Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism in Kashmir
| Date | 01 March 2002 |
| DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/eb026018 |
| Published date | 01 March 2002 |
| Pages | 201-211 |
| Author | Jyoti Trehan |
| Subject Matter | Accounting & finance |
Journal of Financial Crime — Vol. 9 No. 3
ANALYSIS
Terrorism and the Funding of Terrorism in Kashmir
Jyoti Trehan
LEGAL POSITION IN JAMMU AND
KASHMIR IN THE CONTEXT OF
WARS WITH PAKISTAN
The independence of India from the British Empire
was marked by its partition into two countries, viz
India and Pakistan. As a corollary to independence
and partition of India, 500-odd princely states
which had direct relationship with the British
Empire were required to integrate with either India
or Pakistan — the successor states. The process of
integration of princely states was not without its
highs and lows. Some of the princely states, like
Hyderabad, Junagarh and Jammu and Kashmir,
posed quite a few problems at the time of integration
for several reasons, namely the inclination of its
rulers,
the religious component of the local popula-
tion and the competing interests of the two successor
states,
India and Pakistan. Hyderabad and Junagarh
were favourably resolved in India's favour. Integra-
tion of Jammu and Kashmir with India was not a
smooth affair. It was only after Pakistan-aided
forces including the Pakistan army had invaded
Jammu and Kashmir that the then ruler of Jammu
and Kashmir signed the instrument of accession in
India's favour. With the instrument of accession,
India had a locus standi to protect its territory in
Jammu and Kashmir by military means. The salvage
operation of throwing the Pakistan-aided forces and
Pakistan military out of Jammu and Kashmir could
not be accomplished fully, because India agreed that
the United Nations, to which the Kashmir dispute
was to be referred, would help in the resolution of
the Kashmir issue within the accepted legal frame-
work which was in India's favour. However, India's
experience with the United Nations was a great
disappointment. In fact India had put so much faith
in the United Nations that it even agreed to a plebis-
cite in Kashmir for resolving the dispute, subject to
the condition that Pakistan vacated the illegally occu-
pied areas of Jammu and Kashmir. India need not
have agreed to a plebiscite in Jammu and Kashmir,
but it did so because of its abiding faith in democratic
principles, notwithstanding the legal framework on
the basis of which the integration of other princely
states with the successor states was carried out. To
date,
Pakistan has not vacated what is today called
'Pakistan-occupied Kashmir'. On top of that, in
1962 China gobbled up a large part of Kashmir in
the north-east, on the basis of a boundary dispute
which it raised with India and which has yet to be
resolved. To make matters still worse and more com-
plicated, Pakistan ceded a part of Pakistan-occupied
territory to China. Thus the situation, as of today,
is that 45.7 per cent of the 222,336 sq. km area of
Jammu and Kashmir is with India, 35.1 per cent is
with Pakistan and 19.2 per cent is with China.
Apart from a war with China, two more full-scale
wars have been fought with Pakistan over Kashmir;
the 1965 war, which was confined to the western
theatre, and the 1971 war. The 1965 war was a
short one and through the Soviet Union's mediation,
an agreement was arrived at which was to no one's
advantage and more or less restored the status quo
ante. Following the 1971 war with Pakistan, India
was in an advantageous position, because East
Pakistan had ceded from West Pakistan and emerged
as an independent country, the two-nation theory to
which Pakistan subscribed as the basis for partition of
India into two successor states of India and Pakistan
had been exploded; India had 90,000 Pakistan prison-
ers of war and it had also made large gains on the
western front by occupying certain strategic posi-
tions.
It was from this position of strength in 1971
that India decided that the Kashmir dispute had to
be resolved bilaterally by India and Pakistan without
any foreign intervention; a doctrine to which
Pakistan subscribed at that point of time. In fact,
India approached the bilateral talks between the
two countries in a spirit of magnanimity. As a first
step,
India decided to return to Pakistan 90,000
prisoners of war. It agreed to a fresh demarcation of
the Line of Control (including withdrawal from
several strategic positions) on the unwritten under-
standing that this Line of Control, over a period of
Journal of Financial Crime
Vol.
9.
No.
3.2002.
pp.
201-211
Henry
Stewart
Publications
ISSN 1359-0790
Page 201
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