Stratford v Syrett

: A somewhat curious point has arisen in this case, of which the material facts, quite briefly, are as follows: The premises with which we are concerned, which are known as No. 10, Marthan Road, streatley, Luton, appear to have belonged, prior to her death in 1938, to the Plaintiff's aunt.

By her Will the aunt left the premises to the Trustees, who are act parties to these proceedings, upon trust for sale, the beneficial interest being for too Plaintiff for life and subject thereto for the Plaintiff's daughter absolutely.

After the aunt's death it is plain that as a matter of fact the plaintiff was put into possession of the property; that is to say, she was allowed to deal with it as she, the person entitled to the rents and profits, wished. So far as the evidence goss, the Trustees were more or less passive, and permitted the Plaintiff to deal with the property as she chase.

What the plaintiff then proceeded to do was that in the year 1939 she let the premises to the Defendant upon the terms of an ordinary weekly tenancy at a rent. I think I am right in saying that the tenancy was entirely infernal and was oral. However that may be, the Defendant proceeded to go into possession, and under the contract that he made with the Plaintiff, renamed in possession from 1939 until the present time, paying the contractual rent.

It then appeared that the daughter, the person entitled absolutely subject to the Plaintiff's life interest under the aunt's will, serried, and so the Plaintiff came to the conclusion that it would be right for her, if she could, to obtain possession of this property for the daughter and her husband and family, if any, to live in. In consequence, the proceedings were started, and the Plaintiff put her case forward as one coming within paragraph (h) of the schedule to the 1933 Rent Act, that is to say, as a case of what is called "greater hardship".

Upon that matter of greater hardship no question now arises, for the learned Judge, having gone into the Questions of fact, concluded that too plaintiff had established fear case; prima facie, therefore, ho would have made an Order for possession in the plaintiff's favour.

But then the question arose as regards the title to these premises, and the learned Judge case to the conclusion that he was bound by authority to hold that no question of estoppel could be asserted by the landlord against the tenant, as might be applicable in the case of an ordinary lcase outside the Rent Act, and that as a result of a decision of this Court in the case of Parker v. Rosenberg, reported in 1947, Vol. 1, All England Reports at page 87, which he thought was on all fours with this case, he was bound to refuse relief to the Plaintiff. In my judgment, with all respect to the learned Judge, ho fell into error in both those matters.

I can shortly dispose of the case of Parker v. Rosenberg, and perhaps it is convenient that I should do that first. It was a case in which the tenancy had been granted by certain trustees who were trustees for sale, and proceedings were brought by the trustees and a beneficiary to recover possession. It was sought to show those that greater hardship was established on the part of the beneficiary. The Court case to the conclusion that the trustees being the landlords they could not show or indeed assort a case of greater hardship seeing that they themselves of course had no beneficial interest whatever in the property; and that as regards the beneficiary she was aot a party to the contract, and therefore not competent to assert any right against the tenaat.

Having said that much, I think it is quite clear that so far free being on all fours with the present case, the case of Parker v. Rosenberg, if I may respectfully say no, had no bearing upon it.

As regards the estoppel point, the learned Judge's conclusion that the well known doctrine of estoppel which applies between lessor and losses has as application is a Rent Act case, was founded by the learned Judge upon a sentence in the speech of Lord of Thankerton in a case reported in 1947 Appeal Cases, at page 309, the case of J. & F. Stone Lighting & Radle Ltd. v. Levitt. But there again, with all respect to the learned Judge, neither the case nor the passage from Lord Thankerston's speech has any bearing on the question with which we are concerned. It was a case in which, as a result of proceedings earlier brought between tat two parties, J. & F. stone Ltd., the landlords, and Mr. Levitt, on Order had been made that the statutory rent which the tenant ought to pay was 10s. Od. a week, and so for a time matters continued. The tenant remained in occupation, paid 10s. Od. a week, and the Plaintiffs accepted it. Further proceedings were then brought, saying in of feet that since 10s. Od. a week was loss than the requisite fraction of the relevant rates, the case was outside the Rent Acts altogether. The only point at which estoppel case in was this; It was suggested that it was not competent for the landlords to assert, that the tenancy me outside the sent Acts because of what had occurred and of the order made in the previous proceeding; it was said that they were estopped from so asserting. All that Lord Thankerton's observation mounted to was that you cannot give is the Court a statutory jurisdiction by estoppel; either the statutory jurisdiction is there or it is not there, and whether It there or not depends upon the parliamentary language. What Lord Thankerton said in the passage relied upon was this: "From tat above facts it appears clear to me that, however had in law the judgment on that counterclaim say now be deconstructed to be, on the ground that it was without Jurisdiction is view of sub-section 7 of section 12 of the Act of 1930, the fact reaains that the parties, by their actions, were agreed that the rent payable in respect of the tenancy at the material date was 10s.0d. per week. Having reached this conclusion is fact, it is idle to suggest that either...