Srendarjit Kaur Jassal v Sajad Shah

THE DEPUTY MASTER: This judgment concerns the estate of Fiaz Ali Shah who died on 24 April 2020 aged 64. I am going to refer to him throughout this judgment using his given name, Fiaz, rather than ‘the deceased’ as I consider that to be a more respectful way of referring to him. It is relevant to note, however, that during his lifetime he was known by many people as ‘Alan’ and the claimant is also known as ‘Cindy’.

Fiaz's last will dated 6 December 2018 appointed the first defendant, Sajad, who is his son, and the second defendant, Shabana, who is his daughter, as his executors. Under the terms of the will Sajad is the sole beneficiary. Fiaz in fact had two other daughters, in addition to the second defendant, but none of his daughters benefit under his will.

It is common ground that Fiaz and the claimant at one time had a relationship that was equivalent to a marriage. However, they did not marry. Nothing was left to the claimant under the terms of the 2018 Will and she claims against Fiaz's estate under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975.

This judgment is given after a trial lasting three days at which the principal issue has been whether the claimant qualifies under section 1(1)(a) of the 1975 Act. Andrew Morrell appeared as counsel for the claimant and Oliver Ingham appeared as counsel for the defendants. I am giving this judgment, with their agreement, on an occasion when neither of them is present adopting the approach that it is important for the judgment to be delivered promptly so that the parties have an opportunity to consider it. Matters that are consequential upon this judgment can, if necessary, be dealt with at a later hearing.

There were two earlier wills, both dating from 2006 made in quick succession. The first is dated 8 August 2006 and appointed the claimant, referring to her in the will as “my wife” and her father, referred to as “my father in law”, as executors. The sole beneficiary under that will was “my wife”, that is the claimant, with a default gift of favour of “my son and my daughter”, that is Vikram and Shaan, who are the claimant's children by her marriage.

Four months later, Fiaz made a further will revoking the first dated 12 December 2006. The terms of that will are completely different. Fiaz appointed the first defendant, his son Sajad, as the sole executor and left 50 per cent of the proceeds of sale of a property, 12 Sussex Close, to, as he described her “my close friend”, the claimant, and the residue of the estate to Sajad or in default his daughter Shabana. So there was a notable change of approach in that short period and, when it came round to 2018, Fiaz's will removed all benefit for the claimant altogether.

At one point the first defendant claimed that there was a secret trust created by Fiaz that lay behind the terms of the 2018 will. The secret trust was said to require the first defendant to distribute the will in accordance with Sharia law. I need not dwell on this point because, although there was evidence provided by the first defendant on this subject, the point was abandoned during the course of the trial.

Turning therefore to the claim, the claimant says the court has jurisdiction under the 1975 Act on two grounds, which are put forward in the alternative. The first ground is under section 1(1)(a) of the 1975 Act, that during the whole of the period of two years before Fiaz's death, she was living in the same household as him and as if they were a married couple or civil partners. There are two limbs to that test. The first is whether they were living in the same household during the relevant period and the second is whether they were living as if they were a married couple. The alternative ground is under section 1(1)I that the claimant is a person who was being maintained, either wholly or partly, by Fiaz.

That Fiaz had a relationship akin to marriage with the claimant from about the year 2000, and that they were living in the same household during that period, is not in doubt. The defendants say, however, that the relationship ended in about 2012 and, although there was some resumption of the relationship, from that date it did not have the same character as before. They accept there was, as they describe it, a continuing romantic relationship between Fiaz and the claimant, but they say it is best seen as an ‘on/off relationship’ that did not have the characteristics that are necessary to satisfy section 1(1)(a) of the 1975 Act.

I turn briefly then to deal with Fiaz's estate. He was, at his death, the registered proprietor of five properties which have been valued for the purposes of this claim at £1.33 million in their current condition. There is an issue between the parties about the net value of the estate, but for the purposes of this introduction I can take its value as being in the region of £1 million after deduction of debt and expenses. I note in passing that the estate included some £420,000 held in cash in bank and building society accounts.

During his lifetime, Fiaz traded using two trading names. He did not, so far as the evidence reveals, incorporate a company to operate his business. The first trading name was ‘Power Property Care’ which he used where he was a landlord in relation to his property holdings; the second was ‘Power Controls’, which he used for his sole trader business of installing and repairing plumbing, heating and electrical services to domestic properties. Power Controls appears to have been his main job and source of income.

The defendants describe Fiaz as a simple, hard-working man. However, it is evident that he was more complex than that and some of his behaviour revealed by the evidence was plainly devious when it came to paying, or rather not paying, tax. One characteristic that became clear from the evidence is that he had a strong aversion to paying any tax, whether it be council tax or income tax. He and the claimant appear to have been careful to set up a false picture about their financial affairs and this has made it more difficult for the court to establish the true nature of the relationship between them.

One of the more extraordinary features of this case is that the claimant relies upon her fraudulent conduct in making a housing benefit claim and receiving housing benefit over an extended period. She positively asserts that her claim to Slough Council for housing benefit, resulting in payment of more than £60,000 by way of rent, was fraudulent. She does so in order to demonstrate, on her case, that her connection to the address for which benefit was paid was not a real one, that it was not her home. There is no way of dressing up this conduct. It was dishonest and knowingly dishonest. It was also part of a pattern of dishonest conduct relating to claims to benefits and the non-payment of taxes. This is a subject to which I will return.

So far as the law is concerned, there is nothing between the parties about the principles that are applicable to section 1(1)(a) of the Act. The easiest and helpful encapsulation of the law is the reference made by Ward LJ in Gully v Dix [2004] EWCA Civ 139 to the discussion in Santos v Santos [1972] FLR 247. In paragraph 24 in Gully v Dix, Ward LJ says this:

“The relevant word is ‘household’ not ‘house’, and ‘household’ bears the meaning given to it by Sachs LJ. Thus, they will be in the same household if they are tied by their relationship. The tie of that relationship may be made manifest by various elements, not simply their living under the same roof, but the public and private acknowledgement of their mutual society, and the mutual protection and support that binds them together. In former days one would possibly say one should look at the whole consortium vitae. For present purposes it is sufficient to ask whether either has demonstrated a settled acceptance or recognition that the relationship is in truth at an end.”

There are two further passages in the authorities that I consider to be of assistance. The first is a passage from the judgment of Neuberger J (as he then was) in Re Watson [1999] 1 FLR 878, where he says:

“It seems to me that when...