The Carriage Of Goods By Sea Act, 1924, And The Doctrine Of “Stages”

Published date01 March 1960
Date01 March 1960
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2230.1960.tb00590.x
198
THE MODERN
LAW
REVIEW
VOL.
2a
violating the express terms of their engagement, should receive
no
compensation
i’
C.
GRUNFELD.
THE
CARRIAGE
OF
GOODS
BY
SEA
ACT,
1924,
AND
THE
DOCTRINE
OF
“STAQES”
THE
decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
lllaxine Footwear
Co.,
Ltd.
v.
Canadian Government Merchant
Marine,
Ltd.,’
has once again brought into prominence the vexed
question of the effect
of
the Carriage
of
Goods by Sea Act,
1924,
on the common law doctrine of
stages
)’
laid down in relation to the
absolute warranty of seaworthiness in English law.
The Carnage
of
Goods
by Sea Act,
1924,
provides by axticle
111,
rule
1
of the Schedule, that:
‘‘
The carrier shall be bound before
and at the beginning of the voyage to exercise due diligence to
(a)
make the ship seaworthy.’’
The attitude of the authors
of
the standard textbooks
on
the
significance of the words “before and at the beginning of the
voyage” is a varied one. Some writers confine their attention to
the possible effect that they might have
on
the doctrine of stages
after
the vessel has sailed. Cole2 says that proceeding on the
second stage
of
a voyage with insufficient coal would be
a
default
of the carrier in the navigation
or
management of the ship, for
which, by article IV, rule
2
(a)
he was not responsible.
A
similar
view is reached by Scrutton.s However, Temperley and Vaughan
are radically opposed to this opinion, for they say that the courts
might give a wide interpretation to the word “voyage,” and
interpret
it
as meaning each stage of the voyage. Therefore ship
owners should exercise due diligence at the beginning of each stage
of
a voyage in stages to make the ship seaworthy. Maclachan5
thinks than such an interpretation would do violence to the clear
words
of
the Act.
But two of the books consider the situation before the vessel sails.
Maclachlan thinks that the word
‘‘
before
))
would
be
construed
as meaning
at the commencement of loading,” and the words
at
the beginning of the voyage
)’
as meaning
‘‘
when the vessel actually
sails.’’ Carver‘ is of the opinion that the authorities relating to
20
Cf.
Hood Phillips,
Constitutional Law
(2nd
ed.), p.
432.
The Crown
pleasure rule makes something
of
a
mockery
of
the Fair Wages Resolution
of
the House
of
Commons, in pursuit
of
which government departments insist
on
outside contractors being model employere, when the Crown itself appears
to fall somewhat short
of
that ideal.
1
[1959]
3
W.L.R.
232; [1959] 2
Ail
E.R.
740. The case
in
the courts below
is
reported at [1952] Ex.C.R. 569; [1956] Ex.C.R. ‘284; [1957] S.C.R. 801.
2
5.
D.
Cole,
Carriage
of
Goods by Sea Act,
1924,
p.
67.
3
Charterparties and Bills
of
Lading
(16th ed., 1955), p. 473. See ~180 Carver,
The Carriage
of
Goods by Sea
(10th ed., 1957),
p.
184.
4
Carriage
of
Goods by Sea Act,
1924
(4th ed., 1932),
p.
25.
5
Merchant Shipping
(7th ed., 1832), p. 371.
6
Ibid.
p. 370.
7
Op. cit.
p. 184.

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT