The commons institution of Antarctica: a roadmap to governance of mankind resources
DOI | https://doi.org/10.1108/JPPEL-02-2021-0013 |
Published date | 15 July 2021 |
Date | 15 July 2021 |
Pages | 165-184 |
Subject Matter | Property management & built environment,Building & construction,Building & construction law,Real estate & property,Property law |
Author | Paschalis Arvanitidis,Aikaterini Almyriotou |
The commons institution of
Antarctica: a roadmap to
governance of mankind resources
Paschalis Arvanitidis and Aikaterini Almyriotou
Department of Economics, Laboratory of Economic Policy and Strategic Planning,
University of Thessaly, Volos, Greece
Abstract
Purpose –This paper aims to draw on Ostrom’s commons theory to analyse the governance regime of
Antarctic as a commons institution.Antarctic is a peculiar territorial space on Earth, which due to its unique
characteristics constitutes a global common resource that very much resembles outer space resources. On
these grounds, the paper highlightssuccessful, and less successful, arrangements developedin the Antarctic
commons to be considered as a blueprint or roadmaptowards the governance of outer space resources as a
commons.
Design/methodology/approach –The paper uses first, the social-ecological system (SES)
framework to outline the characteristics of Antarctic as a commons institution, and second, Ostrom’s
design principles to assessthe commons institution of Antarctic. The Antarctic commons institutionis
used next, as an analogy to reflect on the challenges outer space global resource face and the way it
could be managed.
Findings –The paper concludes that Antarctic enjoys a functional, credible and successful commons
institution that should reinforce the twofold governance structure it exhibits. Similar cases of global
common resources, such as these of outer space, that seek to establish a similar commons institution
should take into account issues related the benefits spectrum and the credible commitment of actors to
engage in different levels of the governance regime. What matters is not necessarily the form of the
regime but rather how the commons as an institution functions, whether it fulfils the needs and int erests
of the driving actors and, on these grounds, how credible these arrangements are i n the eyes of the
committed members.
Research limitations/implications –Both Antarctica and outer space are rather unique cases and
domainsof multiple resources.
Practical implications –The paper provides an analogyto consider sustainable appropriation of global
resources(“global commons”) for peace and prosperity to all.
Originality/value –The paper is original, in the sense that according to the best of the authors’
knowledge, no published work has identified Antarctic as a commons institution or has used the
aforementionedmethodologies to analyse Antarctica as a commons and to employ theirfindings in providing
directions for the design of appropriate governance frameworks for other resources that exhibit the
characteristicsof global commons, such as these of the outer space.
Keywords Institution, Design principles, Outer space, Antarctic, Global commons, SES framework,
Mankind resources
Paper type Research paper
The paper has benefited from the discussions took place during the RMIT Conference on “Property
rights and real estate interests in outer space”conducted in May 2020. Authors are gratefully
acknowledge the organisers and all the participants to the conference. Authors would like also to
thank the editors and the reviewers for their insightful comments and helpful suggestions to improve
the manuscript. The usual disclaimers apply.
Governance of
mankind
resources
165
Received23 February 2021
Revised16 April 2021
Accepted23 April 2021
Journalof Property, Planning and
EnvironmentalLaw
Vol.13 No. 2, 2021
pp. 165-184
© Emerald Publishing Limited
2514-9407
DOI 10.1108/JPPEL-02-2021-0013
The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available on Emerald Insight at:
https://www.emerald.com/insight/2514-9407.htm
1. Introduction
The “governance of the commons”has gained interest in recent years aiming to articulate
successful approachesfor the sustainable appropriation of internationallyor globally shared
resources (inter alia: McGinnis and Ostrom, 1996;Buck, 1998; Ostrom, 2002/2003;Stern,
2011;Smith, 2017). This development has been associated with the increasing concern
regarding the (over-)exploitation of natural resources and the consequences this has for the
environment and for human life (Harrisonand Sundstrom, 2010;Pillai and Dore, 2020). The
proliferating interest in the decoding of “the commons”signals an extremely rich literature,
where the commons, seen throughdifferent approaches, refers to a governance regime set by
a community of stakeholdersto self-manage their common resources. It should be noted that
this idea of a commons from an economics perspective should not be confused and mixed
with the international law concept of “global commons”, which is simply a typology for
resources that arenot subject to the sovereign control of any state (Ranganathan, 2016).
The current paper draws on Ostrom’s work to discuss the governance such regime of a
unique territorial space on Earth, Antarctica, which due to its peculiar characteristics
constitutes a globally shared(or, simply, common) resource [1] and a commons (Buck, 1998;
Collis, 2017). In particular, the paper assesses the commons institution of Antarctic, aiming
to highlight successful, and less successful, arrangements developed in the collective
governance of the Antarctic resource(s) to be considered as a roadmap towards the
governance of similar kinds of globally shared resources, such as those of the outer space
(Peterson, 1997;Buck, 1998;Dodds et al., 2017;Vollmer, 2020). This seems important
especially due to the fact that the legal frameworkfor outer space has set the basic principles
and values regulating such activities, but it lacks the required clarity (Blount, 2017;
Shackelford, 2014) and the effective cooperation provisions (Kerrest, 2011;Porras, 2006),
whereas recent developments(including a 2020 US executive order on space resources)have
challenged the long-held view of outer space as a globally shared resource [2](Wall, 2020;
Williams, 2020). We believe that Antarctica constitutes a similar frontier and useful
conclusions can be drawn to guide sustainable and peaceful use and exploration of outer
space resources.
The argument starts with the acknowledgement that Antarctica is a unique territory,
since, there is no universally recognized territorial sovereignty over it (Herber, 1991) and
from a legal point of view, it does not belong, or is ruled, exclusively by anyone. The
governance regime, developed over the years, reflects the principles of a commons, which
have enabled to guarantee its stability and the successful management of Antarctic
resources, along withthe various demands of the participating states and other international
players. The legal imprint of the above is the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS),a base legal-
political framework which specifies property rights and regulates relations between
interested parties. Through its analysis the paper builds the argument that Antarctica is a
unique kind of a global commons that resources are governed quite successfully by a well-
defined community of key stakeholders. The experience it brings can help the consider
plausible governanceoptions for other resource domains that exhibit similar characteristics,
i.e. domains to which all nationshave legal access, such as outer space (Buck, 1998;Kerrest,
2011;Triggs, 2011;Shackelford,2020).
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses why common pool resources are
led to destruction and the governancesolutions that have been offered, to focus on Ostrom’s
approach and the methodology she provided to analyse and assess commons as an
institution. Section 3 outlines brieflythe characteristics of Antarctica and the arrangements
that have been made over the years for itsmanagement as a global resource. Section 4 uses
the two methodological tools developed by Ostrom, the Social-Ecological System (SES)
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