Special (peace) operations: Optimizing SOF for UN missions
| Date | 01 June 2018 |
| Published date | 01 June 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020702018787633 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essay |
Scholarly Essay
International Journal
2018, Vol. 73(2) 221–240
Special (peace)
! The Author(s) 2018
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702018787633
SOF for UN missions
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H. Christian Breede
Political Science, The Royal Military College of Canada, Kingston,
Ontario, Canada
Abstract
Since the release of the 2015 United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces
Manual, there has been surprisingly little scholarly attention devoted to it. Indeed, much
of the recent literature on the topic of special operations forces (SOF) is descriptive,
sensationalized, or simply boosting the image of SOF as the proverbial ‘‘easy button’’ for
decision-makers. This article seeks to critically engage with the 2015 United Nations
manual on SOF through the framework of specialized generalists, boundary spanning,
and military autonomy.1 This paper will then continue the argument that SOF has a role
in peace operations, albeit a limited one. Finally, it will conclude with some recommen-
dations for how these findings can inform Canada’s employment of SOF in the future.
Indeed, given that Canada is a relative newcomer to the ‘‘global SOF network,’’2 such
critical inquiry is warranted.
Keywords
Peacekeeping, peace operations, special forces, United Nations
In the summer of 2016, within four days of each other, two major volumes on
international security from the Canadian perspective were published by academic
presses. Both books featured contributions from established scholars and seasoned
practitioners, and claimed to offer a strategic evaluation of the international
1.
Eitan Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari, ‘‘The rise of special operations: Generalized specialization, bound-
ary spanning, and military autonomy,’’ Journal of Strategic Studies 41, no. 3 (2016): 1–37.
2.
Thomas S. Szayna and William Welser IV, ‘‘Developing and assessing options for the global SOF
network,’’ RAND Corporation, 2013, http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_re-
ports/RR300/RR340/RAND_RR340.pdf (accessed 31 May 2018).
Corresponding author:
H. Christian Breede, The Royal Military College of Canada – Political Science, PO Box 17000, Station
Forces Kingston, Ontario, K7K 7B4, Canada.
Email: hans.christian.breede@rmc.ca
222
International Journal 73(2)
environment and what that would mean for Canadian security policy. Both books
discussed the issue of Canada’s re-engagement with the United Nations (UN).
However, they made scant reference to the role of special operations forces
(SOF).3 At one level, this absence is entirely understandable. SOF has a tradition
of operating on the margins of public acknowledgement, and by its very nature
eschews the spotlight. However, militaries are transforming: they are shrinking the
size of their conventional forces and expanding the size of the special forces.4 Now
the mention of SOF becomes conspicuous in its absence. With SOF expanding,
conventional forces shrinking, and engagement with peace operations more likely
for Canada in the coming years, is there a role for SOF in such operations?
First, this article makes the claim that, yes, there is a role for SOF in peace
operations, and second, it assesses a rather little-known policy document released
in 2015 on this very topic. In short, there is a role for SOF, but it might not be what
you think. The United Nations Peacekeeping Missions Military Special Forces
Manual (referred to from here on as the UN SOF Manual) has received little
scholarly attention. This article assesses the findings of this manual against an
established framework in order to determine the strengths and weaknesses of the
policies suggested in the manual. This article will first examine the limited scholarly
literature on SOF, and, second, present an analytic framework presented by Eitan
Shamir and Eyal Ben-Ari of specialized generalists, boundary spanning, and
military autonomy.5 Third, this paper will assess the existing policy put forth by
the UN SOF Manual, and continue the argument that SOF has a role in peace
operations, albeit a qualified one. Finally, this paper will conclude with some
recommendations for how these findings can inform how Canada could use SOF
in future UN operations. Given that Canada is a relative newcomer to the ‘‘global
SOF network,’’6 such critical inquiry is warranted.
Literature and framework
There is little extant literature on the topic of a potential role for SOF in peace
operations, and the very connection seems to go against common SOF stereotypes.
However, the UN SOF Manual is an exception. This 2015 publication outlines how
troop-contributing nations can employ SOF capabilities in peace operations.7 The
manual—published as a form of guidance for military commanders and staff
3.
