Soviet Foreign Policy towards Her European Allies: Interests and Instruments
| Author | Iver B. Neumann |
| DOI | 10.1177/001083678802300207 |
| Published date | 01 March 1988 |
| Date | 01 March 1988 |
Soviet
Foreign
Policy
towards
Her
European
Allies:
Interests
and
Instruments
IVER
B.
NEUMANN
Neumann,
I.
B.
Soviet
Foreign
Policy
towards
Her
European
Allies:
Interests
and
Instruments.
Cooperation
and
Conflict,
XXIII
,
1988,
215-229.
The
aim
of
this
article
is
to
construct
a
taxonomy
for
possible
Soviet
interests
towards
the
CMEA
6,
then
to
discuss
what
foreign
policy
instruments
the
Soviet
Union
disposes
of,
and
finally
to
assess
whether
Soviet
instruments
are
capable
of
fulfilling
Soviet
interests.
Soviet
interests
are
far-reaching.
She
wants
to
have
the
CMEA
6
as
a
buffer
against
aggression,
and
to
prevent
CMEA
6
complicity
in
invasion.
Her
role
as
the
leader
of
one
of
the
two
main
military
alliances
in
the
world
underlines
her
status
as
a
superpower.
At
home,
the
legitimacy
of
the
communist
regime
is
enhanced
by
there
being
other
countries
which
employ
the
Soviet
model.
Effective
Soviet
foreign
policy
instruments
are
indeed
limited.
The
military
instruments
at
her
disposal
can
only
be
used
at
very
high
political
cost,
whereas
economic
subsidies
make
up
an
economic
cost.
The
Soviet
Union
still
depends
critically
on
the
actual
use
of
force
and
on
the
threat
of
use
of
force
in
her
relations
with
the
CMEA
6.
As
the
long-term
costs
of
using
military
foreign
policy
instruments
are
considerable,
the
prospects
for
Soviet
interest
fulfilment
towards
the
CMEA
6
are
poor.
1.
INTRODUCTION
In
this
article,
we
set
out
to
present
a
taxonomy
for
possible
Soviet
interests
towards
the
CMEA
6..We
also
look
at
what
instruments
the
Soviet
Union
may
use
in
her
foreign
policy
towards
the
CMEA
6,
and
try
in
conclusion
to
assess
whether
Soviet
instruments
are
capable
of
fulfilling
Soviet
interests.
We
use
the
term
&dquo;interest&dquo;
simply
in
the
original
Latin
sense
of
something
that
is
perceived
as
being
of
importance.
The
reason
for
this
is
that
we
assume
the
Soviet
Union
to
perceive
a
number
of
disparate
phenomena,
which
at
first
glance
appear
to
affect
her
only
indirectly,
to
be
of
importance.
For
historical
and
ideological
reasons,
her range
of
interests
towards
the
CMEA
6
actually
embraces
the
entire
social
structure
and
the
political
culture
of
these
countries
(Neumann,
forthcoming).
Historically,
as
a
state
formation,
Rus-
sia
has
always
felt
particularly
vulnerable
to
military
pressure.
Because
of
their
lack
of
natural
defences,
Russians
have
found
their
territory
overrun
by
Tartars
and
Mongols
from
the
east,
and
by
Turks
from
the
south;
and
they
have
been
attacked
from
the
west
by
Poles,
Swedes,
French-
men,
and
Germans
(Mackintosh
1981).
Moreover,
Russia
has
always
had
a
per-
ipheral
position
in
the
world
economy.
It
would
seem,
then,
that
throughout
her
history
Russia
has
largely
responded
to
the
actions
of others
(Wallerstein
1979:
207
f.,
Anderson
1974:328
f.).
On
the
other
hand,
Russia
may
at
the
same
time
be
said
to
have
played
an
active
role
towards
other
states.
For
example,
Brze-
zinski
(1984:3)
points
to
the
history
of
Russian
expansion
and
calls
it
the
history
of
a
&dquo;...
uniquely
organic
imperialism&dquo;.
He
sees
the
lack
of
natural
borders
as
unleashing
a
rush
for
security
through
ter-
ritorial
expansion.
Expansion
in
turn
gen-
erated
&dquo;...
new
conflicts,
new
threats,
and
thus
a
further
expansion
drive&dquo;
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