Stanislav Prisacari v Tribunal Judiciaire De Paris, France

Hearing dates: 8.4.25 & 9.10.25

Draft judgments: 3.6.25 & 10.10.25

Approved Judgment

This Judgment was handed down remotely at 10am on 16 October 2025 by circulation to the parties by email and by release to the National Archives.

PART 1. PREFACE

This judgment was written on two separate occasions, after two separate hearings. I wrote §§2–47 below (Part 2) in April/May 2025. That was after a hearing on 8 April 2025. I was poised to hand it down on 13 June 2025. This is a case about extradition. The requested person is wanted by the French authorities to serve a 20 month prison sentence. But he has spent far more than 20 months on a 5-hour electronically monitored curfew. A Divisional Court judgment called A and a judgment of Farbey J called Doga found it was very clear-cut that the application of the French Code would treat each day of that kind of curfew as time served (§6 below). In my original judgment, I described the evidence (§41 below) and the assessment of the evidence by the Courts in A and Doga (§§42–43 below). I found that the Appellant's prospects of Qualifying Curfew being time served under the French Code were “so irresistibly strong” on the evidence that it would be an Article 8 violation to extradite him (§47). I decided to follow A and Doga. I also referred to the controversy about a foreign early release discretion (§37 below). Mr Swain for the Respondent had cited to me the judgment of Swift J in the case of Andrysiewicz v Poland [2024] EWHC 1399 (Admin), in support of a general point about not generally getting involved in contested questions regarding provisions of foreign domestic law. The Divisional Court in A had considered that point, but with a proviso where the position is “very clear cut” (§38 below). I had concluded that this case was very clear cut. My judgment (Part 2) had been circulated in draft on 3 June 2025. I had received and dealt with editorial corrections. Then the Supreme Court handed down judgment in Andrysiewicz [2025] UKSC 23 [2025] 1 WLR 2733 on 11 June 2025, resolving the controversy about a foreign early release discretion (§37 below). In the light of the Supreme Court's judgment, the Respondent asked me to defer handing down judgment, asking for the chance to persuade me to reverse my decision. I gave them that chance. I will address the Respondent's request in Part 3. But first, I will set out (Part 2) my original judgment. For complete transparency, I have left it untouched. The parts of this judgment that have been written later (October 2025) are §1 (Part 1) and §§48–59 (Part 3).

PART 2. THE ORIGINAL JUDGMENT

Introduction

This is an extradition case about Qualifying Curfew under the domestic law of France as the issuing judicial authority (IJA), and its relevance to the responsibilities of the UK court as executing judicial authority (EJA). By “Qualifying Curfew”, I mean a restriction of liberty whose effect in the French domestic law is to reduce the term of imprisonment which a requested person would be required to serve. By the “responsibilities” of the EJA, I mean the functions of deciding whether extradition would violate Article 8 ECHR or constitute an abuse of process. This is previously-trodden ground. My judgment is the third in a line of extradition cases about French Qualifying Curfew. The previous two cases are A v France [2022] EWHC 3214 (Admin) (Stuart-Smith LJ and Jay J, 20.12.22) and Doga v France [2023] EWHC 2561 (Admin) (Farbey J, 3.10.23). In both A and Doga, the requested person was discharged from extradition by this Court as EJA, because the period of electronically-monitored curfew (EMC) in the UK exceeded the length of the French prison sentence which was the subject of France's extradition request. I have to decide whether the same outcome follows in the present case.

Qualifying Curfew in UK and French Domestic Law

When sentences are imposed by UK criminal courts, a mandatory Qualifying Curfew arises pursuant to s.240A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 and s.325 of the Sentencing Act 2020. By operation of the statute, each day of mandatory Qualifying Curfew counts as half a day of time served. The UK domestic statutory definition of mandatory Qualifying Curfew is an EMC of 9 hours or more per day. In our domestic law there is also a sentencing judge's discretion to take into account an EMC of less than 9 hours per day when passing sentence: see R v Whitehouse [2019] EWCA Crim 970 [2019] 2 Cr App R (S) 48 at §17.

