Surrogate Boycotts against Multinational Corporations: Consumers’ Choice of Boycott Targets
| Published date | 01 December 2013 |
| Date | 01 December 2013 |
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8551.2012.00822.x |
| Author | George Balabanis |
Surrogate Boycotts against Multinational
Corporations: Consumers’ Choice of
Boycott Targets
George Balabanis
Cass Business School, City University, 106 Bunhill Row, London EC1 8TZ, UK
Email: g.balabanis@city.ac.uk
Within the context of surrogate boycotts for multinational corporations (MNCs), the
author develops a conceptual framework which examines how the interaction between
expectations of boycott objectives’ attainment, the ascribed egregiousness of the princi-
pal offender and a MNC’s actions, activism, concern for the boycott issue and personal
sacrifices affect consumers’ likelihood to boycott a targeted MNC. The focus is on
surrogate boycotts where the targeted MNCs have some involvement with the underlying
issues. One of the key objectives is to determine disparities in the boycotting of different
MNCs which are targets of the same surrogate boycott. Results from two real boycotts
and four real boycott targets indicate that the ascribed egregiousness of the MNC’s
actions is the strongest determinant of boycott participation, followed by expectation
related to the attainability of the boycott objectives. Those MNCs with lower product
substitutability and higher consumer preferences will suffer less than other boycott
targets. Despite the alleviating influences of low substitutability and consumer prefer-
ences on boycotts, MNCs need to proactively develop decision-making frameworks for
early recognition of ethically dubious issues.
Introduction
In recent years, research has examined whether
socially responsible behaviours are rewarding for
corporations (Bartlett, 2003; Galbreath, 2010;
Küskü and Zarkada-Fraser, 2004), emphasizing
the ‘rewards’ aspect of social responsibility.
However, another aspect is also common, namely
the punishment of social irresponsibility, such as
in the case of consumer boycotts. Boycott popu-
larity has increased during the past 20 years. In a
sample of 15,500 consumers from 17 countries,
Global Market Insite Inc. (2005) found that 36%
of consumers have boycotted at least one brand.
The most frequently boycotted organizations tend
to be well-known multinational corporations
(MNCs).
John and Klein (2003, p. 196) estimated that
‘42% of the top MNCs and 54% of the top brands
are facing boycotts’ from potential customers.
MNCs are typically boycotted when consumers
perceive them as adopting harmful policies or
engaging in unfair business practices. Boycotting
can have devastating effects on sales, corporate
reputations, brand images and stock prices
(Klein, Smith and John, 2002; Koku, Akhigbe
and Springer, 1997; Pruitt and Friedman, 1986;
Walsh et al., 2009).
Friedman (1985, p. 97) defined a consumer
boycott as ‘an attempt by one or more parties to
achieve certain objectives by urging individual
consumers to refrain from making selected pur-
chases in the marketplace’. On the Ethical Con-
sumer (2011) list of current boycotts, the most
comprehensive listing available worldwide, 53%
of the active boycotts are surrogate boycotts,
making surrogate boycotts the most common
type of boycott (Friedman, 2001). With surrogate
boycotts, ‘a protest group finds itself dissatisfied
with the public policies of a city, state, or foreign
bs_bs_banner
British Journal of Management, Vol. 24, 515–531 (2013)
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8551.2012.00822.x
© 2012 The Author(s)
British Journal of Management © 2012 British Academy of Management. Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd,
9600 Garsington Road, Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA, 02148, USA.
nation and acts upon its feelings by boycotting
surrogates (the business firms operating in the
affected geographic area)’ (Friedman, 1985, p.
103).
