Sutherland v Stopes
| Jurisdiction | England & Wales |
| Judge | Viscount Cave,Viscount Finlay,Lord Shaw of Dunfermline,Lord Wrenbury,Lord Carson,. |
| Judgment Date | 21 November 1924 |
| Judgment citation (vLex) | [1924] UKHL J1121-1 |
| Date | 21 November 1924 |
| Court | House of Lords |
[1924] UKHL J1121-1
Viscount Cave.
Viscount Finlay.
Lord Shaw.
Lord Wrenbury.
Lord Carson.
House of Lords
After hearing Counsel, as well on Thursday the 23d, as Friday the 24th, and Monday the 27th, days of October last, upon the Petition and Appeal of Halliday Gibson Sutherland, of 13, Canynge Street, Clifton, Bristol, in the County of Gloucester, and Harding and More, Limited, of 119, High Holborn, in the County of London, praying, That the matter of the Order set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely, an Order of His Majesty's Court of Appeal, of the 20th of July 1923, might be reviewed before His Majesty the King in His Court of Parliament, and that the said Order might be reversed, varied, or altered, or that the Petitioners might have such other relief in the premises as to His Majesty the King in His Court of Parliament might seem meet; as also upon the Petition and Cross Appeal of Marie Charlotte Carmichael Stopes (Wife of Humphrey Verdon Roe) of Givons Grove, Leather head, in the County of Surrey, praying, That the matter of the Order set forth in the Schedule thereto, namely, the said Order of His Majesty's Court of Appeal, of the 20th of July 1923, might be reviewed before His Majesty the King in His Court of Parliament, and that the said Order might be reversed, varied, or altered, or that the Petitioner might have such other relief in the premises as to His Majesty the King in His Court of Parliament might seem meet; as also upon the printed Case of Marie Charlotte Carmichael Stopes, and also upon the printed Case of Halliday Gibson Sutherland and Harding and More, Limited, lodged in the said Original and Cross Appeals; and due consideration had this day of what was offered on either side in these Appeals:
It is Ordered and Adjudged, in the name of the House of Lords, by the Lords of Appeal sitting in the House of Lords during the Dissolution of Parliament, by virtue of a Writing by His Majesty the King under His Sign Manual, dated the 9th day of October 1924, pursuant to the provisions of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, 1876, That the said Order of His Majesty's Court of Appeal, of the 20th day of July 1923, complained of in the said Original and Cross Appeals, be, and the same is hereby, Reversed, and that the Judgment of the Right Honourable the Lord Chief Justice of England, of the 1st day of March 1923, thereby reversed, be, and the same is hereby, Restored: And it is further Ordered, That the said Petition and Cross Appeal be, and the same is hereby, dismissed this House: And it is further Ordered, That the said Marie Charlotte Carmichael Stopes do pay, or cause to be paid, to the said Halliday Gibson Sutherland and Harding and More, Limited, the Costs incurred by them in the Court of Appeal, and also the Costs incurred by them in respect of the said Original and Cross Appeals to this House, the amount of such last-mentioned Costs to be certified by the Clerk of the Parliaments: And it is further Ordered, That the said Marie Charlotte Carmichael Stopes do repay, or cause to be repaid, to the said Halliday Gibson Sutherland and Harding and More, Limited, the sums of one hundred pounds and one thousand three hundred and twenty-five pounds five shillings and seven-pence, being respectively the Damages and Costs paid to the said Marie Charlotte Carmichael Stopes by the said Halliday Gibson Sutherland and Harding and More, Limited, under the Order of the Court of Appeal: And it is also further Ordered, That the Cause be, and the same is hereby, remitted back to the King's Bench Division of the High Court of Justice, to do therein as shall be just and consistent with this Judgment.
My Lords,
This is an appeal by the defendants in the action from an order of the Cout of Appeal in England reversing a judgment of the Lord Chief Justice in their favour and directing judgment to be entered for the plaintiff for £100 and certain costs.
The plaintiff, Mrs. Marie Stopes, who is a Doctor of Science and a Doctor of Philosophy of the University of Munich but has no medical qualification, has for some time been engaged in a campaign in favour of a practice which is known as "birth control," but which is more accurately described as the prevention of conception by artificial means, and in connection with this campaign has published certain books and has established a Mothers' Clinic for Constructive Birth Control in a poor district in Holloway. The defendant H. G. Sutherland is a Bachelor of Medicine and of Surgery and a Doctor of Medicine of the University of Edinburgh, and is the author of a book called "Birth Control: A Statement of Christian Doctrine against the Neo-Malthusians," which was published by the other defendants, Harding and More, Limited, in March, 1922. This book, which is a controversial work designed to expose the dangers, social, medical and moral, which the author considers to be involved in the artificial prevention of conception, contains in its seventh chapter (headed "Evils of Artificial Control," and in a section headed "Specially hurtful to the Poor") the following paragraph, which is admitted to refer to the plaintiff:—
"Secondly the ordinary decent instincts of the poor are against these practices, and, indeed, they have used them less than any other class. But, owing to their poverty, lack of learning and helplessness, the poor are the natural victims of those who seek to make experiments on their fellows. In the midst of a London slum, a woman who is a doctor of German Philosophy (Munich) has opened a birth control clinic where working women are instructed in a method of contraception described by Professor McIlroy as 'the most harmful method of which I have had experience' (Proceedings of the Medico-Legal Society, 7th July 1921). When we remember that millions are being spent by the Ministry of Health and by Local Authorities—on pure milk for necessitous expectant and nursing mothers, on maternity clinics to guard the health of mothers before and after childbirth, for the provision of skilled midwives, and on Infant Welfare Centres—all for the single purpose of bringing healthy children into our midst, it is truly amazing that this monstrous campaign of birth control should be tolerated by the Home Secretary. Charles Bradlaugh was condemned to jail for a less serious crime."
