.

13

An appeal is limited to a review of the Tribunal's decision, unless the court considers that in the circumstances of the appeal it would be in the interests of justice to hold a rehearing, under CPR 52.21(1). There was no application for me to hold a rehearing in this case and I did not consider that the interests of justice required me to do so.

14

The nature of a review was described by May LJ in Dupont de Nemours (EI) & Co v ST Dupont (Note) [2003] EWCA Civ 1368; [2006] 1 WLR 2793 at [94] as follows:

“The review will engage the merits of an appeal. It will accord appropriate respect to the decision of the lower court. Appropriate respect will be tempered by the nature of the lower court and its decision-making process. There will also be a spectrum of appropriate respect depending on the nature of the decision of the lower court which is challenged. At one end of the spectrum will be decisions of primary fact reached after an evaluation of oral evidence where credibility is in issue and purely discretionary decisions. Further along the spectrum will be multi-factorial decisions often dependent on inferences and an analysis of documentary material. Rule 52.11(4) expressly empowers the court to draw inferences”.

15

One issue pertinent to this appeal was the ability of the BSB to rely on the findings against the Appellant in the criminal proceedings. As to this, Regulation (r) E169 of the BSB Handbook provides, so far as is relevant:

“In proceedings before a Disciplinary Tribunal which involve the decision of a court or tribunal in previous proceedings to which the respondent was a party, or where a wasted costs order was made against the respondent, the following Regulations shall apply:

.1 a copy of the certificate or memorandum of conviction relating to the offence shall be conclusive proof that the respondent committed the offence;

.2 any court record of the findings of fact upon which the conviction...

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