The Antitrust Assessment of Loyalty Discounts and Rebates

DOI10.1093/joclec/nhn004
Date21 March 2008
Pages375-410
Year2008
Published ByOxford University Press
THE ANTITRUST ASSESSMENT OF LOYALTY
DISCOUNTS AND REBATES
Gianluca Faella
ABSTRACT
Loyalty discounts lie at the heart of the debate on single-firm conduct, prob-
ably the most controversial issue in contemporary antitrust practice. Under
particular conditions, loyalty discounts may have an exclusionary effect.
However, they constitute a classical form of price competition, an effective
commercial tool, and a way to solve coordination problems in the production
chain. In the United States, the fear of lessening price competition has led to a
very strong presumption of legality of discounts, provided that they are not
predatory or bundled. In the EU, the tendency to induce loyalty, if not a mere
intent to exclude rivals, is traditionally deemed to be enough to justify the pro-
hibition of the practice. In the paper, it is submitted that the opposite (almost)
per se rules prevailing on the two sides of the Atlantic should be set aside. A
detailed analysis, based on a suitable price– cost test and a careful assessment
of the impact of the practice on the competitive capacityof minor rivals and on
the overall degree of competition in the market concerned, would allow inter-
vention in cases of seriously exclusionary discount policies, while limiting the
unnecessary prohibition of effective forms of price competition.
JEL: K21; L1; L2; L11; L22
I. INTRODUCTION
Loyalty discounts and rebates (“loyalty discounts”) include several different
schemes of incentives granted by a supplier to customers, distributors, or
agents provided that their purchases or sales of the relevant products achieve
or exceed certain thresholds formulated in ter ms of a percentage of total
requirements (fidelity discounts and rebates),
1
or an individualized volume
target (target discounts and rebates).
2
Loyalty discounts lie at the heart of
Associate, Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP; Research Scholar, LE Lab—Law and
Economics Lab. E-mail: gfaella@luiss.it. A previous version of this paper was delivered at the
Third Annual Conference of the Italian Society of Law and Economics (ISLE), Luigi Bocconi
University, Milan, November 9– 10, 2007. The author wishes to thank Professor Roberto
Pardolesi for his helpful comments on previous versions of the paper. Part of the research was
done when the author was a ResearchScholar at the New York Law School, New York, NY.
1
Fidelity discounts may be conditioned on the achievement of certain thresholds, or granted in
exchange for an explicit exclusivityobligation, thus giving rise to a form of exclusive dealing.
2
As a general rule, the target is set on the basis of the client’s requirements, so as to
correspond to all or a large part of his demand. Accordingly, fidelity and target discounts and
Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 4(2), 375–410
doi:10.1093/joclec/nhn004
Advance Access publication 21 March 2008
#The Author (2008). Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved.
For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org
the debate on the treatment of single-firm conduct, probably the most
controversial issue in contemporary antitrust practice both in the EU and U.S.
antitrust systems. In the application of Article 82 EC, the Commission devel-
oped a sui generis policy.
3
The influence of the ordo-liberal school of Freiburg
led to much emphasis being placed on the necessity to protect the freedom of
action of minor competitors and customers from the economic power of
major firms. Some types of conduct have been considered exclusionary in
light of their tendency or abstract capability to prejudice rivals, without carry-
ing out a detailed analysis of their actual or potential impact on competition
and (total or) consumer welfare. The concept of special responsibility of
dominant undertakings developed by the European Court of Justice (ECJ)
translated into a case-by-case and form-based approach lacking an underlying
theoretical framework and solid economic roots.
In the last few years, it has begun to be widely understood that a vague
and ambiguous notion of abuse, without limiting principles based on a
coherent theoretical framework, is likely to result in many false positives and
seriously anticompetitive decisions. In December 2005, the Commission
issued a discussion paper on abuse of dominance (the “Discussion Paper”).
4
This document represents an ambitious and, in many respects, appreciable
attempt to clarify and rationalize the implementation of Article 82 EC.
