The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by ‘Private’ Transnational Actors
| DOI | http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.2005.00587.x |
| Published date | 01 May 2006 |
| Date | 01 May 2006 |
The Anonymous Matrix: Human Rights Violations by
‘Private’ Transnational Actors
GuntherTeubner
n
Do fundamental rights obligate not only States,b ut also private transnational actors?Si nceviola-
tions of fundamental rights stem fromthe totalis ing tendencies of partial rationalities,there is no
longer anypoint in se eing the horizontal e¡ect as if rights of private actors haveto be weighed up
against each other. On one side of the human rights relation is no longer a private actor as the
fundamental-rights violator, but the a nonymous matrix of an autonomised communicative
medium. On the other side, the fundamental rights are divided into three dimensions: ¢rst,
institutional rights protecting the autonomyof social discourses ^ art, science, religion - against
their subjugation by the totalising tendencies of the communicative matrix; secondly, personal
rights protecting the autonomy of communication, attributed not to institutions, but to the
social artefacts called ‘persons’; and thirdly,human r ightsas negativebounds on societal commu-
nication, where the integrity of individuals’ body and mind is endangered.
HIV/AIDS VERSUS TNC
The disastrous AIDS epidemic, the numbers killed by which worldwide have
overtaken those of the dead in all civil wars of the1990s,
1
took a special turn in
South Africa with the legal case HazelTau vGlaxo and Boehringer.
2
The case trans-
lates the multidimensional social issues into the narrower quaestiones juris: has the
pricing policy of transnational pharmaceutical enterprises violated fundamental
human rights? Can A IDS patients assert their r ight to life directly against trans na-
tional corporations (TNC)? Does ‘Access to Medication as a Human Right’ exist
in the private sector?
3
More generally, do fundamental rights obligate not only
States, but also private transnational actors directly?
Thirty-nine pharmaceutical ¢rms, represented by the Pharmaceutical Manufac-
turers’ Association of South Africa (PMASA), invoked South Africa’s national
courts.
4
In October 2003 the national Competition Commission had to decide
whether the complainants had an actionable right to access to HIV medications
n
Professor of private law and legal sociology, University Frankfurt. Ce ntennial Visiting Professor,
London School of Economics. I would like to thank Sonja Buckel, Ralph Christensen, Andreas
Fischer-Lescano, Gˇnter Frankenberg, Isabell Hensel, and Soo-Hyun Oh for critical comments and
helpful suggestions.
1 Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change, A More SecureWorld: Our
Shared Responsibility (New York: United Nations, 2004) para 44, 48, at http://www.un.org/
secureworld(last visited 14November 2005).
2 South Africa Competition Commission, HazelTau et al vGlaxoSmithKline, BoehringerIngelheimet al
(16 December 2003), at http://www.compcom.co.za/(last visited 14 November 2005).
3 See H. Hestermeyer,‘Access to Medication as a Human Right’(2004) 8 Max PlanckYearbookof United
NationsLaw 101.
4 N. Bass,‘Implications of theTRIPS Agreement for DevelopingCountries: Pharmaceutical Patent
Laws in Brazil and South Africa in the 21st Ce ntury’ (2002) 34 GeorgeWashington International Law
Review 19 1, 192 .
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against the ¢rms GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim. From a technical
legal viewpoint, the claimants based their legal position on the issue that the ¢rms
had breached Art 8(a) of the Competition Act 89 of 1998 by charging excessive
prices for antiretrovirals (ARV), to the detriment of consumers. They accused pri-
vate collective actors of violating human rights:‘The excessive pricing of ARVs is
directlyresponsibleforpremature,predictableandavoidabledeathsofpeopleliving
with HIV/AIDS, i ncluding both children and adults.’
5
The surprising outcome was
that the South African Competition Commission basically found for the complai-
nants, even though it did allow the ¢rms to amortise development costs.