Published on 4 July was Ste´fanie von Hlatky and H. Christian Breede’s Going to War? Trends in
Military Interventions (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2016), and on
8 July was James Fergusson and Francis Furtado’s Beyond Afghanistan: An International Security
Agenda for Canada (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016). Both edited volumes deal with the question of
what Canada’s role could be internationally post-Afghanistan, and between the two of them, only
three references to SOF were found.
4.
Shamir and Ben-Ari, ‘‘The rise of special operations.’’
5.
Ibid.
6.
Szayna and Welser, ‘‘Developing and assessing options for the global SOF network.’’
7.
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations and UN Department of Field Support, United Nations
Peacekeeping Mission Military Special Forces Manual, January 2015, http://dag.un.org/handle/
11176/89590?show¼full (accessed 9 November 2016).
Breede
223
of UN peace operations—was the result of a working group held in 2014. The
working group, composed of both military and civilian experts, discussed not only
what makes SOF employment for UN operations different from conventional
forces’ employment, but also applied this difference to a general recognition that
the operating environment itself has changed. The various factors making
the employment of SOF tempting for foreign policy decision-makers around the
world apply to UN decision-makers as well. This is indeed the ‘‘golden age of
SOF,’’8 and this is something that the UN has now recognized. However, this
policy initiative has garnered little scholarly or subsequent policy attention.
The dearth of literature on the role that SOF plays in peace operations is under-
standable, for, with few exceptions (Shamir and Ben-Ari are an example of such an
exception), articles and books about SOF tend to be historical, clinical, or profes-
sional at best, and downright sensational at worst.9 There is little that engages with
the question of employment of these capabilities as another tool for the foreign policy
decision-maker. In short, there is little that deals with the policy of SOF employment.
The historical literature on SOF is focused on the tactical exploits of various
SOF organizations. Here, the works are either autobiographical (and again, at
times sensationalized)—such as the controversial No Easy Day by Mark
Owen—or are pieces of military history, which compare or re-tell past SOF oper-
ations, such as Sean Maloney’s article from a 2004 issue of the Canadian Military
Journal, or William McRaven’s 2009 classic Spec Ops. In all cases, the work has
focused on small-unit, tactical activities; rarely do the discussions address issues of
why SOF is suited to the roles it plays, nor do they problematize such roles.
Drilling to an even deeper level of analysis, the clinical literature of anthropolo-
gists and psychologists has conducted extensive research into the ways in which
SOF organizations select potential operators, and of those selected, what person-
ality traits are most common amongst them. Work by Anna Simons of the US
Naval Postgraduate School is particularly noteworthy, as she has devoted decades
to the question of how the selection process works.10 This has been complemented
by psychologists who have taken an even more focused look at the individual traits
held by operators, and how such traits influence motivation during the selection
8.
Norton Schwartz, ‘‘The golden age of special operations forces’’ (remarks at the National Defence
Industrial Association’s 22nd Annual Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict Symposium),
Washington, DC, 9 February 2011, http://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+golden+age+of+spe-
cial+operations+forces.-a0249388647 (accessed 10 June 2016). See also Andrew Bacevich,
‘‘Tomgram: Andrew Bacevich, The golden age of special operations,’’ TomDispatch.com, 29
May 2012, http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175547/andrew_bacevich_the_golden_age_of_spe-
cial_operations (accessed 10 June 2016).
9.
Biographies and the trend of ‘‘counter-autobiography’’ have made serious inquiry into SOF chal-
lenging at times. See, for example, the debates that raged between biographies over the exploits of
the UK Special Air Service (SAS) in Iraq in 1991 [Andy McNab’s Bravo Two Zero (United
Kingdon: Bantam Press, 1993) and Chris Ryan’s The One That Got Away (United Kingdom:
Century, 1995)], or the US Navy SEAL Team Six in Abbottabad in 2011 [Mark Owen’s No
Easy Day (United States: Dutton Penguin, 2012) and subsequent counter claims by Rob O’Neill
on Fox News in 2014]. See Matthew Cole and Anna R. Schecter, ‘‘Who shot Bin Laden? A tale of
two SEALs,’’ NBC News, 6 November 2014, http://www.nbcnews.com/news/investigations/who-
shot-bin-laden-tale-two-seals-n241241 ...
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