SROS: A COMPLIANCE OFFICER'S PERSPECTIVE
| Pages | 364-369 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/eb024783 |
| Published date | 01 February 1993 |
| Date | 01 February 1993 |
| Author | SAMANTHA LINSLEY |
| Subject Matter | Accounting & finance |
SROS:
A COMPLIANCE OFFICER'S PERSPECTIVE
Received: 19th May, 1993
SAMANTHA LINSLEY
SAMANTHA LINSLEY
IS A BARRISTER AND COMPLIANCE MANAGER
WITH A LEADING PRIVATE BANK. SHE HAS
PRACTISED IN THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
INDUSTRY FOR OVER THREE YEARS AND IS A
SECOND YEAR STUDENT ON THE NEW
DIPLOMA IN COMPLIANCE STUDIES RUN BY
THE CENTRE FOR POLICE & CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STUDIES AT EXETER UNIVERSITY.
ABSTRACT
Against the background of
change
and
debate
over the future
structure
of regula-
tion of the financial
services
industry,
this
paper examines the self-regulating
organi-
sations (SROs) established wider the
pliance officer's
perspective.
The paper
analyses
the size of
membership
of
each
of
the four SROs and the monitoring of
investment
business,
SRO
rulebooks
and
the
'New
Settlement',
the
status
and
reputa-
tion of the four
organisations.
It
concludes
that
the
future of the SROs may depend
upon the
outcome
of
the
wider
'regulatory
fragmentation'
argument
and the
success-
ful
creation
of a
new retail
SRO.
INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt that 1992 was a
truly horrible year for the self-regu-
lating organisations (SROs)
established under the Financial Ser-
vices Act 1986. For the Investment
Management Regulatory Organisa-
tion (IMRO), its nadir came in the
form of the Maxwell pension fund
scandal and the report of the Social
Security Committee in March 1992,
which drew stinging criticism of
IMRO from the media. In a state-
ment to its members, IMRO
reported: 'We cannot claim to have
come out of this very well: to an
extent, IMRO was thumped, and that
is not an agreeable experience . . .'.1
In the same month, Sir Kenneth
Clucas published his report into the
feasibility of a new SRO for the
retail sector. The need for a review
of retail regulation arose due to the
well-publicised difficulties encoun-
tered by another SRO, the Financial
Intermediaries, Managers and
Brokers Regulator)' Association
(FIMBRA), which affected the whole
of the self-regulatory structure. Most
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