SR v HR
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Court | Family Division |
| Judge | Mr Justice Mostyn |
| Judgment Date | 23 March 2018 |
| Neutral Citation | [2018] EWHC 606 (Fam) |
| Docket Number | Case No: 2017/0173 |
| Date | 23 March 2018 |
and
Mr Justice Mostyn
Case No: 2017/0173
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
FAMILY DIVISION
(On appeal from HH Judge Sharpe
Sitting in the Family Court at Swansea CX11D00057)
IN THE MATTER OF THE MATRIMONIAL CAUSES ACT 1973
AND IN THE MATTER OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT 1986
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
The Appellant appeared in person
The Respondent appeared in person
Paul French (instructed by Morgan Rostron Solicitors) for the Intervener
Hearing date: 20 March 2018
Judgment Approved
This judgment was delivered in private. The judge has given leave for this anonymised version of the judgment to be published. The identities of the parties must not be disclosed. Breach of this condition will amount to a contempt of court.
On 24 May 2012 Deputy District Judge Parsons made property adjustment orders by consent in respect of three properties in Carmathen. On 7 October 2013, by consent, he rearranged certain aspects of his orders but without altering their underlying proprietary or economic effect. I shall refer to these orders as the substantive orders.
The substantive orders were not implemented for wearily familiar reasons. There were disputes, among other things, about the sale process and about the selling agents. This led to implementation litigation. In June 2016 the wife (as I shall call her) appealed an implementation order. It came before Judge Sharpe. He granted permission to appeal. He may well have granted permission to appeal the 2012 and 2013 substantive orders as well. As the order of 1 June 2016 is not available no-one can tell me what was the scope of the grant of permission to appeal. If it was against the 2012 and 2013 orders then it must be regarded as being of doubtful legitimacy given that it was years out of time and that neither party had previously sought to appeal them.
Judge Sharpe had the case before him on 18 August and 4 September 2017. He resolved to deal with the case anew. In his judgment, issued on 12 December 2014 he clearly explained that he was not exercising appeal powers in order to do so. Rather, as the substantive orders remained executory, and given that they were “at the very edge, if not already beyond, any effective period of implementation in [their] terms” he considered that he could discharge the substantive orders and replace them with a new order.
The new order was made on 4 October 2017, two months before the judgment emerged (for reasons which do not need to be explained). The order explicitly replaces the 2012 and 2013 orders. It was amended on 20 October 2017 to correct an error and to clarify an ambiguity. However, on 22 September 2017, that is before the order of 4 October 2017, the husband (as I will call him) had been made bankrupt.
The new order significantly altered the economic impact of the substantive orders of 2012 and 2013. I calculate that about £46,000 of value was taken from the husband and given to the wife. I set out my calculations later in this judgment.
The husband appeals the new order of Judge Sharpe dated 22 October 2017. I have granted his trustee in bankruptcy leave to intervene in the appeal. She is represented by Mr French of counsel, who supports the husband's appeal.
I now set out some principles of law, which are in my judgment decisive of the outcome of this appeal.
In 1970 Parliament enacted the new ancillary relief powers. These were consolidated in the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Section 31 contains the powers of variation and discharge. Parliament was very careful to keep these powers tightly confined. Ignoring some very rare outliers, the only capital award that could be varied was a lump sum payable by instalments. An order for sale under section 24A could be varied but not the underlying capital award to which it attached. The power to vary an order for sale is a real power which can be invoked to keep a party out of his money for an appreciable period: see Birch v Birch [2017] UKSC 53 at paras 14, 15, 27 and 29 1.
However, it is an iron rule that aside from a lump sum payable by instalments, and aside from a set aside on traditional grounds as discussed below, a capital award cannot be varied, or, a fortiori, discharged, by a court of first instance. That an order has, in the usual way, a “liberty to apply” clause certainly does not entitle a court to rewrite non-variable capital awards and to make different ones. Equally, the fact that a dismissal clause does not take effect until there has been full compliance with certain transfers and payments plainly does not entitle a court to replace an executory order with a new one. The judge referred to the decision of Thwaite v Thwaite [1982] Fam 1. In a recital to an order made on 13 July 2016 he stated:
“In accordance with the authority of Thwaite v Thwaite the court may consider the order and refuse to enforce the order if it is inequitable to do so. Where such an outcome is determined it is open to the court to determine the matter afresh”
I have to say that I do not agree with this. In Thwaite, at page 9, Ormrod LJ stated:
“Where the order is still executory, as in the present case, and one of the parties applies to the court to enforce the order, the court may refuse if, in the circumstances prevailing at the time of the application, it would be inequitable to do so: Mullins v. Howell (1879) 11 Ch D 763 and Purcell v. F. C. Trigell Ltd. [1971] 1 QB 358, 366, 367. Where the consent order derives its legal effect from the contract, this is equivalent to refusing a decree of specific performance; where the legal effect derives from the order itself the court has jurisdiction over its own orders: per Sir George Jessel M.R. in Mullins v. Howell (1879) 11 Ch D 763, 766.”
