The 2010 Merger Guidelines, Critical Loss, and Linear Demand
| DOI | 10.1093/joclec/nhr007 |
| Date | 03 August 2011 |
| Pages | 497-522 |
| Year | 2011 |
| Published By | Oxford University Press |
THE 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, CRITICAL
LOSS, AND LINEAR DEMAND
Jay Ezrielev
& Joseph J. Simons
†
ABSTRACT
Critical Loss Analysis (CLA) is a widely used tool for market definition under
the hypothetical monopolist test. The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines
appear to refer to a specific version of CLA that assumes that (1) pre-merger
pricing satisfies the Lerner Condition; and (2) products’ demand functions are
linear in price in the vicinity of the pre-merger equilibrium point. We show that
under general conditions, the linear demand assumption is not satisfied and
can lead to significant errors in the application of the hypothetical monopolist
test. We develop a model of differentiated products competition that shows
that under reasonable assumptions, products’ demand functions are concave
around the pre-merger equilibrium point. The concavity of the demand curve
appears to be related to clustering of consumers around products in the differ-
entiated product space. When such clustering occurs, the model suggests that
demand will tend to have a concave shape around the pre-merger equilibrium
point.
JEL: K21; L40
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2010 Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission Horizontal
Merger Guidelines (2010 Guidelines) continue to rely on the Hypothetical
Monopolist Test (HMT) as their algorithm for market definition.
1
Under
the HMT, a group of products that includes the merging parties’ products
satisfies the HMT and is deemed a relevant market if a hypothetical mono-
polist owner of the group of products would likely impose a small but signifi-
cant and non-transitory increase in price (SSNIP) on the products.
2
Critical
Loss Analysis (CLA) is a tool for implementing the HMT that has been
used extensively by the courts as well as by domestic and foreign antitrust
Senior Vice President, Compass Lexecon; Faculty Member, Applied Economics Program,
Johns Hopkins University. Email: jezrielev@compasslexecon.com.
†
Partner, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP; Director, Bureau of Competition,
Federal Trade Commission (June 2001 to August 2003). Email: JSimons@paulweiss.com.
The authors thank Paul Godek and Jeffrey Wilder for their comments.
1
U.S. DEP’TOFJUSTICE &FED.TRADE COMM’N,HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES § 4.1.3
(2010) [hereinafter 2010 GUIDELINES].
2
Id.
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 7(3), 497–522
doi:10.1093/joclec/nhr007
Advance Access publication 3 August 2011
#The Author (2011). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com
enforcement agencies. Although CLA has been widely used for roughly two
decades,
3
the 2010 Guidelines expressly incorporate it into the Department
of Justice and Federal Trade Commission merger guidelines for the first
time.
4
The 2010 Guidelines, however, appear to refer to a particular
implementation of CLA that is based on a novel framework developed in a
number of recent articles.
5
Under this framework, the likelihood that a
SSNIP is profitable for the hypothetical monopolist increases with candi-
date market products’ pre-merger margins and aggregate diversion ratios.
Aggregate diversion ratio is defined as the fraction of sales lost by a
product when its price rises by a SSNIP that is captured by the other pro-
ducts in the candidate market. Thus, under the framework, higher margins
and/or aggregate diversion ratios lead to narrower markets. However, this
framework requires a number of assumptions the real-world applicability of
which has not been generally demonstrated. Specifically, the framework
assumes that: (1) the Lerner Condition always applies and is reliable for
predicting the pre-merger demand elasticity at the equilibrium point, and
(2) the demand functions for the candidate market products are linear in
price (the “linear demand” assumption).
6
For convenience, we will refer to
this analytical framework for performing the CLA as the “linear demand
framework.”
The linear demand framework assumes that markets are always in equili-
brium and that market pricing satisfies the Lerner Condition. The Lerner
Condition is a textbook static optimization condition that states that in equi-
librium, a product’s margin equals the negative of the inverse of the pro-
duct’s residual demand elasticity. A number of commentators have
questioned whether actual demand elasticity can be reliably predicted by the
Lerner Condition.
7
Surprisingly, commentators have devoted relatively little
3
The basic CLA methodology was introduced by Barry Harris and Joseph Simons in Focusing
Market Definition: How Much Substitution Is Necessary?,12R
ES.L.&ECON. 207 (1989).
4
The 2010 Guidelines explain that although CLA performs the “breakeven” version of the
HMT rather than the “profit-maximizing” HMT called for by the 2010 Guidelines §4.1.1,
CLA is commonly performed in practice. 2010 GUIDELINES,supra note 1, § 4.1.3. Below, we
discuss further the difference between the “breakeven” and “profit-maximizing” HMT.
5
See Joseph Farrell & Carl Shapiro, Improving Critical Loss Analysis,ANTITRUST SOURCE (Feb.
2008), available at http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/08/02/Feb08-Farrell-Shapiro.pdf;
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Critical Loss: Let’s Tell the Whole Story,A
NTITRUST, Spring
2003, at 49; Daniel O’Brien & Abraham Wickelgren, A Critical Analysis of Critical Loss
Analysis,71A
NTITRUST L.J. 161 (2003). The 2010 Guidelines’ language that appears to refer
to this analytical framework is: “The higher the pre-merger margin, the smaller the recapture
percentage necessary for the candidate market to satisfy the hypothetical monopolist test.”
2010 GUIDELINES,supra note 1, § 4.1.3.
6
Farrell & Shapiro, supra note 5, at 3-5.
7
See,e.g., David Scheffman & Joseph Simons, Unilateral Effects for Differentiated Products:
Theory, Assumptions, and Research,A
NTITRUST SOURCE (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.
americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/Apr10_Scheffman4_14f.pdf;
498 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
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