Strong states, weak elections? How state capacity in authoritarian regimes conditions the democratizing power of elections
| Published date | 01 January 2018 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512117697544 |
| Author | Carolien van Ham,Brigitte Seim |
| Date | 01 January 2018 |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512117697544
International Political Science Review
2018, Vol. 39(1) 49 –66
© The Author(s) 2017
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DOI: 10.1177/0192512117697544
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Strong states, weak elections? How
state capacity in authoritarian
regimes conditions the
democratizing power of elections
Carolien van Ham
University of New South Wales, Australia
Brigitte Seim
University of North Carolina, USA
Abstract
State capacity may be a crucial factor conditioning the democratizing power of elections in authoritarian
regimes. This paper develops a two-phase theory considers the different effects of state capacity on turnover
in elections and democratic change after elections. In regimes with limited state capacity, manipulating
elections and repressing opposition is more difficult than in regimes with extensive state capacity, rendering
turnover in elections more likely in weak states. However, if the new incumbent has limited capacity to
deliver public services and make policy changes after coming to power, sustainable democratic change is
unlikely. Hence, state capacity is hypothesized to have a negative effect on turnover, but a positive effect
on democratic change. These hypotheses are confirmed in a sample of 460 elections in 110 authoritarian
regimes taking place in the period 1974 to 2012 using the Varieties of Democracy dataset. The findings
suggest a need to revisit strong-state-first theories of democratization.
Keywords
Democratic change, democratization, elections, electoral authoritarianism, turnover
Introduction
Because many autocracies in the world today hold multiparty elections (Croissant and Hellmann, this
issue), it is critical to understand the conditions under which elections lead to democratization or, con-
versely, sustain authoritarianism. On the one hand, research into democratization-by-elections argues
that repeated elections, even when held in authoritarian contexts, eventually lead to democratization
Corresponding author:
Carolien van Ham, School of Social Sciences, University of New South Wales, 2052 NSW, Sydney, Australia.
Email: c.vanham@unsw.edu.au
697544IPS0010.1177/0192512117697544International Political Science Reviewvan Ham and Seim
research-article2017
Article
50 International Political Science Review 39(1)
(Edgell et al., 2015; Howard and Roessler, 2006; Lindberg, 2009). Indeed, in countries as varied as
Tunisia, Ghana and Mongolia, the introduction of multi-party elections has generated increased civil
liberties, deepened respect for the rule of law, and regular turnover of the national executive (Doorenspleet
and Kopecky, 2008; Lindberg, 2006; Stepan, 2012). On the other hand, cases such as Malaysia, Russia
and Cameroon demonstrate that elections in authoritarian regimes can be subverted to such an extent
that they strengthen, rather than weaken, authoritarian rule (Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Levitsky and
Way, 2010; Schedler, 2002, 2013). Clearly, elections can both sustain and undermine authoritarianism,
raising the question: what factors mediate the relationship between elections and democratization?
We argue that state capacity is one of the factors affecting the democratizing power of elections
in authoritarian regimes. Scholars have argued that developing strong state institutions is an impor-
tant pre-condition for successful democratization, acting both to prevent instability and conflict in
transitional regimes and to enable newly democratic governments to gain legitimacy by providing
public services (Fortin, 2012; Fukuyama, 2014; Mansfield and Snyder, 2007; Mazzuca and Munck,
2014). However, state capacity may serve those same functions in authoritarian regimes and, in
addition, strengthen autocrats’ capacity to manipulate support and oppress dissent (Seeberg, 2014;
Slater, 2012; Way, 2005), suggesting state capacity might be equally important for either demo-
cratic or autocratic stability (Andersen et al., 2014b; Slater and Fenner, 2011).
We build on insights from research on state capacity, democratization and electoral authoritari-
anism to develop a theory of how state capacity conditions the effectiveness of elections in bring-
ing about democratic change in authoritarian regimes. We argue that, ultimately, whether state
capacity undermines or reinforces democratization depends on who is exercising the capacity of
the state and to what end. We therefore propose a two-phase theory that considers the differential
effects of state capacity on turnover in elections and democratic change after elections. We hypoth-
esize that state capacity has a negative effect on the likelihood of turnover in authoritarian elec-
tions, but a positive effect on democratic change after turnover has occurred. In authoritarian
regimes with weak state capacity, manipulating elections, repressing opposition and co-opting
elites may be more difficult than in authoritarian regimes with strong state capacity. Hence, we
expect elections in regimes with weak state capacity to be more likely to lead to incumbent turno-
ver. However, after turnover, if the new incumbent has limited capacity to deliver public services
and make policy changes after coming to power, democratic change is unlikely to be sustainable.1
Thus, state capacity in authoritarian regimes can either reinforce or undermine the democratizing
power of elections, depending on the stage at which state capacity is being applied.
In the next section, we develop our theoretical argument and hypotheses about the relationship
between state capacity, elections and democratization. We then present our data and methods, fol-
lowed by the results of our empirical analyses using new data from the Varieties of Democracy
(V-Dem) dataset (version 6.1) and Hanson and Sigman (2013). By drawing on the V-Dem dataset
and the Hanson and Sigman state capacity index, we are able to test our theoretical expectations
robustly, cross-nationally, and over time, examining 460 elections in 110 electoral authoritarian
regimes over a 35+ year period, from 1974 to 2012. In the final section we conclude with a discus-
sion of the results and suggestions for future research. Our findings highlight the need to revisit
strong-state-first theories of democratization.
State capacity, elections and democratic change in electoral
authoritarian regimes
A rich and extensive literature considers whether or not elections in authoritarian regimes lead to
democratization. Some conclude that elections in authoritarian regimes sustain authoritarianism.
Historical research on elections in fledgling democracies in Europe, the United States and Latin
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