Teledyne UK Ltd v Julian Allen Gao

Introduction

This is an application for an interim injunction against seven named defendants and four categories of persons unknown. It is also a without notice application, although short informal notice has been given. I also have before me an application for third-party disclosure, seeking information from West Yorkshire Police about some of the matters to which I shall refer below.

The claimant is a company which produces components and systems for commercial use in a range of industrial markets, including defence and aerospace. Some products have military end-uses and are manufactured for use by the UK Ministry of Defence, NATO member states and other allied nations. Some products are exported under licence to Israel.

In the course of 2024, acts of protest have taken place at the premises of the claimant at six sites in England and Wales, where the claimant is freeholder in some cases and leaseholder in others. These have included acts by individuals protesting about the conflict in the Middle East. The claimant claims that these protests have included acts of (aggravated) trespass and criminal damage by individuals connected with groups known as Palestine Action and Bradford Friends of Palestine. It fears that there will be further such acts during the Christmas holiday period.

The named defendants are all individuals who have been arrested at one of the claimant's sites during 2024 in connection with alleged acts of unlawful protest. The persons unknown are identified by reference to their committing unlawful acts of the type specified in each category set out in the claim.

Interim relief is requested until a return date on 24 January 2025. The claimants have put forward a draft order, including some amendments made just before the hearing, which would restrain acts of trespass at the six sites and would restrain interference with the claimant's right to access the highway from its land, and public nuisance, consisting of obstruction of the highway at its site at Shipley (“the Shipley site”).

The law

I accept the summary of the relevant law put forward by the claimant's counsel Natalie Pratt, which I now set out in brief.

The tort of trespass is committed where a person intrudes on the land of another without legal justification. It is a tort of strict liability and is actionable without proof of damage. A trespass cannot normally be justified by the fact that the trespasser is exercising rights under the European Convention of Human Rights articles 10 and 11.

The owner of land adjoining the highway has an actionable right of access to the highway from any part of his premises, and the public's rights to pass over the highway are subject to that right: see Marshall v Blackpool Corporation [1935] AC 16.

The law on obstruction of the highway was summarised by Julian Knowles J in Thurrock Council & Anor v Adams & Ors [2024] EWHC 2576 KB (“ Thurrock”) at [64]:

“a. There is a right to peaceful assembly on the highway, but it must be remembered that the highway is more than just the carriageway. The assembly on the highway in Jones was concerned with the grass verge;

“b. That right does not extend so far as to allow the committing of a public nuisance;

c. While the right to use the highway comprises activities such as assembly on the highway, such activities are subsidiary to the use for passage, and they must be not only usual and reasonable but consistent with the primary use of the highway to pass and repass, if a person is deliberately interfering with the primary use to pass and repass, they are obstructing the highway;

d. That public nuisance may arise by the unreasonable obstruction of the highway, such as unreasonably impeding the primary right of the public to pass and repass;

e. Whether an obstruction of the highway is unreasonable is a question of fact, but will generally require that the obstruction is more than de minimis, and it must be wilful.”

In an application for an injunction to restrain obstruction of the highway, the court must ask five questions, identified in Director of Public Prosecutions v Ziegler and others [2021] UKSC 23; [2022] AC 408 (“ Ziegler”):

“(1) Is what the defendant did in exercise of one of the rights in articles 10 or 11?

(2) If so, is there an interference by a public authority with that right?

(3) If there is an interference, is it ‘prescribed by law’?

(4) If so, is the interference in pursuit of a legitimate aim as set out in paragraph (2) of article 10 or article 11, for example the protection of the rights of others?

(5) If so, is the interference ‘necessary in a democratic society’ to achieve that legitimate aim?”

The fifth of those questions requires four sub-questions to be asked (see [16] of Ziegler):

“(1) Is the aim sufficiently important to justify interference with a fundamental right?

(2) Is there a rational connection between the means chosen and the aim in view?

(3) Are there less restrictive alternative means available to achieve that aim?

(4) Is there a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the general interest of the community, including the rights of others?”

When considering this question of proportionality, the court should also consider relevant factors, including the following (see Ziegler at [72], following City of London v Samede & Ors [2012] EWCA Civ 160; [2012] PTSR 1624 (“ Samede”) at [39] to [41]):

(1) The extent to which the continuation of the protest would breach domestic law.

(2) The importance of the precise location to the protesters.

(3) The duration of the protest.

(4) The degree to which the protesters occupy the land.

(5) The extent of the actual interference the protest causes to the rights of others, including the property rights of the owners of the land and the rights of any members of the public.

(6) Whether the views giving rise to the protest relate to “very important issues” and whether they are “views which many would see as being of considerable breadth, depth and relevance”.

(7) Whether the protesters “believed in the views that they were expressing”.

Injunctive relief may be granted wherever the court considers it “just and convenient” (Senior Courts Act 1981, section 37).

When considering whether to grant an interim injunction against the named defendants, it is necessary to apply the familiar American Cyanamid test:

(1) Is there a serious question to be tried? If yes,

(2) Would damages be an adequate remedy for a party injured by the court's grant of, or its failure to grant, an injunction?

(3) If not, where does the balance of convenience lie?

Where “precautionary” relief is sought, further guidance is to be taken from the judgment of Marcus Smith J in Vastint Leeds BV v Persons Unknown [2018] EWHC 2456 (Ch); [2019] 4 WLR 2 (“ Vastint”)...