The case for relative plausibility theory: Promising, but insufficient

Published date01 April 2019
DOI10.1177/1365712718816749
Date01 April 2019
Subject MatterArticles
Article
The case for relative plausibility
theory: Promising, but insufficient
Reid Hastie
University of Chicago, Chicago, USA
Abstract
Allen and Pardo’s Relative Plausibility Model provides a mostly valid descriptive model for the
reasoning of fact-finders like American jurors. My major reservations on the project concern
the incompleteness of the authors’ review of empirical, behavioral research relevant to their
proposal. The merits of the project as a normative model are less satisfying and, again, the
review of relevant sources seems incomplete.
Keywords
explanations, evidence, legal decisions, American jury
To anticipate my ‘bottom line evaluation’, I think the Relative Plausibility Model (Allen and Pardo,
2019; see also Pardo and Allen, 2008) provides the most vali d, though sketchy, description of the
reasoning of common fact-finders like American jurors. And I think Relative Plausibility provides a
promising starting point for a normative theory of judicial proof. But, for the moment, I believe that the
Bayesian probability approach is the leading contender for the reigning normative model.
1
I believe the
probability approach should get credit for its vast budget of applications to realistically complex evi-
dence problems.
2
In comparison, the Relative Plausibility approach does not provide much detail on
inferences and calculations and it lacks exemplary realistic applications.
Four theories of judicial proof: Allen and Pardo’s Relative Plausibility
Theory, Schwartz and Sober’s Probability Model, Nance’s Multi-
threshold Probability Model and Clermont’s Multivalent-belief Model
Allen and Pardo state that their Relative Plausibility Model should be evaluated partly with reference to
its success at describing the manner in which individuals or institutions reason about proof in typical
Corresponding author:
Reid Hastie, University of Chicago, Chicago, IL 60007, USA.
E-mail: reid.hastie@chicagobooth.edu
1. Associated with many scholars from Kaplan (1968) through to Schwartz and Sober (2017).
2. For examples see Fenton et al. (2016); Kadane and Schum (1996).
The International Journalof
Evidence & Proof
2019, Vol. 23(1-2) 134–140
ªThe Author(s) 2019
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DOI: 10.1177/1365712718816749
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