In French domestic law, a Qualifying Curfew arises under Article 142–11 of the French Code of Criminal Procedure, when read with Article 716–4: see §21 and 29 below. The question under the French Code is whether the restriction of liberty constitutes “electronically monitored house arrest” (EMHA). If it does, each day spent on EMHA counts as a day of time served. Whether it does, is a question of evaluative judgment. The Respondent has reiterated, as did the French Ministry of Justice in Doga (see §16), that this evaluative judgment is a “discretion” which is “unfettered”, belonging to a French trial judge. On 17 March 2021 the French Supreme Court (Cour de Cassation Criminal Division) published a judgment on an appeal from the Court of Appeal, in test cases where UK EMC had been treated as EMHA under the Code. That French Supreme Court judgment was provided to the Divisional Court in A (see §§11 and 32) and addressed by the French Ministry of Justice in Doga (see §16).

Four Components

I have found it helpful to keep in mind the following four distinct components to the idea of Qualifying Curfew being applied under French domestic law to a requested person whose extradition is sought. First, there is a who component. This is about who decides whether the deduction as time-served falls to be made in the individual case. The answer is that it is the French decision-makers; ultimately the French courts. Secondly, there is a when component. This is about the point in time at which the decision-maker decides whether the deduction as time-served falls to be made in the individual case. The answer is that this is after the extradition has taken place and the requested person is in France. Thirdly, there is a what component. This about what criteria are applied, when the decision-maker comes to decide whether a deduction as time-served should be made. The answer is that the French decision-maker asks whether the EMC constitutes EMHA. Fourthly, there is a whether component. This is about the prospect that the relevant decision-maker at the relevant time applying the relevant criteria will make a favourable decision and make a deduction as time served.

A and Doga

In A, the requested person had been on a 5 ¹/₂ hour (then a 4 hour) EMC for 1,521 days; and his French prison sentence was 1,360 days (3y 8m 22d): see A at §§7–8. The Divisional Court ordered his discharge, in the light of evidence about the Qualifying Curfew in the French Code, because extradition would be disproportionate, and also an abuse or process: see A at §49. In Doga, the requested person had been on a 5 hour EMC for 34m 16d; and his French prison sentence was 18m: see Doga at §§1, 4. Farbey J ordered his discharge, in the light of A and evidence about the Qualifying Curfew in the French Code, because extradition would be disproportionate, and also an abuse or process: see Doga at §§34–35. Each Court concluded on the evidence that the requested person would fall to be credited with the period on EMC as Qualifying Curfew: A §§40–42, 49; Doga at §33. In each case, previous adverse appeal decisions were reopened to avoid real injustice (Crim PR 50.27).

Expert Evidence and the Chance to Respond

The hearing in A was on 6 December 2022. The requested person relied on statements from a first French lawyer (M Thibaut Kempf) dated 25 July 2022 and a second French lawyer (M Etienne Arnaud) filed on 2 December 2022: see A at §§9, 18. The IJA's position was that the French court had exclusive competence to consider whether to make a deduction for Qualifying Curfew and it was not open to the UK extradition court to consider whether – by reference to Qualifying Curfew under the French Code – the requested person had “served his sentence” (§§21, 23, 40). That argument failed (at §40). Reference was made in A (at §19iv and vi) to a case at Westminster Magistrates Court called France v Miller. In Miller the requested person had relied on a report of a French lawyer (M Philippe Pejoine) dated 5 February 2020 ( A at §19vi). Reference was made to the French Supreme Court's judgment of 17 March 2021 ( A at §§11 and 32). The hearing in Doga was on 3 October 2023 and the requested person relied on a report from the French lawyer (M Arnaud) dated 4 July 2023 ( Doga §9). There was no “reasoned opposition to M Arnaud's evidence” ( Doga §33). In the present appeal, the Appellant relied on A and Doga and the substantive content of the materials discussed in those judgments.

The substantive hearing was fixed on 4 December 2024, for 8 April 2025. The Respondent's skeleton argument (31 March 2025) included the submission that the appeal could not succeed without case-specific expert evidence. On 1 April 2025 the Respondent filed and served two documents discussed in A and Doga (§17 below). On 2 April 2025 the Appellant filed an application to adduce fresh evidence, accompanied by a 3-page legal opinion of a French lawyer (Marie D'Harcourt). On 3 April 2025 the CPS (Darren Watts) emailed the Court and the Appellant's representatives...