The accountability of the European Central Bank: New frontiers, new challenges

Published date01 August 2023
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1177/1023263X231224714
AuthorMenelaos Markakis,Diane Fromage
Date01 August 2023
Subject MatterGuest Editorial
The accountability of the
European Central Bank: New
frontiers, new challenges
Menelaos Markakis* and Diane Fromage**
Abstract
Over the years, the European Central Bank (ECB) has taken on new tasks in response to fresh chal-
lenges, and its mandate has been interpreted in novel ways. This broader role for the ECB –whether
it translates into a novel interpretation of its mandate, the creation of a new form of public money,
more complex and discretionary decision-making, or the conferral of new tasks –has brought greater
scrutiny onto the ECB. This introduction and the contributions to this special issue focus squarely on
the “new”or “modern”ECB. They examine its accountability across the range of tasks that it now-
adays carries out, including its interinstitutional relationships with other actors in this area. Although
the ECB has assumed a broader role than the one envisaged at the time of its creation, its account-
ability framework, which is by and large hardwired into the Treaties, has remained unchanged. It is
argued that the expansion of the ECB’sroleandtasksmustbeaccompanied by robust accountability
and transparency arrangements. As the ECB pushes new frontiers in the future, those options to
enhance accountability, transparency and legitimacy which are ava ilable within the existing Treaty
framework should be pursued. This would also ensure that the ECB and other relevant authorities
go far enough in meeting their objectives.
Keywords
European Central Bank, accountability, Economic and Monetary Union, digital euro, greening
monetary policy, Banking Union, macroprudential supervision, central bank losses
*
Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, Netherlands
**
University of Salzburg Department of Law, Salzburg, Austria
Corresponding author:
Diane Fromage, SCEUS, University of Salzburg Department of Law, Moenchsberg 2, Salzburg, 5020, Austria.
Email: diane.fromage@plus.ac.at
Guest Editorial
Maastricht Journal of European and
Comparative Law
2023, Vol. 30(4) 359–376
© The Author(s) 2024
Article reuse guidelines:
sagepub.com/journals-permissions
DOI: 10.1177/1023263X231224714
maastrichtjournal.sagepub.com
1. Introduction
Since its creation, the European Central Bank (ECB) has sought to make a signif‌icant contribution to
price stabilityand, more broadly speaking, to f‌inancial stability. As ‘thecentral bank of the European
Union countries which use the euro’,
1
it is in charge, through the European System of Central Banks
(ESCB), of monetary policy for those Member States.
2
As a consequence, the ECB is exercising a
great deal of publicpower, but is outside the trias politica.Monetary policy is ‘delegated’to the inde-
pendent ECB andis thus beyond the day-to-day reachof elected politicians. In linewith the economic
thinking that prevailed at the time of the ECB’s creation, its original mandate in monetary policy was
narrowly circumscribed and underpinned by a strong independence.
3
Unsurprisingly, scholars have
taken an interestin its legal and institutional arrangements, as well as its independence, accountability
and legitimacy regimes, ever since its early –somewhat more halcyon –days.
4
Over the years, the ECB has taken on new tasks in response to fresh challenges, and its mandate
has been interpreted in novel ways. It is the proliferation of its responsibilities and powers, and the
expansion of its activities, notably since the f‌inancial and sovereign debt crisis, that has brought
greater scrutiny onto the ECB.
5
To help combat the crisis, the ECB resorted to ‘unconventional’
(or ‘non-standard’) monetary policy instruments, and was also involved in negotiating and monitor-
ing the conditions attached to the f‌inancial assistance programmes for euro area Member States.
Moreover, it acquired a new role in banking supervision within the context of the Single
Supervisory Mechanism (SSM), where it directly supervises the ‘signif‌icant’(i.e., larger) banks
of the participating countries and ensures a consistent approach in the supervision of ‘less signif‌i-
cant’(i.e., small and medium-sized) banks by the national authorities. In addition, the ECB was
granted important powers in the framework for restructuring (‘resolving’) failing banks within
the context of the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM), and is responsible for the macroprudential
oversight of the EU f‌inancial system and the prevention and mitigation of systemic risk. More
recently, in response to the COVID-19 crisis, the ECB’s role in crisis management was again broa-
dened.
6
The ECB is rightly described by Amtenbrink as ‘a very potent institutional force at the heart
of the European (economic and monetary) integration project’.
7
Other commentators, such as
Curtin, go further, noting that the ECB has emerged as ‘the most central –and powerful –
1. See www.ecb.europa.eu/ecb/html/index.en.html.
2. The ESCB, which comprises the ECB and national central banks, def‌ines and implements the monetary policy of the
Union (Articles 282(1) and 127(2) TFEU). It is governed by the decision-making bodies of the ECB (Article 282(2)
TFEU). The EU has exclusive competence in the area of monetary policy for the Member States whose currency is
the euro (Article 3(1)(c) TFEU).
3. F. Amtenbrink and M. Markakis, ‘The Legitimacy and Accountability of the ECB at the Age of Twenty’, in T. Beukers,
D. Fromage and G. Monti (eds), The New European Central Bank: Taking Stock & Looking Ahead (OUP, 2022), p. 267ff,
with further references.
4. See, among others, R.M. Lastra, ‘The Independence of the European System of Central Banks’,33Harvard International
Law Journal (1992), p. 475; J. de Haan and L. Gormley, ‘The Democratic Def‌icit of the European Central Bank’,21
European Law Review (1996), p. 95; R. Smits, The European Central Bank: Institutional Aspects (Kluwer Law
International, 1997); F. Amtenbrink, The Democratic Accountability of Central Banks: A Comparative Study of the
European Central Bank (Hart Publishing, 1999); W. Buiter, ‘Alice in Euroland’,37Journal
of Common Market Studies (1999), p. 181.
5. See, in more detail, F. Amtenbrink and M. Markakis, in T. Beukers, D. Fromage and G. Monti (eds), The New European
Central Bank: Taking Stock & Looking Ahead, p. 273–85, with further references.
6. Ibid., p. 285–87.
7. F. Amtenbrink, ‘The European Central Bank’s Intricate Independence versus Accountability Conundrum in the
Post-Crisis Governance Framework’,26Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law (2019), p. 165, 179.
360 Maastricht Journal of European and Comparative Law 30(4)

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