A surprising spat: The causes and consequences of the Saudi–Canadian dispute
| Published date | 01 June 2019 |
| Date | 01 June 2019 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020702019855347 |
| Author | Thomas Juneau |
| Subject Matter | Policy Brief |
Policy Brief
International Journal
2019, Vol. 74(2) 313–323
A surprising spat: The
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causes and consequences
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702019855347
of the Saudi–Canadian
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dispute
Thomas Juneau
University of Ottawa, Canada
Abstract
In August 2018, Saudi Arabia expelled the Canadian ambassador to Riyadh, recalled its
own ambassador in Ottawa, and imposed sanctions on Canada. This overreaction to
tweets by the Canadian foreign ministry demanding the release of jailed activists was
consistent with the pattern of foreign policy assertiveness that has accompanied the rise
of Mohammed bin Salman (MbS). The Saudi–Canadian spat is not very important: bilat-
eral ties were never essential for either country. But the dispute carries lessons for
Canada and its allies as they reflect on future ties to the Kingdom. This partnership was
always necessary but costly. MbS, however, has amplified and exposed these costs.
By bringing unprecedented scrutiny to Saudi actions, recent events have opened a
window of opportunity for Canada and its allies to re-evaluate relations. They should
increase pressure on Riyadh to change the costliest aspects of its policies. Should this
fail, they should downgrade the partnership.
Keywords
Canada, Saudi Arabia, MbS, sanctions, United States
In August 2018, to virtually everyone’s surprise, Saudi Arabia announced that it
was expelling the Canadian ambassador to Riyadh, recalling its own ambassador in
Ottawa, and imposing commercial and other sanctions on Canada. This overreac-
tion to innocuous tweets by the Canadian foreign ministry demanding the release
of jailed activists was not an isolated incident. Rather, it is consistent with a pattern
of foreign policy since Mohammed bin Salman (commonly known as MbS) became
defence minister in 2015 and then Crown Prince in 2017. Under his rule,
Corresponding author:
Thomas Juneau, University of Ottawa, 120 University Private, Social Sciences building, office 6082, Ottawa,
Ontario, K1N 6N5, Canada.
Email: tjuneau@uottawa.ca
314
International Journal 74(2)
Saudi Arabia has jettisoned its traditionally cautious foreign policy in exchange for
an assertive and often reckless approach to international affairs. Riyadh leads a
multinational coalition intervening in Yemen, it has imposed an embargo on its
tiny Qatari neighbour, and it de facto kidnapped the Lebanese prime minister in
2017 and forced him to resign. MbS has initiated an ambitious program of social
and economic reforms, but has also clamped down hard on what little space there
existed for civil society, as illustrated by the brutal murder of Jamal Khashoggi
in 2018.
The Saudi–Canadian spat, on its own, is not very important: bilateral ties were
never essential for either country. But it is useful to understand why and how the
dispute arose, as it carries crucial lessons for Canada and its allies as they struggle
with difficult questions regarding the future of their ties to the Kingdom. The
partnership with Saudi Arabia has always been costly but necessary. Recent
events have not only exposed these costs by leading to greater scrutiny; they
have also amplified them. It is now time to rethink relations with Saudi Arabia.
They remain necessary, but Canada, alongside its allies, should significantly
increase pressure on Riyadh to change the costliest aspects of its foreign and
domestic policies. Should this fail, the next step should be to permanently down-
grade the breadth and depth of the partnership.
Cordial but limited relations
Canada’s calculus broadly mirrors—albeit on a far smaller scale—that of the
United States. The partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia is
built on a fundamental bargain reaching back seven decades: Riyadh helps
ensure the stability of global oil markets in exchange for security guarantees
from Washington.1 Contrary to widespread misperceptions, imports of Saudi oil
are not a pillar of this partnership: in recent years, less than 5 percent of American
oil consumption has come from Saudi Arabia. Rather, relations are premised on
Saudi Arabia holding the world’s largest reserves of conventional oil and being the
world’s largest exporter, providing it with significant leverage over the global econ-
omy. The United States thus has a vital interest in ensuring that Saudi Arabia
remains a partner and not a rival.
This calculus has allowed the partnership to weather multiple crises, including
the oil shocks of the 1970s, severe disagreements on the Israeli–Palestinian conflict,
the fact that fifteen of nineteen hijackers for the 11 September 2001 attacks were
Saudi citizens, Saudi Arabia’s abysmal human rights record, and, more recently,
Saudi frustrations with what it viewed as President Barrack Obama’s efforts to
disengage from the Middle East. This has made bilateral relations a constant
source of frustration in Washington. Yet successive administrations have not
budged from their assessment that they remain necessary.
1.
Rachel Bronson, Thicker than Oil: America’s Uneasy Partnership with Saudi Arabia (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2008).
Juneau
315
Canada and other mid-sized Western powers have an interest in this partner-
ship: they benefit from its perpetuation and from its flaws remaining contained.
That is why Canada and Saudi Arabia had, until recently, cordial but limited
relations. They were cordial, in that they cooperated on shared interests, notably
counterterrorism, while they usually ensured that disagreements maintained a low
profile. Arguably, the main area of success in the bilateral relationship has been in
the education sector: about 15,000 Saudi students were, until the last academic
year, in Canadian universities.
At the same time, relations have been limited in their breadth and depth:
each country has historically ranked as a marginal priority for the other.
Annual bilateral trade, for example, has fluctuated in recent years at around
$3–4 billion, or roughly two days of Canada–US trade, making Saudi Arabia
Canada’s seventeenth largest trading partner. In 2017, Canada exported slightly
over $1 billion of goods to Saudi Arabia, almost half of which was military
equipment, while it imported roughly $2 billion of goods from Saudi Arabia,
mostly oil.2
The LAV deal
Canada–Saudi ties underwent a significant evolution in 2014 when the
Conservative government of Stephen Harper announced the largest arms export
contract in Canadian history, a $15-billion deal for the sale of light armoured
vehicles (LAVs) and associated weapons systems, spare parts, and technical data,
manufactured by General Dynamics Land Systems – Canada (GDLS-C). The deal
sustains 3,000 well-paid jobs for up to fifteen years, and involves the work of
about 500 small- and medium-sized businesses. Upon assuming power in 2015,
the Liberal government of Justin Trudeau decided to uphold the contract,
exposing Ottawa to domestic criticism from the media and civil society because
of Saudi Arabia’s poor human rights record and its use of previously acquired
Canadian-made armoured vehicles during its interventions in Bahrain in 2011 and
in Yemen.
The deal has remained shrouded in secrecy. It was not initially known, in par-
ticular, how many and what types of vehicles were to be delivered, according to
what calendar, and what penalties either side would have to pay in case of cancel-
lation. CBC did report in September 2018 that the contract had been scaled back in
2016 and 2017, bringing down the number of vehicles to be...
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