Extant literature illustrates that consumers par-
ticipate in boycotts out of a sense of fairness and
justice (Klein, Smith and John, 2004; Littler,
2005; Crockett and Wallendorf, 2004; Stolle,
Hooghe and Micheletti, 2005). The idea that
many of the issues leading to boycotts are
not resolvable through the legal system adds to
the frustration of consumers and increases
their desire to sanction ‘offenders’ through
other means. In surrogate boycotts, the situation
is more complicated, because consumers use
boycott targets (e.g. MNCs) as a lever to pressure
a government or other authority to change its
policy on issues that, in many cases, have little to
do with the targeted MNC itself. However, in
other cases, MNCs are directly involved in the
boycott issues, either as business partners with
governments or through other more subtle and
less visible ways. For example, many MNCs try to
influence governmental policies through lobby-
ing, political donations or other means (Gross-
man and Helpman, 1996; Hansen and Mitchell,
2000; Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004).
This study focuses on surrogate boycotts of this
category (i.e. those aimed at firms that have some
involvement in contentious issues). Among the
key boycotting issues are environmental protec-
tion, animal rights, human rights protection,
labour practices, health concerns, and social and
political issues.
Although a few studies have investigated surro-
gate boycotts (Braunsberger and Buckler, 2010;
Larry and Leslie, 2009; Ettenson and Klein, 2005;
Farah and Newman, 2010), none has examined the
boycott effects on specific MNCs. Instead, focus
has been on the boycott per se or the boycotted
products in general, not on the specific surrogate
boycott targets. The current study uses a different
approach and attempts to examine differences in
the treatment of MNCs that are boycott targets of
the same surrogate boycott. These disparities in
the treatment of boycott targets may be due to
differences in the degree of MNC culpability or
differences in the boycotting costs.
The purpose of this paper is to develop and test
a conceptual model on the likelihood that con-
sumers will boycott the products of an MNC that
is a target of a surrogate boycott. We attempt to
determine which targeted MNCs in the same sur-
rogate boycott will suffer more. The model builds
on prior research in the field (Klein, Smith and
John, 2004) and empirically examines the varia-
tion in consumers’ boycott likelihood of four dif-
ferent surrogate boycott targets, using evidence
from two surrogate boycotts. The two examined
boycotts include (1) the US administration’s
(under President Bush) failure to ratify the Kyoto
Protocol for global warming and (2) the human
rights abuses by the Burma regime. The boycott
targets come from three different countries and
either were donors to the US Republican party
at the time or were doing business in Burma.
To facilitate the communication herein, we
use the terms ‘boycott’ and ‘surrogate boycott’
interchangeably.
Theoretical framework and hypotheses
This study’s theoretical framework explicates the
factors that influence consumers’ likelihood to
participate in surrogate boycotts. It draws on
prior direct boycott studies (Friedman, 1985,
1991; Garrett, 1987; John and Klein, 2003; Klein,
Smith and John, 2004; Koku, Akhigbe and
Springer, 1997; Miller and Sturdivant, 1977;
Pruitt and Friedman, 1986; Sen, Gürhan-Canli
and Morwitz, 2001), social cognitive theory
(Bandura, 1977, 1986, 2001), consumer and eco-
logical activism theories (Kozinets and Handel-
man, 2004; Stern et al., 1999), blame attribution
theory (Alicke, 1992, 2000) and punishment moti-
vation theory (Carlsmith, Darley and Robinson,
2002). The study expands on these ideas by exam-
ining the likelihood to boycott in the context of
surrogate boycotts when consumer boycotting
costs are high versus low. Specifically, we examine
the trade-off among the following three factors:
(1) the moral need to punish a complicit party;
(2) the need to contribute to the achievement of
the boycott’s objectives; and (3) the personal sac-
rifices and costs of boycotting.
With these factors, consumers’ likelihood to
boycott the products of a surrogate boycott target
will depend on the interplay of several factors,
explained in detail subsequently. In line with the
majority of boycott studies (Ettenson and Klein,
2005; Farah and Newman, 2010; John and Klein,
2003; Klein, Smith and John, 2004; Koku,
Akhigbe and Springer, 1997; Sen, Gürhan-Canli
516 G. Balabanis
© 2012 The Author(s)
British Journal of Management © 2012 British Academy of Management.
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