Some Developments of the Principle of Mens Rea in the Case Law of the Court of Justice of the European Union
| Author | Alessandro Rosanò |
| Published date | 01 September 2016 |
| Date | 01 September 2016 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/203228441600700305 |
| Subject Matter | Case Notes |
302 Intersentia
SOME DEVELOPMENTS OF THE PRINCIPLE
OF MENS REA IN THE CASE LAW
OF THE COURT OF JUSTICE
OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
A R*
1. INTRODUCTION
As a matter of fundamenta l legal principle, crimi nal liability may not arise from the
mere existence of the fact or from the anti-jurid ical nature of the fact: the defendants
should be held criminal ly liable only for events or consequences which they intended
or knowingly riske d.1 at is t he principle of mens rea which is expressed by the well-
renowned formula nullum crimen, nulla poena sine culpa and which manifests the
* Alessand ro Rosanò, PhD, is Teaching Assist ant of EU Law and Internationa l Law at the Law School
of the University of Padova (Italy). e author wishes t o thank Eleonora Rosanò, John Fos ter and
the anonymous re viewers for their valua ble contributions and comments on ea rlier versions of the
case note. e author is so lely responsible for the content of the ca se note.
1 Andrew Ashwort h, Jeremy Horder, Principles of Criminal Law (7th edn, Oxford University Press
2013) 74. As it was underlined by Ala n Brudner, ‘Agency and Welfare in Criminal L aw’ in Stephen
Shute, John Gardner, Jeremy Horder (eds), Action and Value in Criminal L aw (Clar endon P ress
1993) 35 ‘what alone takes us to c riminal punishment is t he intentional or (advertently) rec kless
disdain for t he autonomy of another self t hat, when absolut ised as a principle, i nvolves the insec urity
of one’s own liberty as it s necessary con sequence’. Regarding mens rea at commo n law, s ee gene ral ly
Claire de an, Russell He aton, Criminal Law (4th edn, Oxford Univer sity Press 2013) 50–89;
Richard Ca rd, Card, Cross & Jones Crimi nal Law (21st edn, Oxford University P ress 2014) 69–109;
Nicola Pad eld, Criminal Law (9th edn, Oxford University Press 2014) 47–75; Andrew Ashworth,
Sentencing an d Criminal Just ice (6th edn, Cambri dge University Press 2015) 157–159. Regarding
mens rea at civil law, see genera lly Giuseppe Magg iore, Prolegomeni al concetto di colpevolezza
(Priulla 1951); Marcello Gallo, Il concetto unitario di colpevolezza (Giu rè editore 1951); Biagio
Petroce lli, La colpevolezza (3rd edn, Cedam 1955); Pietro Nuvolone, ‘La conc ezione giuridic a italiana
della colpevolez za’ [1976] Rivista italiana d i diritto e procedu ra penale 3; Claus Rox in,
‘Considerazioni d i politica crim inale sul principio d i colpevolezza’ [1980] Rivista ita liana di dirit to
e procedura pena le 369; Tullio Padovani, ‘Teoria de lla colpevolezza e sc opi della pena’ [1987] Rivista
italiana d i diritto e procedura p enale 798; Mohamed Badar, ‘Mens rea – M istake of Law & Mista ke
of Fact in German Criminal Law: A Survey for International Criminal Tribunals’ [2005]
International Cr iminal Law Revi ew 203. For an introduction to mens rea in international criminal
law, see Mohamed Badar, e Concept of Mens Re a in International Criminal L aw: e Ca se for a
Uni ed Approach (Bloomsbury Publ ishing 2013).
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