6
The ‘horizontal’ e¡ect of fundamental rights, ie the question whether they
impose obligations not only on governmental bodies but also directly on
private actors, is taking on much more dramatic dimensions in the transnational
sphere than it ever had nationally. The issue arises not only for infringements
of human rights by pharmaceutical enterprises in the worldwide AIDS epi-
demic,
7
but it has already raised a stir in several scandals in which
transnational corporations were involved.
8
I shall single out a few glaring cases:
environmental pollution and inhuman treatment of local population groups, eg
by Shell in Nigeria;
9
thechemicalaccidentinBhopal;
10
disgraceful workingcon-
ditions in‘sweatshops’ in Asia and Latin America;
11
child labour connected with
IKEA and NIKE;
12
the suspicions levied against sports goods manufacturerAdi-
das of having footballs produced in China by forced labour;
13
the use of highly
poisonous pesticides in banana plantations;
14
disappearances of unionised work-
5HazelTau and Others vGlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim, Complaint to the South African
Competition Commission, para 17, at http://www.tac.org.za/Documents/DrugCompaniesCC/
HazelTauAndOthersVGlaxoSmithKlineAndOthersStatementOfComplaint.doc (last visited 14
November2005).
6 South Africa CompetitionCommission, n 2 above; onthe case, see Law andTreatmentAccess Unit
of the AIDS Law Projectu ndTreatmentAction Campaign,The Price of Life:HazelTau and Othersv
GlaxoSmithKline and Boehringer Ingelheim: A Report on the Excessive Pricing Complaint to South
Africa’s Competition Commission (July 2003), at http://www.alp.org.za/view.php?¢le=/resctr/
pubs/20030813_PriceCover.xml (last visited 14 November 2005); J. P. Love, Expert Declaration
(Center for the Study of Responsive Law, 2003), at http://www.cptech.org/ip/health/cl/cl-cases/
rsa-tac/love02032003.doc(last visited14 November 2005).
7 Details in A. Fischer-Lescano and G.Teubner,‘Regime-Collisions:The VainSearch for Legal Unity
in the Fragmentation of Global Law’(2004) 25 Michigan LawJournalof InternationalLaw 999.
8 S. G.Wood and B. G. Schar¡s,‘Applicability of Human Rights Standards to Private Corporations:
An American Perspective’ (2002) 50 AmericanJournalof Comparative Law 531,539.
9 See, eg, K. Saro-Wiwa, Flammen der H˛lle. Nigeria und Shell: Der schmutzige Krieg gegen die Ogoni
(Hamburg: Reinbek,1996).
10 U. Hoering, ‘Bhopal und kein Ende oder: Der Second-Hand-Kapitalismus und die kologie’
(1985) 6 Peripherie 53.
11 A. Fung, D.O’Rourkeand C. Sabel, CanWePut an End to Sweatshops? (Ann Arbor: Beacon, 2004).
12 See, eg, K. Ashagrie, Statistics onWorkingChildren and Hazardous ChildLabour in Brief (Geneva: ILO,
1998) at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/simpoc/stats/child/stats.htm (last visited
14November 2005); S.Cleveland, ‘Global Labor Rights and theAl ienTort Claims Act’ (1998) 76
Texas Law Review 1533, 15 51.
13 D.Holtbrˇgge and N. Berg,‘Menschenrechte undVerhaltenskodizes in multinationalenUnterneh-
mungen’in P.Bendel and T.Fischer (eds), Menschen-und Bˇrgerrechte:Ideengeschichte undInternationale
Beziehungen (Erlangen: UniversityErlangen-Nˇrnberg, 2004) 179.
14 E. Yozell,‘The Castro Alfaro Case: Convenience and Justice: Lessons for Lawyers inTranscultural
Litigation’ in L. Compa and S. Diamond (eds), Human Rights, Labor Rights, and InternationalTrade
(Philadelphia: Universityof Pennsylvania,1996).
The Anonymous Matrix
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