Sustaining and jeopardising a credible arbiter: Judicial networks in Benin’s consolidating democracy
| DOI | 10.1177/0192512118805366 |
| Author | Alexander Stroh |
| Date | 01 November 2018 |
| Published date | 01 November 2018 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512118805366
International Political Science Review
2018, Vol. 39(5) 600 –615
© The Author(s) 2018
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/0192512118805366
journals.sagepub.com/home/ips
Sustaining and jeopardising a
credible arbiter: Judicial networks in
Benin’s consolidating democracy
Alexander Stroh
University of Bayreuth, Germany
Abstract
Democracy greatly benefits from credible courts. If context conditions make democratic consolidation
unlikely, as in many African countries, credible arbitration between political actors can be essential for
democracy. This article argues that informal judicial networks can critically affect a court’s credibility.
Network analysis of Benin’s Constitutional Court using original data on major politicians and all 25 judges
who have served between 1993 and 2018 provides evidence that biased judicial networks can jeopardize
the crucial role of courts for democratic consolidation. In Benin, the loss of credibility under the Yayi
presidency correlates with a clear political representation bias on the constitutional bench whereas socio-
cultural representation remained balanced. Since executive and legislative appointment practices account for
the network balance or bias, the political creation and privation of informal judicial relations emerges as an
interesting avenue for studies of democratic consolidation.
Keywords
Benin, constitutional courts, judicial politics, legitimacy, networks
Introduction
Credible dispute-settlement bodies are indispensable for any democratic polity to peacefully
resolve political and private conflict. Usually formal courts play this role. Courts conducting inde-
pendent constitutional reviews are particularly conducive to democratic regime stabilisation
(Epstein et al., 2001: 155; Larkins, 1996) and independent judiciaries, more generally, tend to
prevent regime change towards authoritarianism (Gibler and Radazzo, 2011: 696). Courts can
become key players in emerging and gradually consolidating democracies of less-developed coun-
tries. Especially the highest courts have proven their ability to act not only as central political play-
ers but political activists (see Dressel, 2012; Kapiszewski et al., 2013), even in liberalising
authoritarian regimes (Ginsburg and Mustafa, 2008; Hilbink, 2007). Courts are not necessarily
Corresponding author:
Alexander Stroh, Junior Chair of Political Science, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Bayreuth,
Bldg GW II, Universitaetsstrasse 30, Bayreuth 95440, Germany.
Email: alexander.stroh@uni-bayreuth.de
805366IPS0010.1177/0192512118805366International Political Science ReviewStroh
research-article2018
Article
Stroh 601
one-sided champions of liberty (Ellett, 2013; Trochev, 2008). They need to acquire the role of a
credible arbiter through their own actions and favourable surrounding conditions. The literature
largely agrees that courts need to earn credibility from the public, or at least from important soci-
etal actors to build the ability to settle conflict with authority (Caleidra, 1986; Gibler and Randazzo,
2011: 698; Vanberg, 2000). In other words, credibility and a good reputation among the relevant
public can significantly contribute to a court’s ability to act as a legitimate democratic arbiter.
Given this, surprisingly little is known empirically about how the required credibility is created
and sustained. The largest empirical void exists with regard to the least developed countries that
often accumulate the most unfavourable conditions for democratic progress, such as economic
fragility, extensive presidential powers and ungovernable militaries (see Cheibub, 2007; Linz and
Valenzuela, 1994; Przeworski et al., 2000). A number of unlikely third-wave democracies have
managed to survive for two or three decades. In some of them – including the West African
Republic of Benin – expectations for democratic continuity are relatively high. Since we can con-
sider these countries to be in the process of democratic consolidation, they must have found a way
to avoid the negative effects of their unfavourable situation. A credible arbiter which can effec-
tively solve political conflict can be a crucial factor for these consolidating democracies.
What makes courts credible arbiters of political disputes and brings them into the position to
facilitate or even foster the consolidation of unlikely democracies? Similar to other African schol-
ars in the field of judicial politics who directly hold appointment practices responsible for the
legitimation and functional performance of African courts (Adouki, 2013; Fombad, 2014), I argue
that the representation of networks on the bench (see Dressel et al., 2018) critically affect the
court’s reputation and credibility. Due to the court’s reputational decline in the recent past, the
Constitutional Court of Benin (CCB) presents a pertinent case for empirically examining the link
between (objective) network structures and (subjective) perceived credibility. A range of socio-
cultural, personal and political ties are included in the analysis. And the results provide two major
insights. First, the composition of the bench does correspond with the court’s public reputation, and
so appointment practices influence the court’s ability to facilitate or foster democratic consolida-
tion. Second, despite the emphasis on communalism in scholarly and public debates regarding
African political systems in general and Benin in particular, the representation of political affilia-
tions on the bench appears to support credibility much more than the usually suspected ethno-
regional connections.
The argument will be developed in four steps. First, I briefly recount the theoretical debate on
the relevance and sources of court credibility. Second, I present the theoretical argument concern-
ing the meaning of balanced network representation on the bench for the court’s credibility in
greater detail. The subsequent empirical analysis is based on original interviews, newspaper analy-
ses and comprehensive biographical data on major politicians and all Constitutional Court judges
who have served on the CCB from its creation in 1993 up to and including the fifth round of
appointments in 2013. The third section presents the contextual information on the subject and the
descriptions of various public perceptions of the court. Fourth, tools from formal network analysis
will provide visual and numerical information about the shape of judicial networks and about the
fair or biased representation of these networks on the bench over time. Finally, I draw general
conclusions about appointment practices, judicial networks, court credibility and the barriers to
democratic consolidation.
The relevance and sources of court credibility
Two major concepts have crucially contributed to creating court independence which Gibler and
Randazzo (2011), Larkins (1996), and other authors argue provide credibility and legitimacy. The
To continue reading
Request your trial