A strategic theory of effective monitoring arrangements for international institutions
| Date | 01 October 2014 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0951629813511550 |
| Published date | 01 October 2014 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
Article
A strategic theory of effective
monitoring arrangements for
international institutions
Journal of Theoretical Politics
2014, Vol. 26(4) 599–628
©The Author(s) 2013
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DOI:10.1177/0951629813511550
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Thania Sanchez
Yale University, New Haven, CT, USA
Johannes Urpelainen
Columbia University, New York, NY, USA
Abstract
States often delegate compliance monitoring to international monitors. It is commomly assumed
that these monitors will report accurately on the information they gather. However, the effec-
tiveness of compliance monitors varies widely. Monitors may fail to collect information about
non-compliance or even collude with non-compliant states and deliberately fail to report the
information they gather. To explain this variation, we present a formal theory of how structural
conditions and institutional designs lead to different levels of monitoring efficacy. We show that
international institutions can improve monitoring by avoiding ruthless sanctions, and that intrinsi-
cally motivated monitors generally achieve better outcomes than neutral bureaucrats. Our theory
contributes to the broad literature on international institutional design and treaty effectiveness.
Keywords
Compliance; enforcement; international institutions; monitoring; principal–agent models
1. Introduction
The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movementsof Hazardous Wastes
and their Disposal was created in part to halt the large amounts of exports of hazardous
wastes by developed countries to developing countries that lacked the ability to properly
dispose of the waste (Marcoux and Urpelainen, 2012). By limiting the amount and type of
hazardous wastes countries could export, the treaty hoped that developed nations would
produce less hazardous waste and dispose of it themselves in environmentally friendly
Corresponding author:
Johannes Urpelainen, Columbia University, 7th Floor, International Affairs Building, 420 West 118th Street,
New York, NY 10027, USA.
Email: ju2178@columbia.edu
600 Journal of Theoretical Politics 26(4)
ways, instead of dumping it on developing nations. However, the shipment of hazardous
wastes continues to occur even though it is illegal.
Italy has been a notorious non-complier with the treaty,as Italian toxic and hazardous
waste has been dumped in countries such as Albania and Somalia, even though this is in
violation of the treaty and EU regulations. According to Legambiente, a leading Italian
environmental non-government organization (NGO), the Italian Customs Agency seized
7,400 tons of hazardous waste leaving the country illegallyin 2011 alone (Ciaf ani, 2012).
This is mostly accomplished as the criminal networks that export the waste illegally bribe
or blackmail the monitors that are meant to check the transport of waste and procure
the paperwork to authorize shipments (Massari and Monzini, 2006). Without reliable
monitoring, the illegal transfer of hazardous waste continues.
The failure to effectively end the illegal shipment of hazardous waste demonstrates
how sensitive international cooperation can be to monitoring failure. It is often diffi-
cult to obtain information about any given state’s compliance record with international
agreements. Indeed, states have incentives to hide non-compliant behavior from external
observes, so monitoring is crucial for treaty effectiveness. As Barrett (2003, 37) writes,
‘[i]f non-compliance cannot be observed, then it cannot be punished. Effective monitor-
ing is a prerequisite for enforcing compliance.’ Often parties to a treaty seek to solve this
problem by establishing monitors entrusted with the task of detecting non-compliance.
Scholars of international relations have paid scant attention to monitors’ incentives to
actually gather and report information.1Often theories assume that once monitors are in
place they will provide the relevantinfor mation, although political economists have long
emphasized that supervising effort is prone to collusion (Tirole, 1986). Here we present
a theory that can explain why sometimes monitors may fail at their task. We present a
strategic theory of treaty monitoring that pays special attention to issues of institutional
design. Wepresent a formal model that is developed around three key questions regarding
the monitor’s incentives. First, can the monitor profitably collude with non-compliant
states? Second, if a monitor reveals information about non-compliance to other states,
what are the consequences? Finally, if a monitor is negligent or engages in collusion,
what is the probability of being caught later?
Our research finds that the best way to secure effective monitoring and compliance
is to reward the monitor for successful information revelation while applying measures
against collusion. Monitors should have incentives to collect information for the right
reasons: to reveal this information to other states and publics rather than collude with
the non-compliant state. When treaty monitors have incentives to collect and publicize
information on non-compliance, high levels of treaty compliance by member states are
attainable. However, often these incentives are missing, and a potential for monitoring
failure is present.
With regard to institutional design, our analysishas two implications worth emphasiz-
ing. First, successful monitoring depends on the enforcement regime. While international
cooperation theorists have emphasized the importance of strong sanctions for compliance
(Carrubba, 2005; Downs et al., 1996), they have not considered the possibility that the
enforcement regime needs to induce monitors to expend effort. When a monitor who
is interested in cooperation expects the consequences of information revelation to be
harmful to cooperation, she has an incentive not to reveal that information. In other
words, when a monitor expects the punishment for lack of compliance to push actors
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