State capacity and the resilience of electoral authoritarianism: Conceptualizing and measuring the institutional underpinnings of autocratic power
| Author | Jonathan K Hanson |
| Published date | 01 January 2018 |
| Date | 01 January 2018 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1177/0192512117702523 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512117702523
International Political Science Review
2018, Vol. 39(1) 17 –32
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512117702523
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State capacity and the resilience
of electoral authoritarianism:
Conceptualizing and measuring
the institutional underpinnings
of autocratic power
Jonathan K Hanson
University of Michigan, USA
Abstract
This article discusses three main challenges to gaining a better understanding of whether state capacity
contributes to the resilience of electoral authoritarian regimes. First, the concept of state capacity is
multi-dimensional and can be entangled with regime organizational structures. Second, there is a range of
different mechanisms through which elections may draw upon capacity in these different dimensions to
affect authoritarian resilience. Third, good indicators of the dimensions of state capacity for empirical work
are sorely lacking. To address these challenges, this article outlines the connections between extractive,
coercive and administrative dimensions of state capacity with regard to how electoral authoritarian regimes
address threats arising from society and from within the ruling elite. It then assesses different approaches to
measuring these dimensions for empirical work.
Keywords
Authoritarianism, state capacity, electoral authoritarian regimes, measurement, regime survival
Introduction
The route to a better understanding of whether state capacity facilitates the survival of electoral
authoritarian regimes involves navigation through conceptual, theoretical and empirical chal-
lenges. First, state capacity is multi-dimensional, and it can be difficult to disentangle the state
from the regime’s organizational structure. Thus, it is important to develop conceptual clarity about
the relevant dimensions of state capacity and to distinguish them, as much as possible, from fea-
tures of regimes.
Corresponding author:
Jonathan K Hanson, Gerald R. Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan, 735 S. State Street, Ann Arbor,
MI 48109, USA.
Email: jkhanson@umich.edu
702523IPS0010.1177/0192512117702523International Political Science ReviewHanson
research-article2017
Article
18 International Political Science Review 39(1)
Second, producing clear theoretical expectations is tricky. Authoritarian rulers can employ a
range of strategies to survive in the face of challenges emanating from within the ruling elite and
arising from the broader society. Holding multiparty elections is a component of this strategic
choice set. In the introductory article to this special issue, Hellmann and Croissant review the
vibrant scholarly debate about the ways in which elections may affect the survival of authoritarian
regimes, concluding that elections can have both regime-strengthening and regime-weakening
effects. The key question addressed in this special issue is the extent to which and how state capac-
ity shapes these effects. In this article, I argue that there is no single answer to the question.
Elections serve different strategic purposes, and have different effects, across different combina-
tions of state capabilities. Additionally, strategic decisions at one point in time lead to investment
in state capacities, or their atrophy, affecting subsequent strategic options. This argument provides
a framework for thinking about these contextual effects.
Third, measuring the various dimensions of state capacity is a significant challenge for empiri-
cal research, and good indicators are sorely lacking (Hanson and Sigman, 2013; Hendrix, 2010).
Observing ‘state capacity’ is inherently difficult, for we typically are limited to outcome variables
that we believe are connected to it. This is hazardous, on the one hand, since capacity is not neces-
sarily fully utilized. On the other hand, indicators that we may believe are correlated with state
capacity, such as gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, often have an important direct effect on
our phenomena of interest. A review of available measures aims to guide empirical research.
This article addresses these conceptual, theoretical, and empirical challenges in turn, develop-
ing propositions for further research in this area and guidance for empirical testing. Its key theoreti-
cal contribution to the literature comes through fleshing out the argument that contextual factors,
such as the state’s administrative and coercive capacities, shape the effects of authoritarian elec-
tions (Seeberg, 2014). Different combinations of state capabilities are associated with the utility of
different strategies, such as performance-based legitimacy, the creation of an aura of dominance,
or the clientelistic provision of resources. These strategies manage threats to the regime in different
ways, and they break down in different ways.
Conceptualizing regimes, states, and state capacity
The question of whether state capacity contributes to the survival of electoral authoritarian regimes
presupposes a conceptual distinction between states and regimes. Although disentangling regime
from state is often difficult empirically, we require some basic conceptual distinctions. A useful
definition of the state appears in Fishman (1990: 428): ‘a more permanent structure of domination
and coordination including a coercive apparatus and the means to administer a society and extract
resources from it.’ The basic functions of territorial control and administration, including the col-
lection of revenues, are the essential features of states.
Regimes are a set of formal and informal rules that identify who holds power, their means of
selection or appointment, the relations between them, and the extent to which their powers are
constrained vis-à-vis each other and society writ large (Skaaning, 2006). In more institutionalized
regimes, these rules are implemented and enforced by organizations and institutions such as politi-
cal parties, politburos, and legislatures. As the ‘prevailing form of access to political power’
(Mazzuca, 2010: 342), regimes constitute a configuration of control over the state. The state is thus
a more elemental concept. Over time, regimes tend to come and go, while states have an enduring
quality (Fishman, 1990).
Electoral authoritarian regimes, then, are autocratic regimes in which multiparty elections are
held but these elections are systematically biased in favor of the ruling party (Schedler, 2002).The
underlying purpose of elections is not to select which set of actors has control over the state but
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