Splitting the Libel
| Published date | 01 March 1966 |
| Author | Alexander A. M. Irvine |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1966.tb01122.x |
| Date | 01 March 1966 |
210
THE
MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
VOL.
29
the option in matters discharged by others, as vicarious imprison-
ment appears to be foreign to the will of P~rliament).’~
In
this context the punishment of the wife in
Fisher’s
case
is
clearly justified,
as
it
will
encourage her to control her customers.
Likewise the punishment of the husband, even though he was
absent, will clearly encourage him to insist that his wife, to whom
he had delegated his responsibilities,
will
do her duty to comply with
the Act. Thus the results in this case illustrate the contemporary
morality that appears to be the basis of absolute liability, and which
is
more appropriate in the context of public welfare statutes than
the morality of
mens
rea.
It
is
to be hoped that the House of Lords
will
approve what appears to be
a
desirable development.
R.
W.
L.
HOWELLEI.
SPLITTING
THE
LIBEL
Astaire
v.
Campting
l
raises
a
question
“
of first principle in the
law
of libel
:
what is
a
defamatory statement
?
”
Fourteen news-
paper articles, published by persons other than the defendants,
and
an interview broadcast by the
B.B.C.,
contained disparaging refer-
ences to
a
“
Mr.
X
”
and
a
syndicate in connection with British
boxing. The defendants published in
a
Sunday newspaper
a
front-
pagc article which named and criticised the plaintiff, and stated that
he was the
‘‘
man
known
in
the fight game
as
‘
Mr.
X
’.”
The
plaintiff alleged he was defamed by this article and pleaded eight
innuendoes, setting out,
as
the facts relied upon to support them,
extracts from the above publications by persons other than the
defendants. The plaintiff argued that even
if
the natural and
ordinary meaning of the alleged libel was innocent, hc could still,
by
reference to these extraneous publications, attribute to the words
a
defamatory meaning. Thus
a
defendant who published
a
true
and quite innocent statement about the plaintiff could be liable to
him if its readers would reasonably identify him
as
the person
anonymously referred to in false and defamatory statements made
by third parties.
The Court of Appeal emphatically rejected this contention and
held that
‘‘
the statement of fact
or
expression of opinion relied
on
as
defamntory must be one which can be reasonably said to be
contained in the statement in respect
of
which the action
is
brought
and not merely
in
some other statement.”
It
may be that whcrc
the
identity
of the plaintiff is not disclosed in
a
defamatory article,
publications by persons other than the defendant may be put in
evidence to show that the public must necessarily have understood
10
On
this,
sea
Lord
du
Porcq
in
Shrinioas’
casa
(aupra)
(1047)
I.L.R.
26
Pat.
460
1
10661
1
W.L.R.
94;
10651
9
All
E.R.
666.
*
her
Diplock
L.J.
If9611
9
All
E.B.
666
at
p.
660.
8
Ibid.
per
Diplock
.J.
at
p.
408.
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