Mullins v. Howell concerned an undertaking to remove some buttresses projecting from an archway mistakenly given by counsel at an interlocutory hearing. Sir George Jessell MR stated: “I have no doubt that the Court has jurisdiction to discharge an order made on motion by consent when it is proved to have been made under a mistake, though that mistake was on one side only, the Court having a sort of general control over orders made on interlocutory applications.” That is a far cry from rewriting a final order anew.
Purcell v. F. C. Trigell Ltd concerned a personal injury action where a defence had been struck out for failure to comply with a consent order which required a full reply
to interrogatories. That strike-out was upheld in the Court of Appeal. Lord Denning MR stated, almost in passing, at page 364:“But there is no ground here so far as I can see for setting aside this consent order. It was deliberately made, with full knowledge, with the full agreement of the solicitors on both sides. It cannot be set aside. But, even though the order cannot be set aside, there is still a question whether it should be enforced. The court has always a control over interlocutory orders. It may, in its discretion, vary or alter them even though made originally by consent.”
Again, this gives no support to the notion that if the court, exercising its equitable jurisdiction, refuses to enforce an order it gains the power to make a completely new one.
I have to say that Mullins v. Howell and Purcell v. F. C. Trigell Ltd provide scant support for a loophole to the prohibition of the discharge of a non-variable final capital order. Both cases concerned the court's power to “control” interlocutory orders. The first case involved an undertaking where there was full power to discharge it anyway. In the second case the court refused to discharge the earlier interlocutory order requiring answers to interrogatories. Therefore, I think that any application under the principle in Thwaite should be approached extremely cautiously and conservatively.
I have pondered whether in this case the court could engage in a form of barter with the wife akin to that described by Lord Wilson in Birch in relation to the “variation” of an undertaking. At para 5 he stated:
“An undertaking is a solemn promise which a litigant volunteers to the court. A court has no power to impose any variation of the terms of a voluntary promise. A litigant who wishes to cease to be bound by her (or his) undertaking should apply for “release” from it (or “discharge” of it); and often she will accompany her application for release with an offer of a further undertaking in different terms. The court may decide to accept the further undertaking and, in the light of it, to grant the application for release. Equally the court may indicate that it will grant the application for release only on condition that she is willing to give a further undertaking or one in terms different from those of a further undertaking currently on offer. In either event the court's power is only to grant or refuse the application for...
Get this document and AI-powered insights with a free trial of vLex and Vincent AI
Get Started for FreeStart Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial of vLex and Vincent AI, Your Precision-Engineered Legal Assistant
-
Access comprehensive legal content with no limitations across vLex's unparalleled global legal database
-
Build stronger arguments with verified citations and CERT citator that tracks case history and precedential strength
-
Transform your legal research from hours to minutes with Vincent AI's intelligent search and analysis capabilities
-
Elevate your practice by focusing your expertise where it matters most while Vincent handles the heavy lifting
Start Your Free Trial
-
BT v CU
...[1970] 3 All ER 671, CA R v R (Lump Sum Repayments) [2003] EWHC 3197 (Fam); [2004] 1 FLR 928 R v R (Financial Order: Replacement) [2018] EWHC 606 (Fam); [2018] 4 WLR 68; [2018] 2 FLR 843 Raja v Van Hoogstraten [2018] EWHC 3261 (Ch) R v Bloomsbury and Marylebone County Court, Ex p Villerwest......
-
CB v EB
...v Myerson (No 2) [2009] EWCA Civ 282; [2010] 1 WLR 114; [2009] 2 FLR 147, CA R v R (Financial Order: Replacement) (C intervening) [2018] EWHC 606 (Fam); [2018] 4 WLR 68; [2018] 2 FLR 843 Shaw v Shaw [2002] EWCA Civ 1298; [2002] 2 FLR 1204, CA Tibbles v SIG plc (trading as Asphaltic Roofing ......
-
Safiullah Ahmadi v Guardian News & Media Limited
...that the publication, in its meanings on which the claimant relies, refers to the claimant. MR JUSTICE JOHNSONMonroe v Hopkins [2018] EWHC 433 (QB) [2017] 4 WLR 68 per Warby J at [23]. The reference to “society generally” is important. It is not enough that the statement has an adverse effe......
-
Safiullah Ahmadi v Guardian News & Media Ltd
...with the civil procedure rules: CPR 3.4(2)(c). In any event, I refuse the separate application under CPR Part 11Monroe v Hopkins [2018] EWHC 433 (QB) [2017] 4 WLR 68 per Warby J at [23]. The reference to “society generally” is important. It is not enough that the statement has an adverse ef......