Symbolic act, real consequences: Passing Canada’s Magnitsky Law to combat human rights violations and corruption
| Author | Delaram Arabi,Meredith Lilly |
| Date | 01 June 2020 |
| Published date | 01 June 2020 |
| DOI | 10.1177/0020702020934504 |
| Subject Matter | Scholarly Essay |
Scholarly Essay
Symbolic act, real
consequences: Passing
Canada’s Magnitsky Law
to combat human rights
violations and corruption
Meredith Lilly
Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Delaram Arabi
Carleton University, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada
Abstract
Both the volume of economic sanctions and the reasons for their imposition have
increased tremendously around the globe. In this context, several countries, including
the United States and Canada, have introduced Magnitsky acts to enable their govern-
ments to act unilaterally to impose sanctions against foreign actors for gross violations
of human rights and significant acts of corruption. This paper evaluates the legislative
changes made to Canada’s sanction regime in 2016–2017 and explores how the new
authorities have been applied following implementation (2017–2019). We find that,
despite granting the Canadian government new authorities to undertake autonomous
sanctions, the country has continued to cooperate with other states as it had done
prior to the changes. We conclude that lawmakers never intended for Canada to use
the new autonomous capabilities to “go it alone.” Instead, the symbolism represented
by Canada taking a strong stance against human rights abuses globally was the driving
force behind the Magnitsky Law’s passage.
Keywords
Economic sanctions, Magnitsky Law, autonomous sanctions, human rights, corruption
Corresponding author:
Meredith Lilly, Carleton University (Ringgold standardinstitution), Norman Paterson School of International
Affairs, 5109 River Building, 1125 Colonel By Drive, Ottawa, Ontario, K1S 5B6, Canada.
Email: MeredithLilly@cunet.carleton.ca
International Journal
2020, Vol. 75(2) 163–178
!The Author(s) 2020
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DOI: 10.1177/0020702020934504
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Originally applied as an alternative to the use of force, economic sanctions have
been used for decades as a foreign policy tool to coerce, deter, and encourage
behaviour change by foreign governments. Recently, both the volume of sanctions
and rationale for imposing them have increased tremendously to address human
rights violations and the subversion of democracy; fight terrorism by non-state
actors; ameliorate internal conflict; and promote environmental protection.
1
This increased use of sanctions has prompted some experts to reconsider their
effectiveness as a foreign policy tool more broadly.
2
Yet, part of the difficulty in
evaluating efficacy is the variety of purposes for which states may impose sanc-
tions. While, at one time, it was believed that sanctions were imposed by states in
order to change behaviour in target states, it is now well recognized that sanctions
are often imposed to deter further escalation, to “signal” to a domestic audience
that their government is taking action, or simply to punish wrongdoers. Without
understanding the purpose for imposing sanctions, it is difficult to measure wheth-
er they have been successful.
3
The increased use of sanctions also brings a growing awareness of the negative
consequences of comprehensive sanctions, particularly for civilians and innocent
populations.
4
While there is a solid literature on the relative efficacy of broad
sanctions led by the United Nations (UN), less is known about the effectiveness
of “smart sanctions,”
5
designed to be limited in scope and targeted at individual
aggressors rather than entire populations. The most recent trend to emerge is the
use of autonomous sanctions, whereby one or two states act to invoke sanctions
against individuals in a target state, without the support of the UN or broader
international community. Once solely the undertaking of global powers such as the
United States, increasingly, middle powers, such as Canada, have undertaken
policy changes that allow them to unilaterally impose sanctions against other
countries or their citizens.
6
To complicate matters, the range of “offences”
7
that
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(2009): 541; Adam Smith, “A high price to pay: The costs of the US economic sanctions policy and
the need for process oriented reform,” UCLA Journal of International Law and Foreign Affairs 4, no.
2 (1999): 325–376; Makio Miyagawa, Do Economic Sanctions Work? (Houndmills, UK: Palgrave
Macmillan UK, 1992).
2. Doxey, “Reflections”; Bryan Early, Busted Sanctions Explaining Why Economic Sanctions Fail (Palo
Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 539–549; Robert A. Pape, “Why economic sanctions do
not work,” International Security 22, no. 2 (1997): 90–136; Miyagawa, Do Economic Sanctions
Work?
3. Doxey, “Reflections,” 541–542; Kim Richard Nossal, “International sanctions as international
punishment,” International Organization 43, no. 2 (1989): 301–322.
4. Daniel Drezner, “Sanctions sometimes smart: Targeted sanctions in theory and practice,”
International Studies Review 13, no. 1 (2011): 96–108; Susan Hannah Allen and David J. Lektzian,
“Economic sanctions: A blunt instrument?” Journal of Peace Research 50 no. 1 (2013):121–135;
Dursun Peksen, “Better or worse? The effect of economic sanctions on human rights,” Journal of
Peace Research 46, no. 1 (2009): 59–77. Nossal, “International sanctions.”
5. Jane Boulden and Andrea Charron, “Evaluating UN sanctions,” International Journal 65, no.1
(2009), 1–11.
6. Idriss Jazairy, “Unilateral economic sanctions, international law, and human rights,” Ethics &
International Affairs 33, no. 3 (2019): 291–302.
7. Nossal, “International sanctions.”
164 International Journal 75(2)
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