However, the lack of a clear and widely accepted theoretical framework for
the assessment of unilateral conduct, together with the need to act within
the framework of ECJ’s past case law, seems to curb the transition towards a
more economic-based enforcement policy. Given their intrinsic ambivalent
nature, discount and rebate policies represent a kind of laboratory, where it
is possible to test both the economic soundness of the current Article 82
rebates tend to have similar effects, as recognized by the Commission’s decision practice: see
Commission decision of 20 March 2001, Case COMP/35.141, Deutsche Post AG, O.J. L 125/
27 (2001); and 14 July 1999, Case IV/D-2/34.780, Virgin/British Airways, O.J. L 30/1 (2000).
The choice between the two types of practices may depend on the stability and predictability
of demand. When demand fluctuates significantly over time, suppliers may prefer to make
reference to a certain percentage of the customers’ requirements, rather than predetermined
individual targets. Both the fidelity and target discount systems may provide for a single
threshold or a grid of ascending thresholds, corresponding to increasing discount rates.
3
On the EU experience, see, ex plurimis, Alison Jones & Brenda Sufrin, EC Competition Law:
Text, Cases & Materials (3rd edn, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); Valentine Korah,
An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice (9th edn, Oxford: Hart Publishing,
2007); and Aldo Frignani, “L’abuso di posizione dominante,” in Aldo Frignani & Roberto
Pardolesi (eds), La concorrenza, in Gianmaria Ajani & Gian Antonio Benacchio (eds), Trattato
di Diritto Privato e dell’Unione Europea (Torino: Giappichelli, 2006) 178.
4
See DG Competition discussion paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to
exclusionary abuses, Brussels, December 2005, available at http://ec.europa.eu/comm/
competition/antitrust/art82/index.html. Interestingly, the most significant changes to the
current approach would concern the treatment of discounts and rebates, where the state of
the law is commonly perceived as more unsatisfactory.
376 Journal of Competition Law & Economics
enforcement and the innovations that might be introduced to define a more
reliable and coherent abuse standard.
This paper is structured as follows: Section II addresses the economic
analysis of loyalty discounts, taking into account the potential exclusionary
effect, further anticompetitive effects, and possible business justifications;
Section III analyzes the traditional approach of the community institutions
and its main drawbacks and inconsistencies; Section IV sketches the main
innovations proposed by the Discussion Paper; Section V compares the
approach suggested by the Discussion Paper with the subsequent Tom r a
decision and British Airways judgment; Section VI provides more detailed
indications on the antitrust assessment of loyalty discounts; finally, Section
VII draws some general conclusions based on the analysis carried out in the
previous sections.
II. THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FIDELITY AND TARGET DISCOUNTS
AND REBATES
Loyalty discounts lie close to the thin line between anticompetitive conduct
and legitimate competition: on the one hand, the practice may have exclu-
sionary effects or otherwise injure consumers by softening interbrand
competition; on the other hand, loyalty discounts constitute an effective
competitive tool and may solve coordination problems in the production
chain, thus giving rise to efficiency gains.
A. The Exclusionar y Effect
Loyalty discounts represent a classical form of nonlinear pricing.
5
When
applied retroactively to the entire amount of purchases realized by a custo-
mer during a certain reference period (so-called all-units discounts), loyalty
discounts may determine a kind of lock-in effect, in that they generate
switching costs for buyers.
6
If customers decided to differentiate their supply
sources and failed to achieve the thresholds set by the dominant firm, they
would lose discounts or rebates calculated retroactively on the products that
they have already purchased during the reference period, as well as on
additional units that they would buy in any case from the supplier.
Loyalty discount schemes produce a so-called suction effect. When custo-
mers are close to the threshold, a small increase in purchases would trigger
5
Nonlinear pricing occurs when the price paid by a customer is not strictly proportional to the
quantity purchased. See Robert B. Wilson, Nonlinear Pricing (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1992).
6
Frank P. Maier-Rigaud, Switching Costs in Retroactive Rebates: What’s Time Got to Do with it”,
26 EUR.COMPETITION L. REV. 272 (2005). On switching costs, see Ciara McSorley, A. Jorge
Padilla & Mark Williams, Switching Costs, Department of Trade and Industry—Office of Fair
Trading, Discussion Paper No. 5, April 2003, available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/
advice_and_resources/publications/reports/Economic-research/oft655 (visited 30 January
2008).
Loyalty Discounts and Rebates 377

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