In consequence of the publication of the above paragraph the plaintiff brought this action against the defendants, claiming damages for libel and an injunction. The defendant Sutherland in his Defence pleaded (1) that the words complained of in their natural meaning were true in substance and in fact; (2) that the words in their natural meaning were fair and bonâ fide comment made and published without malice on a matter of public interest; and (3) as an alternative plea, that in so far as the words complained of consisted of allegations of fact they were true in substance and in fact and in so far as they consisted of expressions of opinion they were fair comments made in good faith and without malice upon matters of public interest. The defendants Harding and More put in a Defence which was somewhat different in form but which for practical purposes has been treated as being to the same effect as the Defence of the defendant Sutherland. Particulars having been given and issue joined, the action went for trial.
The action was tried by the Lord Chief Justice with a special jury; and after a hearing which lasted for five days the learned judge put to the jury a series of questions which, with the answers given by the jury, were as follows:—
"(1) Question. Were the words complained of defamatory of the plaintiff? Answer. Yes.
(2) Question. Were they true in substance and in fact? Answer. Yes.
(3) Question. Were they fair comment? Answer. No.
(4) Question. Damages, if any? Answer. £100."
On the following day the Lord Chief Justice, after hearing arguments as to the meaning and effect of these findings, gave judgment for the defendants; and as the reasons which he gave for taking that course throw light upon the course of the case, it is desirable to quote them in full:—
"In this case" he said "the jury, after a protracted deliberation extending to something like four hours, have found by their verdict that the words complained of in this action, while they were defamatory of the plaintiff, were true in substance and in fact. In the course which the case took that really became the main issue. On the one hand, nobody denied the sincerity, the ability or the honesty of purpose of the plaintiff. On the other hand, there was no real evidence of ill-will on the part of the defendants. Mr. Charles, at the conclusion of the case for the plaintiff, submitted to me that there was no evidence of malice and invited me in effect to say that upon the defence of fair comment it was not necessary to submit any question to the jury. My own mind inclined in that direction, but upon the whole I thought it was more satisfactory, inasmuch as I thought the matter ought to be wholly before the jury, to leave that question also to the jury, and I decided not to withdraw it. So it came about that at the conclusion of the matter there were two questions put to the jury: one of them upon the plea of justification, and the other upon the plea of fair comment. I have always understood that (in the words which have been quoted) it is a good defence to an action for libel that the words complained of are true in substance and in fact; and although no doubt suggestions were made and arguments were employed upon the one side and upon the other as to whether a particular element in the words complained of was fact or opinion, it was clearly put to the jury, I think—at least, it was put as clearly as I could put it myself—that it was for them to decide whether particular statements which had been...
To continue reading
Request your trial
- Institute of Commercial Management United Kingdom v New Straits Times Press (M) Bhd
-
Francis George Polidore Plaintiff v (1) Crusader Caribbean Publishing Company 1971 Ltd (2) George Odlum Defendants [ECSC]
...true or substantially true and that the defamatory inferences borne by the comments are true, as per Lord Findlay in Sutherland v Stopes [1925] A.C. 47 at pages 62 – 63. 57 It is, however, a complete defence to the action of libel that the defamatory imputation is true. The defence of justi......
- Henry Wong Jan Fook v John Lee and Another
- British Guiana Rice Marketing Board v Peter Taylor and Company Ltd
-
Pleadings
...J. at 24546 (B.C.S.C.). Boys v. Star Ptg. &> Pub. Co., [1927] 3 D.L.R. 847 per Riddell J.A. at 85455 (Ont. C.A.). Sutherland v. Stopes, [1925] A.C. 47, per Viscount Finlay at 6263, Lord Shaw of Dunfermline at 7778 (H.L. (Eng.)) Khurana v.Jouhal (c.o.b. Ranjeet), [1982] B.C.J. No. 819, at pa......
-
Fair Comment
...of proving that the comment is true. Ross v. New Brunswick Teachers' Association (2001), above at para. 50, citing Sutherland v. Slopes, [1925] A.C. 47,where Viscount Finlay states at 62 (H.L. Eng.): It is clear that the truth of a libel affords a complete answer to civil proceedings. This ......
-
Justification
...grounds (2000), 189 D.L.R. (4th) 241 at 256, para. 32 (C.A.), leave to appeal to S.C.C. denied, [2000] S.C.C.A. 465 Sutherland v. Slopes, [1925] A.C. 47 per Viscount Finlay at 62 (H.L.): It is clear that the truth of a libel affords a complete answer to civil proceedings. This defence is ra......